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ABSTRACT 
Bangladesh came into being as an independent sovereign state on 
December 16, 1971. The Government of Bangladesh immediately after 
liberation decided to nationalize the key industries and created a vast public 
enterpirse sector in the country. After the change in the government in 
August 1975, the government has started to shift the Industrial Policy in 
favour of private sector. The Government of Bangladesh has declared some 
private-biased Industrial Policies in different time periods and private as 
well as foreign investments have being encouraged through increasing some 
incentives including remittances. 
Though the rapid industrialization has been accepted as a vital in-
strument and major strategy for the economic development of Bangladesh, 
but unfortunately a large number of industrial units have become sick. The 
number of sick units is increasing year after year and creating serious 
bottleneck for the economic growth. 
Most of the state-owned manufacturing enterprises (SOMEs) under 
different public sector industrial corporations failed to achieve their socio-
economic objectives and thus incurred huge losses exerting heavy pressure 
on the national exchequer. The number of sick industries particularly public 
sector sick mills and volume of their losses are increasing in an alarming 
proportion. As a result, the amount of investments and the number of loan 
defaulters are constantly increasing. The Government of Bangladesh and 
DFIs have taken a few steps to identify and rehabilitate the sick industrial 
units but no substantial progress has yet been achieved. 
It may be noted that Bangladesh is passing through a menacing stage 
of industrial sickness which stands as a stumbling block for the growth & 
development of the country and as a burning issue this needs deep and wide 
study to check and remove such malady. 
The present study, "Causes and Remedies of Industrial Sickness in 
Bangladesh", has been undertaken to suggest, in general, some possible 
measures to face the problems industrial units are facing in Bangladesh and 
to make an in-depth analysis of the causes of sickness and suggest remedial 
measures for improving the performance of the public sector cotton textile 
mills, in particular, which are operating under Bangladesh Textile Mills 
Corporation (BTMC) — the second largest public sector industrial corpo-
ration in Bangladesh as regards capital machineries, number of mills and 
employment etc. 
BTMC was brought into existence on March 26, 1972 with the pro-
mulgation of Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalization) Order, 
1972. According to the second schedule of the Nationalization Order, 64 
textile units and subsequently 10 more mills were brought under the ad-
ministrative control of BTMC. Out of seventy four, eight had no tangible 
assets. In 1977, the BTMC was placed under newly created Ministry of 
Textiles. Since nationalization, majority of the BTMC mills are being run 
into losses. 97 per cent of the total running mills have incurred a huge 
loss in the last financial year (1996-97) aggregating Tk. 163.55 crores as 
against Tk. 144.59 crores in 1992-93 by 93 per cent of the total mills under 
BTMC. Capacity utilization and production cost of the BTMC mills are 
increasing, sales volume is decreasing resulting in increasing huge operating 
losses. These mills are also facing some problems like decrease of demand, 
machinery obsolescence, heavy interest & debt burden, surplus manpower 
etc. Net worth of most of the mills has been completely eroded. Since last 
decade, the operating losses incurred by these mills have showing an in-
creasing trend and become a.burden on the national exchequer. In spite of 
negative liquidity & profitability, position and adverse debt-equity ratio, 
these mills are being run only in the greater social interest. 
For incurring continuous losses and also for achieving the goal of 
the private-sector biased industrial policy, the Government of Bangladesh 
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has started denationalization of public textile mills since 1977, but vigor-
ously since 1982. In different phases, some loss-making BTMC mills have 
been liquidated and some have been transfered to their former Bangladeshi 
owners. 
Some professionals and researchers have written several articles on 
different aspects of industrial sickness and some specific problem areas of 
textile industries but no in-depth study has done on this vital issue of 
industrial sickness and the causes thereof, in a systematic and integrated 
manner, giving emphasis on public sector textile industries. This encouraged 
the researcher to undertake the present study. 
In course of the study, four specific hypotheses have been tested with 
the help of collected data. The major hypotheses of this study are: Most 
of the public textile mills operating under BTMC are sick; Probable prof-
itable & nearest to the break-even mills (Group-A) have better operational 
efficiency and financial performance than that of losing mills (Group-B) 
etc. The study basically has covered a period of five years ranging from 
1992-93 to 1996-97. Ten BTMC running mills have been selected as sample 
to achieve the specific objectives of the study. 
Annual reports, annual MIS reports and provisional reports of BTMC 
have mostly been used as the secondary sources of data. Primary data, 
collected from the executives of the selected mills through a questionnaire, 
have also been used in the study. The total study has been divided into seven 
chapters. 
For the purpose of data analysis, major statistical techniques such 
as percentage, ratio analysis, mean, standard deviation, t-test etc. have been 
used. Three established multivariate models (Altman's Z-score, Satyanarayana's 
Z* value and Yadav's Y-score) have also been applied to measure the degree 
of sickness of the sample mills. 
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The major findings of the present study are stated as follows : 
• During the study period, all the sample mills have been recorded an 
abnormal deterioration in capacity utilization. Average installed capac-
ity utilization of the sample mills has come down to 20 per cent in 1996-
97 from 76 per cent in 1992-93. 
• Most of the textile mills are tied up with outdated technologies & 
obsolete machineries. 25 per cent of installed spindles & 100 per cent 
of installed looms of the selected mills are 35 to 43 years old. 45 per 
cent of installed spindles are 15 to 20 years old. The machineries of 
BTMC mills are found to be far away from modern technology. 
• Time taken for project implementation of the sample mills was more than 
reasonable. It is found that in large number of cases (75 per cent) the 
time gaps between establishment and commencement of commercial 
production were too much wider (more than two years), mostly due to 
the financial difficulty and delay in decision for bureaucratic adminis-
tration. 
• BTMC mills have surplus manpower and the expenditure for the surplus 
personnel are affecting the working capital position of the mills. 
• The selected mills and for that matter BTMC had to depend on heavy 
bank loan & govt, grant in different forms to meet the deficit of required 
working capital. 
• During the study period, it has been observed that the net worth has been 
completely eroded in nine selected mills. Only Sunderban Textile Mills (Bj) 
had positive net worth. 
• During the study period of five years from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the 
performance of the mills has deteriorated to a hopeless position. The last 
year i.e. 1996-97 was far worse off than before for the sample mills in 
the sense that, idle capacity, cost of goods sold to sales and net losses 
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have been increased during 1996-97 compared to that of previous years. 
• The authority of the public textile enterprises is very much centralized 
in BTMC head office & Ministry of Textiles. Decision making process 
is mostly bureaucratic. Not only this, the hierarchy and structure is highly 
complicated. The powers and responsibilities of different tiers (Ministry, 
Corporation & Enterprise level) have not been clearly demarcated. 
• BTMC mills are mostly (approximately 90 per cent) depend on imported 
raw cotton. Individual mills have no authority to import or purchase raw 
cotton from domestic sources. The procurement process is highly com-
plicated. 
• The demand of BTMC cloths has been deteriorated due to poor quality; 
lack of attractiveness of print, design, smooth finishing & fastness of 
colour; poor attention to consumers preferences etc. Besides, BTMC 
cloths are facing stiff competition from smuggled & imported second 
hand cloths because of their low prices. 
• The demand of yarns, produced by the BTMC mills, has come down 
considerably due to some reasons viz. low quality, availability of smug-
gled yarn, high price (in comparison to imported / smuggled yarn), 
inappropriate distribution policy etc. 
• During the study period, in every year a lion share of cash generated from 
operation of the selected mills is eaten-up through payment of huge bank 
interest as well as for liquidating loan. 
• All the sample mills during the period of study, holding much higher 
finished products, suffering from shortage of cash, paying a large amount 
as interest. The inefficiency handling of the different components of 
working capital has resulted in huge losses and also affected the liquidity 
position of the mills. 
• It is viewed and also observed that the mill executives and top manage-
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ment of BTMC are always engaged in responding to the inquiries raised 
by ministers, bureaucrats, politicians, parliamentarians and the like. They 
are transferred/fired without any notice mainly due to personal or political 
reasons instead of evaluation of their performance. Frequent changes of 
the BTMC chairman and mill executives are the root of sickness and 
instability in policies. 
• Out of ten selected mills, nine have been identified as sick and only 
Sunderban Textile Mills (Bj) was non-sick but this mill has showed 
approaching sickness when Altman's & Satyanarayana's MDA models are 
applied. As per Yadav's MDA model, all the selected mills have been 
identified as sick. 
• The main controllable i.e. internal problems faced by the BTMC mills 
are adverse debt-equity ratio, frequent breakdown of machineries due to 
obsolescence, under utilization of capacity, low quality of products, 
surplus manpower, high cost of production, lack of BMRE, corruption 
& bribery at all levels etc. 
• In course of the study, it is found that shortage of working capital is 
the single most important factor which leads to sickness. Some significant 
external factors for incurring a huge operating losses are : smuggling/ 
unauthorized entry of yarn & cloths, heavy financial burden due to total 
debt & interest liability, frequent power failure & load shedding, changes 
in demand, inappropriate activities of trade union leaders, high price of 
raw cotton, high rate of bank loan interest & electricity charges etc. 
In view of the above findings and conclusions of the study, some recom-
mendations are made to cure the sick public sector textile mills and for achieving 
rapid growth of textile industry in Bangladesh. Some policy measures are also 
recommended to solve the serious problem of industrial sickness in Bangladesh. 
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PREFACE 
In 1971, the Liberation War had disrupted influence on the working of the 
economy and administration of Bangladesh and arose a big vacuum in most of the 
sectors of economy by withdrawal of non-local entrepreneurs who were the owners 
of these enterprises. The Government of Bangladesh immediately after liberation 
decided to nationalize the key industries & financial institutions and created a vast 
public enterprise sector in the country. 
Rapid industrialization has been accepted as a vital instrument and major 
strategy for the economic development of Bangladesh, but unfortunately a large 
number of industrial units in Bangladesh became sick. The number of sick units 
are increasing year after year and creating serious bottleneck for the economic 
growth of the country. Most of the state-owned manufacturing enterprises (SOMEs) 
under different public sector industrial corporations failed to achieve their socio-
economic objectives and thus incurred huge losses exerting heavy pressure on the 
national exchequer. The number of public sector sick industries and volume of their 
losses are increasing in an alarming proportion. These mills are continuing their 
operations, in spite of huge accumulated losses, mainly because of financial as-
sistance being received by them from the government controlled financial insti-
tutions like BSB & BSRS, commercial banks and government itself. The loss-
making SOMEs have become an unbearable burden for the government. 
Not only the SOMEs, but also a large number of industrial units under private 
sector have become sick and closed their operations. As a result, the amount of 
investments and the number of loan defaulters are constantly increasing. To solve 
the grave problem of industrial sickness, the Government of Bangladesh and DFIs 
have taken few steps to identify and rehabilitate the sick industrial units, but no 
substantial progress has yet been achieved. It may be noted that Bangladesh is 
passing through a menacing stage of industrial sickness which stands as a stumbling 
block for the growth and development of the country. At present, industrial sickness 
is a burning issue and needs deep and wide study to check and remove this malady. 
The present study is undertaken to suggest, in general, some possible 
measures to face the problems industrial units are facing in Bangladesh and to make 
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an in-depth analysis of the causes of sickness and suggest remedial measures for 
improving the performance of the public sector cotton textile mills of Bangladesh 
in particular, with the help of the analysis of collected data. The study is based 
on the secondary as well as primary data sources. 
The selection as a sample of public textile mills operating under Bangladesh 
Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) is guided by several reasons viz. it is one of 
the earliest established & organized industries, BTMC is incurring highest losses 
since 1993-94 compared to other public sector industrial corporations, these mills 
are spread over the country more widely than several other traditional industries, 
BTMC is the second largest public sector corporation (on the basis of investment, 
capital machineries, the number of the mills and employment), these mills are 
producing one of the most important day-to-day consumer items essential for the 
people etc. 
The study has been divided into seven chapters. In the first chapter, the 
development of industrial enterprises in Bangladesh, industrial policies regarding 
industrialization & sick industries, significance of the study and the details of 
chapter scheme have been presented. In the second chapter, different aspects of 
industrial sickness have been discussed for conceptual framework. In the third 
chapter, a review of existing literature in the field of industrial sickness particularly 
the sickness in textile sector has been done. In the fourth chapter, the objectives, 
hypotheses, scope and methodology have been specified. In the fifth chapter, an 
overview of BTMC has been made. Analysis of operational efficiencies and financial 
performances of the selected mills through some basic statistical techniques with 
the help of primary and secondary data, opinions of the respondents on different 
aspects of sickness, testing of the hypotheses etc. have been discussed in the sixth 
chapter. In the seventh & final chapter, major finding of the study, conclusions 
and recommendations have been given. In this chapter, some potential areas for 
further research have also been provided. 
Hopefully, the study will serve the specific objectives as well as the general 
objective and would also be of immense interest and benefit to all those engaged 
in industrial enterprises, particularly in public sector cotton textile industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bangladesh is a low-lying country with a total area of 55,598 square miles 
or 1,43,998 square kilometers mostly surrounded by Indian territory except for 
a small strip in the south-east by Myanmar. Bay of Bengal lies on the south. Total 
population of Bangladesh is about 125 million. Majority (87 per cent) of the 
population are Muslims. Hindus, Budhists and Christians make-up 13 per cent. 
Over 98 per cent of the people speak Bengali, English, however is widely used. 
The total number of districts stands at 64. The entire country is broadly divided 
into six administrative divisions namely Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi, 
Barisal and Sylhet. The economy of Bangladesh, though agrarian in nature, is 
poised for industrial development like many other developing countries. 
1.1 The Evolution and Development of Industrial Enterprises in 
Bangladesh 
The manufacturing sector, both large and small scale, is a relatively minor 
sector of the Bangladesh economy. It accounts for 10-12 percent of the GDP 
and absorbs only about 6 per cent of the total labour force. In the following, 
a brief attempt has made to present the history of industrial development in 
Bangladesh under different time periods. 
1.1.1 Industrial Development in Bangladesh before Independence 
In 1947, the area which is now Bangladesh (then East Pakistan, one of 
Pakistan's two wings) was a raw-product producing region with little modern 
industry. There were only a handful of large-scale industrial units-a few cotton 
textile mills with 99,000 spindles and 2583 looms; a few sugar mills with a total 
capacity of 39,000 tons; one cement factory with a capacity of 1,00,000 tons; 
and a number of jute baling presses [Ahmed; 1976]. In 1949-50, contribution 
of the manufacturing sector to the GDP was only about 3 per cent-large scale 
enterprises contributing just over half a per cent [Alamgir & Berlage; 1974]. 
The Government of Pakistan announced the first Industrial Policy in 1948. 
The common theme of that policy was: (a) industrialization through private 
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enterprises; (b) bureaucratic control for decision making influencing the allocation of 
resources; (c) import substitution approach to industrialization; and (d) tolerating 
but not encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI). It is apparent that the 
industrial base of the country was not only small but also critically lacking because 
no facilities existed within the country to process its raw materials like jute, 
tobacco, hides and skins, oil seeds and forest resources. 
Actually, East Pakistan lacked potential investors either of industrial 
or of trading background as the Hindus who controlled these activities in the 
province left the country on independence. As a result, East Pakistan faced more 
formidable problems than West Pakistan in securing the establishment of factories. 
However, one of the immigrant industrial families, the Adamjee, which was 
eventually convinced that attractive profit opportunities existed in jute manufac-
turing in East Pakistan. By 1949 the government had approved a scheme prepared 
by the Adamjee for setting up three jute manufacturing units of 1000 looms each. 
Thus, the industrial development in East Pakistan started with jute manufacturing. 
It should also be noted here that the jute manufacturing industry was started in 
East Pakistan through a combination of government patronage and private ini-
tiative, a phenomenon which continued to play a crucial role in the establishment 
of industrial units in the country over the next two decades [Ahmed; 1978]. 
In 1952, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was 
established (which was bifurcated and became the East Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation - 'EPIDC in July 1962) to undertake promotional activities, extend 
equity and managerial support to new private industrial enterprises and to sponsor 
industrial enterprises in collaboration with the private sector. In East Pakistan 
(now Bangldesh), the progress as industrialists and the initiatives of the people 
of West Pakistan were largely facilitated by government policies of providing 
extremely generous assistance and support. By the early 1960's, however, some 
Bengalees came forward to setup industrial enterprises with small accumulated 
capital, entrepreneurial aptitude and limited managerial abilities. EPIDC vigor-
ously helped them to grow by its all out support. The government also granted 
some concessions to the industries. 
The predominance of industrial investment in Bangladesh by (West) Pakistanies 
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had given rise to strong resentment among Bengalees and its continuation was 
no longer politically acceptable by mid-1960s. Actually Bengalee entrepreneurship 
began to develop from about mid 1960s and a significant progress was achieved 
in this regard by the time of Liberation. In large scale production, Bengalee 
entrepreneurs remained mainly confined to jute manufacturing and cotton textiles. 
At the time of Liberation, Bengalees owned about 34 per cent and 53 per cent 
of fixed assets in jute and cotton textile industries respectively. Outside these 
two industries, there were only six Bengalee owned enterprises with assets above 
Tk. 2.5 million. The newly developing Bengalee entrepreneurs were more interested 
in small and medium industries [Ahmed; 1978]. 
From being negligible in 1947, the industrial base of East Pakistan reached 
a substantial level by the end of the 1960's. At constant 1959-60 prices, the 
manufacturing sector contributed Rs. 1972 million (7.8 per cent) to the GDP 
in 1969-70, compared to Rs. 339 million (3.0 per cent) in 1949-50. The 
contribution of the large-scale industries was Rs. 783 million (3.7 per cent) and 
that of small manufacturing was Rs. 889 million (4.1 per cent), the corresponding 
figures for 1949-50 having been Rs. 69 million (0.6 per cent) and Rs. 270 million 
(2.4 per cent) [Alamgir & Berlage; 1974]. 
Before Liberation War (in 1971) some simple-process industries like jute, 
textile and sugar mills, two pulp and paper mills, a small urea fertilizer plant, 
a cement factory, a 'mini' steel making plant with imbalanced downstream rolling 
facilities for making mild steel bars, sheets and plates, a few pharmaceutical units 
with capacities for formulation, bottling and packaging and several minor dock-
yards and light engineering workshops comprised the industrial base of Bangladesh 
[MOF; 1997]. 
1.1.2 Industrial Development in Independent Bangladesh 
Bangladesh came into being an independent sovereign state on December 
16, 1971. The Liberation War had disrupted influence on the working of the 
economy and administration. There arose a big vacuum in most of the sectors 
of economy and it became acute in manufacturing, trading and financial institutions 
in particular. The vaccum was created by the withdrawal of non-local entrepreneurs 
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who were the owners of these enterprises. The Government of Bangladesh 
immediately after liberation decided to nationalize the key industries eg. jute, 
textile, sugar etc. as well as insurance & banking and tookover the abandoned units 
in all other sectors, and thus created a vast public enterprise sector in the country. 
Most of the industrial units restarted operation within a minimum possible 
time but there were various problems affecting the recovery of their output. Most 
of these problems were: shortage of skilled managers & workers, labour unrest 
and indiscipline, shortage of power, spare parts, working capital etc., and 
disrupted transportation facilities. 
In the span of 27 years since the independence of Bangladesh, fundamental 
state policies relating to economic management have undergone three entirely 
different models. Staring off with a loose type of mixed economy with a pre-
ponderance of private ownership, the country without any preparation and without 
creating any political and social institutions and infrastructure haddecided to adopt 
socialism as a state policy. But the type of socialism inducted into the economy 
was not the traditional type. Whilst private ownership of property was allowed 
in every other sectors, it was severely restricted in industries, banking, insurance 
and some trade and transport sectors. The next phase was the return to mixed 
economy with an emphasis to develop a vigorous and buoyant private sector 
capable enough to undertake increasing responsibility of economic development, 
whilst the government still retained the basic and the large segment of the industrial 
sector. Whilst this phenomenon was showing signs of some welcome growth rates 
with a hope for better economic climate in future, time came for yet another radical 
change. This time the change was for a so-called return to a total market economy 
with unfettered freedom to private sector. This is the phenomenon in which the 
country is now passing through [Ahmed, J. 1992]. 
The First Five Year Plan (1973-78) of the country adopted an import 
substitution strategy for industrialization with emphasis on domestic production 
of basic needs investment goods. An investment ceiling was allowed within Tk. 
2.5 million to Tk. 3.5 million for the new private industrial investment. All new 
foreign investments was permitted only in collaboration with the government 
whose share in the equity would be at least 51 per cent. A number of incentives 
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including remittances in different form were allowed to the foreign investors. 
Though the First Industrial Investment Policy (announced in January 1973) was 
assigned a major role to the public sector and hence restricted the role of the 
private sector in the industrial development of the country but just after one and 
half year, the government policy shifted in favour of the private sector through 
declaring the New Industrial Policy in July 1974. Through this policy, earlier 
investment ceiling of Tk. 2.5 million was raised to Tk. 30 million, tax holiday 
for less developed areas was extended from 5 to 7 years and foreign investors 
were allowed to collaborate with government and local private entrepreneurs 
except in some basic industries. However, with the change in the government 
in August 1975, the government declared the Revised Investment Policy in 
December 1975 and encouraged private investments through increasing some 
incentives including remittances. 
During the period 1978-95, a Two Year Plan (1978-80) and three Five 
Year Plans viz. Second Five Year Plan (1980-85), Third Five Year Plan(1985-
90) and Fourth Five Year Plan (1990-95) were launched and implemented. During 
this period, a major portion of public investments was devoted to new capacity 
creation in chemical fertilizers and in the establishment of several basic engineering 
industries, while both the public and private sectors invested in textiles and 
clothing. Some investments were also made in balancing, modernization and 
expansion of some of the existing Jute and textile mills. Besides, a significant 
promotional investments were made by the government by way of setting up a 
large number of industrial estate for small and medium sized industrial units as 
well as two export processing zones (EPZs) to provide infrastructural facilities, 
utilities and other services for the entrepreneurs - both foreign and local. However, 
with the exception of export oriented ready-made garments industries (RMGs), which 
achieved a commendable growth over a relatively short span of time, country's 
industrialization efforts in other areas, particularly in producing consumer goods, 
RMG-linkage inputs and high value added consumer durables & producer goods, 
did not bear much fruit [MOF; 1997:2]. 
Over the period from 1990-91 to 1995-96, the manufacturing sector grew 
at an average annual rate of 6.3 per cent. The growth rates during 1995-96 and 
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1996-97 were 5.3 per cent and 3.3 per cent respectively. Among the industrial 
sub-sectors, ready-made garments (RMG) and pharmaceuticals recorded the 
highest growth performance (greater than 10 per cent), while jute and cotton 
textiles registered decline in growth [MOF; 1997:3]. Total investment in the 
private sector increased rapidly, on the contrary it decreased in the public sector 
in the same rate. Details of year-wise total investment in the manufacturing sector 
for the period of Fourth Five Year Plan and in 1995-96 and 1996-97 are given 
below. 
Table 1.1 : Investment in the Manufacturing Sector 
(In million Taka) 
Year 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 Total 
Total Investment 
Public Sector 
Investment 
Private Sector 
Investment 
Private Direct 
Investment 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Investment in 
the EPZs 
Percentage Share 
Public Sector 
Private Sector 
Domestic Private 
Sector 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
Investment in 
the EPZs 
22501 19468 23470 27513 36237 47291 57814 
833 3338 1240 2273 2227 1718 1082 
14170 16130 22230 25240 34010 45573 56732 
10683 14428 19840 21428 12333 18980 26971 
2550 696 1453 2222 20150 25293 26839 
937 1006 937 1590 1527 1300 2922 
37.03 17.15 5.28 8.26 6.15 3.63 1.87 
62.97 82.85 94.72 91.74 93.85 96.37 98.13 
47.48 74.11 84.53 77.88 34.03 40.14 46.65 
11.33 3.58 6.19 8.08 55.61 53.48 46.42 
4.16 5.16 3.99 5.78 4.21 2.75 5.06 
234294 
20209 
214085 
124663 
79203 
10219 
8.63 
91.37 
53.21 
33.80 
4.36 
Source : Bangladesh Economic Review 1997. Ministry of Finance, GOB, p. XIV-4. 
The total investment during the period 1990/91 - 1994/95 stood at Tk. 
129,189 million, at current prices, in which the share of the private sector was 
86.5 per cent, including foreign direct investment (FDI) of 21 percent. Investment 
in the years 1995.96 and 1996/97 stood at Tk. 47,291 million and Tk. 57,814 
million, in which the share of the private sectors was 96 per cent and 98 per 
cent, respectively. Major portion of the investment went into fertilizer and pharmaceuticals 
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as well as export production. Ready made gaments and knitwears jointly ac-
counted for over 70 per cent of the total investment in the manufacturing sector 
[MOF; 1997]. 
At present, there are three main financial institution involved in lending 
term loans to industrial enterprises in Bangladesh. The BSB and BSRS provides 
long term loans to private and public sector projects both in local and foreign 
currency. The ICB (since 1976) and Nationalized & Private commercial banks 
also provides bridge finance and occasional term loans. Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
(BKB) also has programmes to finance industrial projects. Bangladesh Small and 
Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC) also provides consultation and financial 
helps to small as well as cottage industries. 
In pursuance of the goals as spelt out in the Constitution of the country 
regarding industrial development, the present government has clearly enunciated 
its industrialization objectives and strategies. These are: industrial development 
with emphasis on optimum utilization of indigenous endowments, promotion of 
employment and catalysing the growth of production and exports. In this context, 
the specific objective of the industries sector is expected, during the Fifth Five 
Year Plan (1995-2000), to bring about a structural change in the economy to 
make it conductive to accelerated growth of overall GDP and face boldly the 
challenge of a free market economy in the twenty first century. 
1.1.3 Industrial Policies in Bangladesh : An Overview 
Industrial policy largely determines the process of industrialization in a 
country. The policy interventions of a government which can influence the pace, 
structure and efficiency of industrialization process. 
Two key issues have dominated industrial policies formulated by the 
Government of Bangladesh (GOB). These relate to the question of ownership 
of industry and the mechanisms for stimulating private investment. The question 
of ownership was addressed in the very first paper on industrial policy presented 
to the cabinet by the Bangladesh Planning Commission in December 1972. The 
paper addressed the issue of the private public sector mix in industrial ownership 
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and the role of foreign investment. Subsequent policy interventions in June 1974 
and again early in 1975 sought to modify provisions of the 1972 policy [Sobhan; 
1991]. These included virtual elimination of the investment ceiling, extended tax 
holidays, concessional rate of import duty on machinery, curtailing the reserved 
list of industries for public sector investments, introduction of a free list of 
industries for which no prior approval is required, enactment of a law for 
promotion and protection of foreign private investment, activation of the National 
Stock Exchange and revival of the Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) 
for underwriting public issues of shares and for providing bridge finance to private 
industrial units, etc. Perhaps, the most statutory effect had been the government 
decision for progressive disinvestment of the industrial units which, following 
Independence, had to be taken over by the government for management. During 
the period 1973-80, a total of 199 industrial units were disinvested by the 
government a total sales price of Tk. 115.8 million [MOF; 1997]. 
The most remarkable policy reform in the industry sector was brought in 
1982 when the government announced a New Industrial Policy (NIP-82). That 
policy was revised in 1986 (RIP-86) providing further relaxation and changes 
in which all industries, except seven strategic industries, were open for private 
investment. No approval for investment was then required if the investors im-
ported machinery and equipment using their own resources and/or through Secondary 
Exchange Market (SEM) and if, imported raw-materials constituted less than 50 
per cent of total requirement. The public sector enterprises were given operational 
autonomy in pricing, procurement etc. Under the RIP-86 a large number of fiscal 
and other incentives were also introduced/expanded in order to promote rapid 
industrial development of the country. A number of import bans and quota 
restrictions were relaxed to promote industrial efficiency. During the Third Five 
Year Plan there was considerable investment in power looms and ready-made 
garments industry. The export of ready-made garments increased substantially 
during that period. 
The Industrial Policy 1991 was formulated in the light of promoting a 
competitive market economy and which was further revised in 1992 lays out basic 
strategies required for industrial development of the country. All industries have 
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now been opened for private investment, both local and foreign, except the 
following five sectors which earmarked for only public sector investment. 
(a) Arms, ammunitions and other defence equipments and machineries; 
(b) Production of nuclear energy; 
(c) Security printing (currency notes) and minting; 
(d) Forest Plantation and mechanized extraction within the bounds of reserved 
forests; and 
(e) Air transportation and railways. 
Under the policy, the government has been pursuing privatization of selected 
public sector enterprises. A large number of public sector units have already been 
privatized or downsized/closed down and others are in the pipeline for privatization. 
It may be mentioned here that a high powered committee, formed by the 
government, recently has submitted their report for preparing a new industrial 
policy and in the next session of the parliament, it is going to be discussed for 
final approval. Under this new policy, facilities and incentives currently offered 
will be reviewed and enhanced further so as to make industrial investments more 
attractive as well as conform to the changing needs of the 21st century. 
1.2 Government Policy Regarding Sick Industries 
The Government of Bangladesh has accorded enormous importance to the 
expansion of medium and large scale industries through Development Financing 
Institutions (DFIs) like Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB), Bangladesh Shilpa Rin 
Sangstha (BSRS), Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) and small scale 
industries through Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation(BSCIC) 
since the birth of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, a large number of industrial units 
in Bangladesh have become sick. The number of sick units is increasing day by 
day. Weighing the serious repercussions ofthe industrial sickness on the economy 
as a whole, the Government of Bangladesh, much concerned with this problem, 
has issued several policy guidelines from time to time for tackling this problem. 
Some institutional support and facilities have provided to accelerate the 
process of industrialization and to guide it in a proper direction through the 
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announcement of Industrial Policy 1991. There was a clause [MOI; 1991] about 
rehabilitation of sick industries, "The sick industries will be rehabilitated through 
BMRE, rescheduling of old loans to applicable cases, and providing new loan 
on easy terms. The Ministry of Industries will formulate guidelines for identifying 
sick industries and take other necessary measures in this regard." 
According to the above clause and fulfil the objectives, Ministry of In-
dustries issued a notice and a cell was formed namely "Sick Industries Reha-
bilitation and Revitalizing Cell" on 15th June 1991. The terms of reference for 
that cell were : 
(a) to define a sick industry; 
(b) to identify sick industries in the light of aforesaid definition and on the 
basis of a survey and ascertain the reasons for sickness; 
(c) to submit report to the Ministry of Industries with specific recommenda-
tions for arriving at the appropriate solutions in each case. 
A sick project was defined by the cell, as follows: 
"Sick Projects will be those which could not commence commercial 
operations during the last three years or failed to achieve a normal profit level 
or remain closed during the said period for reasons beyond their control." 
In response to government call for registration as sick units, 1889 units 
had applied. To scrutinize the received applications, ten committees were formed 
by the cell. The committee had identified 1583 units as sick and a good number 
of causes of sickness and recommendations were suggested by the committees 
separately to rehabilitate and revive the identified 1583 sick units which were 
already approved by the cell. On the basis of the reports of the committees, 
concerned financial institutions and banks were requested for extending assistance 
to the respective sick units. After the completion of all activities, the cell was 
declared formally abolished. 
Actually no progress has been made during the last five years in respect 
of arrangements for rehabilitation of the units identified as sick excepting a few 
cases settled for rehabilitation through extending financial assistance at bilateral 
level between the banks and the concerned entrepreneurs. There arose a lot of 
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genuine problems in regarding to financing all the sick units. Then the financial 
institutions informed those problems to the government and expressed their 
inabilities in implementing the recommendations. 
A high level 'Review Committee' was formed in 1993 in the Ministry of 
Finance with the Executive Chairman of the Board of Investment as its Convenor 
to devise a pragmatic and effective solution in regard to the recommendations 
and other related matters. The review committee was to entertain the applications 
of the industries identified as sick for recommendation if they fail to get assistance 
from the banks. Practically, the rehabilitation process was slow due to lack of 
consensus amongst banks, financial institutions and entrepreneurs/owners/man-
agements on modalities of refinancing. In the past, efforts towards sick industries 
rehabilitation were concentrated mainly on securing additional funds from the 
banks/financing institutions. 
Recently (in December, 1996) the Government of Bangladesh reconsti-
tuted a 1 O-Member' Review Committee' under the convenorship of the Secretary, 
Ministry of Industries, to carry out in-depth examination of the causes of sickness 
and come out with practical recommendations on the ways and means for re-
habilitating the sick industries. On the basis of the decision of this 'Review 
Committee', a study has already been commissioned to review the policies and 
approaches pursued so far and suggest remedical measures for mitigating the 
problems which engulf the sick industries. 
Besides the steps taken by the government of Bangladesh, some steps 
have also been taken by the DFIs include rephasing of outstanding loans and 
interest by extending the original loan period (11 to 12 years) by 3 to 8 years, 
waiving of penal interest, conversion of partial interest into equity or into block 
account and setting up of a project rehabilitation department etc. 
During the last 5 years, a large number of industries have fallen sick. The 
number of such sick industries, the amount of investments and the number of 
defaulters are constantly increasing. The growing phenomenon of sickness in 
Bangladesh is causing concern to government, banks and financial institutions. The 
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government is seriously concerned about the sick industries. Thisisnatural because 
the number of sick industries are going disproportionately high and the situation 
is alarming. To solve the problem, the government may set up a 'Screening 
Committee' under the chairmanship of one experienced parliament member in the area 
of industry with representatives of the Ministry of Industry & Commerce, Ministry 
of Finance, Bangladesh Bank, DFIs, Commercial Banks, Chamber of Commerce 
& Industries, specialists in the field, Economists to identify the causes of sickness, 
make suitable recommendations and formulate a new policy relating to sick 
industries on the following lines: 
1. The committee should cover all the existing private and public industries 
as well as the new projects under implementation; 
2. The committee may identify the existing industries into three groups as: 
(a) Strategic and crucial for the economic development (b) Non-strategic 
but viable for revival and (c) Neither strategic nor viable for rehabilitation. 
For the first and second categories something must be done to remove 
the malady. The third category of industries should be closed down [Ather; 
1993]. 
3. The committee should recommend the steps/actions for implementation 
which will prevent the industries from future sickness. 
It can be summarized that before a policy is evolved and successfully 
implemented to deal with the problem of industrial sickness, it is absolutely 
necessary to have correct diagnosis of the problem. 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Rapid and efficient industrialization as an important instrument of economic 
growth is well recognized. Therefore, rapid industrialization has been accepted as 
a vital instrument and major strategy of economic development in many developing 
counties like Bangladesh. Healthy industries, created by planned effort of industri-
alization, are widely recognized as the 'red cells' of an economy. Fewer numbers 
of these industries will definitely turn an economy into a case of anaemia. There 
are instances where an economy suffocates from insufficient numbers of healthy 
industries, moreover, at the same time it is burdened with a large number of sick 
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industries which sometimes incur a huge amount of operational expenses. Most 
of these sick industries lack necessary resources and technical know-how to 
become profitable. It is evident that for economic growth, any business organisation 
or for that matter industry, will have to be profitable but unfortunately most of 
the industries of Bangladesh are operating at losses especially which are under 
the control of various public sector corporations. 
The availability of data in respect of industrial sick projects in 
Bangladesh is not satisfactory. It appears from some available literature 
but there is no detailed or in-depth study either by the DFIs or government 
or entrepreneurs except some occasional statements and announcements 
by them. It is difficult to gather idea or to have an exact picture of 
industrial sickness in Bangladesh since such statements are not reliable 
and sometimes contradictory. The report of "Sick Industries Rehabili-
tation and Revitalizing Cell", is more reliable, because it was the first 
govt, initiative to identify the sick units. 
To fulfil the objectives, outlined in the Industrial Policy 1991, Government 
of Bangladesh formed a cell, namely "Sick Industries Rehabilitation and 
Revitalizing Cell' headed by the Secretary, Ministry of Industries on 15th 
June 1991. The cell requested the entrepreneurs to fill up a prescribed 
form for registering as sick unit which contained detailed information about 
the enterprises including data on investment, production capital equip-
ment, balance sheet and entrepreneurs' own views on causes and remedies 
of sickness. In response to that, a total of 1889 forms were received. 
These were divided into ten different sub-sectors. The cell formed ten 
committees for ten sub-sectors and those committees were given respon-
sibilities to identify the actual sick units and to give recommendations for 
rehabilitation. The committees identified 1583 units as sick. The sub-
sector wise break-up were as follows : 
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Table 1.2 : Sub-sectorwise Break-up of Sick Industries 
Sl.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Sub-sectors 
Steel and Engineering 
Leather and Chemical (including 
soap, oxygen etc.) 
Food and Allied (including 
cold storage) 
Textiles and Garments 
(other than handloom) 
Hand loom 
Pharmaceuticals 
Jute 
Rubber and Rubber Goods 
Service and Utilities (shipping/ 
hotels/laundry) 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
No. of 
Sick Units 
363 
132 
364 
391 
74 
24 
21 
18 
56 
140 
1583 
%of 
Total 
22.93 
8.34 
23.00 
24.70 
4.67 
1.52 
1.33 
1.14 
3.53 
8.84 
100.00 
Source : Report of Rehabilitation and Revitalizing Cell of Sick Industries, Ministry of Industries, 
Govt, of Bangladesh, 1992. 
Total outstanding bank loan was amounted to Tk. 1239 crore to the 
identified sick industries. As calculated by the selection committees, the required 
amount for working capital andBMRE of the identified sick industries was estimated 
at Tk. 252 crore. The above table depicts the scenario of private sector (98%), 
only 30 public sector enterprises (2%) applied for and declared themselves as 
sick. So if all continuously loosing/sick industries of public sector would apply, 
the picture would be anything but dangerous. 
The number of defaulting entrepreneurs, who had taken loan over taka 
ten million from BSB and BSRS was 500. The total amount of dues recoverable 
from them wasTk.7500 million. BSRS financed 331 projects and all of which 
were assumed to be sick. The number of defaulting entrepreneurs who had taken 
loan from BSRS was 31. On the other hand BSB financed 622 projects, out 
of which 400 were considered as sick [Nabi; 1991]. 
In case of BSB, a good number of financed projects became stuck-up 
during construction or could not operate successfully after implementation. These 
projects are ubable to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the banks dues 
and make any contribution to the national economy. BSB identified these units 
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as sick projects and prepared a special scheme for their rehabilitation. As on 
30th June, 1*995 BSB had 86 projects in its portfolio which were identified as 
sick. After athorough evaluation it took steps for rehabilitation of those units 
which were considered as viable [BSB Annual Report; 1994-95]. On the other 
hand, in case of 167 projects of BSRS in its loan portfolio as on 30th June, 1995, 
79 projects were identified as non-performing/sick [BSRS Annual Report; 1994-
95]. 
It was disclosed in 1991 in the parliament that the amount of overdue 
industrial loan would be Tk. 1,00,000 million [Ather; 1993]. As per Bangladesh 
Bank's observation the financial institutions disbursed Tk.2,20,000 million to 
industries and trade, out of which Tk. 60,000 million was non-recoverable 
[Khaborer Kagoj; 1991]. A source indicates that about 10,000 industrial units 
of all categories have become sick [Purbokone; 1995]. A paper [Nabi; 1991] 
reported that on an average 60% of industrial units in Bangladesh have fallen sick 
in one way or other, whereas the same percentage for India and Pakistan is 
reported to be 51. The sick industries in Bangladesh is stated to be 70% by 
an author [Rahman; 1991 ]. As per another source there are 4000 small, medium 
and large scale sick industrial units in Bangladesh with a total investment of 
Tk. 1,00,000 million [Ajker Kagoj; 1991]. 
Most of the industries have started with a loan capital from BSB, BSRS 
and Nationalized Commercial Banks (NCBs). Due to become sick they are unable 
to repay the loan in due time. This has created recycling problem in banks and 
DFIs which is preventing them to help the new industrial projects. On the other 
hand, the growing industrial sickness in Bangladesh has also made the prospects 
for attracting more foreign direct investments (FDI) bleaker. 
Though there are an incomplete picture of sickness, even with this it is 
easily perceivable that Bangladesh are passing through a menacing stage of 
industrial sickness which stands as a stumbling block for the growth and devel-
opment of the country. Hence to check and remove this malady is the prior need 
of the day and also needs deep and wide study. 
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1.4 Significance of the Study 
The increasing incidence of sickness in Bangladesh, particularly in the state 
owned manufacturing enterprises (SOMEs) has created black spots in the indus-
trial map. Though the public sector was assigned a commanding role in the 
economy of Bangladesh as an instrumentof social change and as a tool for accelerating 
development but it is unfortunate that the performance of public enterprises in 
Bangladesh is not satisfactory. Most of the manufacturing enterprises operating 
at losses. The poor performance of these enterprises has adversely affected the 
non-industrial sector and also they became a burden on the national exchequer. 
This adverse situation calls for immediate corrective measures. The trend of profit & 
loss of major state owned manufacturing enterprises are given in the following 
Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3 : Net Profit/(Loss) in State-Owned Manufacturing Enterprises (SOMEs) 
(Taka in Crore) 
Corporation 
BTMC 
BSEC 
BSFIC 
BCIC 
BFIDC 
BJMC 
TOTAL 
1990-91 
(Actual) 
(58.39) 
(86.11) 
(12.06) 
(34.25) 
(6.21) 
(247.33) 
(444.34) 
1991-92 
(Actual) 
(43.42) 
(107.79) 
(72.21) 
(55.37) 
(11.46) 
(317.50) 
(607.75) 
1992-93 
(Actual) 
(135.46) 
(129.29) 
(86.16) 
20.58 
(13.23) 
(523.35) 
(866.91) 
1993-94 
(Actual) 
(153.87) 
(110.22) 
(19.60) 
25.49 
(5.09) 
(64.05) 
(327.34) 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
(117.04) 
(68.36) 
2.53 
(75.47) 
1.16 
(31.43) 
(288.61) 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
(134.40) 
(64.50) 
(37.80) 
(121.40) 
3.00 
(96.20) 
(451.60) 
1996-97 
(Revised) 
(124.80) 
(69.20) 
(67.90) 
(269.10) 
12.00 
(107.70) 
(626.70) 
Source : Bangladesh Economic Review 1997, MOF, GOB; p. 117. 
Note : Figures in parentheses indicate loss. 
Despite large scale privatization in the 1980's, state owned manufacturing 
enterprises still account for a significant portion of the manufacturing sector of 
Bangladesh. In 1996-97 there were 134 enterprises under the control of six 
industrial corporation employing 165000 (approx) persons. The dividend con-
tribution of the SOMEs to the govt, exchequer in 1996-97 amounted to only 
Tk. 1.5 crore. During the period 1990/91 - 1996-97, the highest amount of 
dividend paid by the SOMEs to the government was Tk. 10 crore in 1992-93 
and again the same amount in 1993-94; on the other hand in 1994-95 the figure 
was ni 1. The amount of accumulated loan to the SOMEs by the DFIs and Commercial 
Banks upto 31st December, 1996 was Tk. 2734 crore. Out of this dues Tk. 1112 
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crore (41 percent) was unrecovered [MOF; 1997]. With the analysis of the above 
data it can be said that the performance of SOMEs is deteriorating at an alarming 
rate. 
The textile mills under Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC), 
second largest public sector corporation on the basis of investment, capital 
machineries and employment, occupies a key position in the economy of Bangladesh. 
The industry, apart from being one of the oldest organized industries, is also labour 
intensive and produces one of the most important day to day consumer items 
essential for the people. Though the purpose of public textile industries is to build 
a strong industrial base, achieve the objectives of total socio-economic welfare 
of the people, increase national incomes and provide surpluses for further growth 
but it is observed that the performances of the mills owned and managed by BTMC 
are extremely poor. 
Due to changes in government policy and poor performance, Govt, of 
Bangladesh started closing down the textile mills since 1976, but vigorously since 
1982. 36 public textile industries have already been denationlised upto 30th June, 
1997 anda policy of disinvestment is being followed. Further disinvestment either 
purely to private sector or by forming holding companies is in the pipeline. 40 
mills which are still under the control of BTMC do not performing satisfactorily. 
Out of these 40, only 19 mills are now in operation i.e. 21 mills are closed (16 
mills are in laid off, 3 mills having no tangible assets and withdrawn of capital 
from 2 mills) and some running mills may be closed in near future. During the 
financial year 1996-97, BTMC has incurred net losses of Tk. 163.55 crore as 
against Tk. 134.36 crore in the previous year. Out of 19 running textile mills 
18 have incurred net losses of Tk.100.05 crore in 1996-97. This situation of 
BTMC leads to large scale wastage of national wealth in the form of capital 
machineries and human resources and creates the problem of unemployment. 
Unless effective measures are undertaken to help the ailing and financially sick 
industrial units, it would lead to loss of investment made by banks and DFIs, 
loss of employment opportunity and permanent impairment of the financial sound-
ness of the affected public textile industrial enterprises. So the industry requires 
deep study and analysis of the factors which lead towards sickness. A large 
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number of sick industrial units in Bangladesh, public textile enterprises in par-
ticular, are economic liability to the nation and thisdemands serious consideration. 
The present study is considered important for several reasons viz. it is the 
question of survival, it identifies the reasons for poor performance in relevant areas etc. 
At the end, the study will propose a survival package which will directly assist to the 
BTMC authority and concerned government agencies to formulate suitable policy 
package and improve the overall performance of textile mills under BTMC. The 
findings will also provide useful guidelines and information to the management 
of sick public sector industrial enterprises. It is expected to provide some facts 
and figures to the management of industrial units, the financing agencies and the 
government organizations and thus enabling them to chalkout programme for 
rejuvenation and rehabilitation of sick industrial units of Bangladesh especially 
of public textile industries. The study is also of great relevance for solution of 
the problem of industrial sickness in general. 
To ensure the successful existence and progress in future the causes of 
losses/sickness of public textile industrial enterprises in particular and sick industries 
in general should be detected and solved. 
1.5 Chapter Scheme 
The study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides 
information regarding the development of industrial enterprises in Bangladesh 
before and after Independence and Industrial Policies of the Govt, of Bangladesh 
considering the sick industries. This chapter also covers the statement of the 
problem, significance of the study and the details of chapter scheme. 
The second chapter is concerned with the conceptual framework on the 
issue of industrial sickness. It deals with concept, process, stages, signals and 
symptoms, diagnosis, consequences of industrial sickness alognwith the common 
causes and remedial measures of sickness in industries. This chapter also contains 
various univariate & multivariate model-based studies and other research works 
done earlier for prediction of industrial sickness alongwith a critical evaluation. 
The third chapter is concerned with the review of the existing literature 
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available in the field of industrial sickness, particularly public sector textile 
industries as well as individual/institutional textile sector studies. 
The fourth chapter deals with the objectives, hypotheses, scope of the 
study and the methodological design used in the study. This chapter also contains 
the limitations of the study. 
The fifth chapter provides an overview of the structure and changing growth 
pattern of public sector cotton textile mills in Bangladesh during British & Pakistan 
period and in independent Bangladesh. The chapter also provides the historical 
perspective of Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) and the information 
covering the financial trends & operational achievements of the mills under BTMC 
alongwith the present position. 
The sixth chapter focuses the findings, and discussions. In this chapter, 
a detailed information about the selected mills, analysis of operational efficiencies 
& financial performances, opinion of the respondents on different aspects of industrial 
sickness and their suggestion to the government to overcome the adverse situation have 
been presented. In this chapter, twenty nine important liquidity, solvency, profit-
ability and turnover ratios have been used under univariate approach and t-values 
have been calculated for the test of statistical significance of the mean values of two 
groups of mills. Under multivariate approach, three multiple discriminant analysis (MD A) 
models for prediction of sickness have also been applied in this chapter in order 
to know the actual position of the selected mills. The chapter also deals with the 
testing of hypotheses. 
The seventh and last chapter contains the conclusions with major findings, 
recommendations, policy implications and suggestions for further research. 
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INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS : A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
For conceptual framework on the issue of industrial sickness, this 
chapter deals with the concept, process, stages, signals & symptoms, diag-
nosis and consequences of industrial sickness. The chapter also presents 
some common causes and remedial measures alongwith various predictive 
models of industrial sickness developed earlier. 
2.1 Concept of Industrial Sickness 
Before analyzing the industrial sickness it is better to define the word 
'industry' and 'sickness'. Within the framework of the Industrial Policy-1991 
the following activities have considered as industries [MOI; 1991]. 
(a) Manufacturing, assembling or preparation of any product through 
mechanical process; 
(b) Extraction of any mineral and natural resources through mechanical 
means; 
(c) Construction industry, hospital and clinic, hotel and tourism and other 
service-oriented industries; 
(d) Technology-based fisheries, livestock and poultry, seed production 
and multiplication, and other farm-based activities; 
(e) Handicraft and cottage industries; and 
(f) Service or other activities which are accepted and recognized by the 
Government as industry. 
Actually, 'Industry' is an entity which is engaged in any of the 
activities like manufacturing, processing, preservation and servicing. The 
industries may be broadly grouped under five heads, viz. 
(i) Basic industries 
(ii) Capital goods industries 
(iii) Intermediate goods industries 
(iv) Consumer goods industries and 
(v) Service industries 
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A person is treated as 'sick' if any part of his body (system or sub-
system) does not function normally. Similarly, if any functional area of an 
industrial unit (viz., production, marketing, finance, personnel and corporate 
management) develops any abnormality, the whole unit may become sick 
[Bidani & Mitra; 1982:17]. 
'Industrial sickness' is easy to understand but difficult to define. It 
has different meaning to different people. The workers may consider the unit 
as sick if they are not getting their wages in time. The management and 
shareholders may measure the sickness in terms of inadequate return on their 
investment and irregular dividend. The financial institutions/banks give 
importance to the repayment of their loans and units ability to pay interest 
regularly. To an investor the industrial sickness is one which skips dividends. 
To an industrialist it means recurring losses and tottering on the brink of 
closure. So, the meaning of sickness is based on different norms such as 
generation of surplus, liquidity and solvency position, erosion of equity, the 
amount and the period of irregularities etc. 
To define the term 'industrial sickness' is a problem because mainly 
definitions given by different sources depends on different purposes. No 
single definition will suit all the purposes. 
The State Bank of India's study team on small scale industrial advance 
(1975) defined industrial sickness as, "a unit which fails to generate adequate 
internal, surpluses on a continuing basis and depends for its survival on 
frequent infusion of external financial help, thereby it brings about serious 
dis-equilibrium in its financial structures" [Sahu; 1990]. Thus the study 
group found that the industrial unit is sick when its internal capabilities are 
exhausted and it began to seek external financial help for its survival. 
The study group set up by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to frame 
guidelines for follow-up of bank credit defined the industrial sickness as, 
"with a steady erosion of profitability, the borrower's liquidity declines and 
the first sign of difficulty is delayed payments to creditors, leading ultimately 
to default. With further deterioration in profitability, followed by losses, 
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current liabilities exceed current assets; in other words, a net working capital 
surplus becomes a net working capital deficit" [Kaveri; 1983:23]. The team 
rightly paid emphasis on liquidity of a firm. It stated that the liquidity of 
a firm declines to meet the obligations of creditors when current liabilities 
exceeds current assets and ultimately the unit becomes sick. 
The Government of India enacted the Sick Industrial Companies (Special 
Provisions) Act (SICA) 1985, which defines sickness on the basis of con-
tinuous losses and complete erosion of the equity base of the unit. According 
to this Act, "an industrial company (being a company registered for not less 
than seven years) is as sick when it has at the end of any financial year 
accumulated losses equal to or exceeding its entire net worth and has also 
suffered cash losses in such financial year, and the financial year immedi-
ately preceding such financial year". The aforesaid seven years has been 
changed to five years by an amendment of the SICA in December 1991. 
Prof. Farooq defined industrial sickness as "the situation where the 
revenue of a firm are insufficient to meet the cost, and the rate of return 
on investment is less than firm's cost of capital" [Khan, A.F; 1986]. 
The definition of sick units adopted by the term- lending financial 
institutions is based on the criteria of continuous cash losses, defaults in 
debt servicing requirements and irregularities in meeting statutory and other 
liabilities. Thus, an industrial unit is classified as sick by the term- lending 
institutions after taking into account any of the following symptoms: (i) 
continuous defaults in meeting four consecutive half yearly instalments of 
interest or principal in respect of the institutional loans; (ii) continuous cash 
losses for a period of 2 years or continued erosion in the net worth by 50% 
or more; and (iii) mounting arrears on account of statutory or other liabilities 
for a period of one or two years [Bidani & Mitra; 1983:19]. 
The National Institute of Bank Management (NIBM) defined sick units 
as "those where the operation result in continuous losses bring down the 
working capital available and ultimately affecting the borrowing potential 
almost permanently." 
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Reserve Bank of India [RBI; 1988] defined (i) a unit may be considered 
sick, if it has incurred cash losses for one year and, in the judgement of 
the bank, it is likely to continue to incur cash losses for the current year 
as well as the following year, (ii) the unit has an imbalance in its financial 
structure such as current ratio is less than 1:1 and worsening debt-equity 
ratio i.e. the ratio of total outside liabilities to net worth; and (iii) when 
the cumulative losses exceed capital and reserves. Thus, the emphasis is the 
RBI's definition of sickness is on profitability, liquidity and solvency. 
Mr. Sudarshan Lai in his definition of sick unit has indicated two 
stages of sickness. According to him, "a unit can be considered sick if it 
is operating at less than break-even point, that is, where it is unable to meet 
its costs and depreciation, the unit, which has eroded its capital and reserves, 
should be considered to have reached an advanced stage of sickness" [Lai; 
1979]. 
The Government of Bangladesh constituted 'Sick Industries Rehabil-
itation and Revitalizing Cell' in the Ministry of Industry in 1991. According 
to the cell, "An industrial unit: (a) which could not attain the normal production 
and profit level, (b) has incurred loss or remained at the unprofitable level 
for consecutive 3 to 6 years from the year of commencement of commercial 
production, or (c) could not produce above the break-even point (BEP) for 
the reasons beyond the control of the entrepreneurs would be considered as 
sick" [MOI; 1992]. 
Sickness in an industry means the same as sickness in a human body. 
It is an organic process in the life history of a unit. This may be attributed 
to fall in demand, technological obsolescence, statutory interference, exces-
sive taxation, trade unionism and mis-management but the single reason 
which leads to maximum sickness is financial mis-management [Sen; 1989]. 
According to Bhaskar Banerjee "Sick Unit may be defined as one 
which fails to generate internal surplus on a continuing basis, which has 
not been able to finance even margin money for borrowing capital and where 
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part of the capital has been lost because of the losses already made" [Banerjee; 
1979]. 
On the basis of above mentioned definitions, it may be concluded that 
an industrial unit may be considered sick if it does not perform primary 
functions like purchase, production, sales, collection and repayment of debts 
and dues satisfactorily. It is a unit which fails to generate internal surplus 
and continuously depends on external funds for its survival. 
2.2 Process of Industrial Sickness 
Industrial sickness does not occur all of a sudden in the life history 
of an industrial unit. In fact, it is a gradual process with distinct stages taking 
from 5 to 7 years to corrode the health of a unit. An industrial unit just 
like a human body. The human body [Bidani & Mitra 1982] is a healthy 
biological organism which, before it becomes sick, generally passes through 
various stages. If the sickness continues for a long period it may become 
chronic. In case no treatment is given at the initial stage, it may go beyond 
control and result in the death of the organism. Likewise, an industrial unit 
also passes through various stages before it becomes sick. 
Sickness does not develop at once except due to accidents, natural 
catastrophies or other external factors causing heavy irrecoverable loss to 
the industry. In most of the cases, sickness is bred within the unit itself. 
A healthy unit may grow sick temporarily and recover or vice-versa. Factors 
that cause sickness in an industrial unit could be internal or external. The 
external factors generally affect all units in the same group while the internal 
factors affect a particular unit only. 
According to NCAER, "Sickness is defined in terms of financial 
viability consisting of three independent elements of equal emphasis and 
weight, viz., profitability, liquidity and solvency represented by cash profit 
or loss; net working capital; and net worth respectively. When all these 
parameters show positive figures, the unit's financial viability will be sound 
and normal. Where one of them shows a negative figure, the unit could be 
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regarded as tending towards sickness; where two of them show negative 
figures, it would be a case of incipient sickness; where all of them show 
negative figures the unit may be termed as sick" [NCAER; 1986]. On the 
basis of the above definition, the organic process which generally passes 
through various stages of sickness in an industrial unit is illustrated in the 
following figure No. 2.1: 
Figure 2.1 : Organic Process of Industrial Sickness 
Stage - 1 Stage - II Stage - in 
Healthy Unit Tending Towards Incipient Sick Unit 
Sickness Sickness 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Cash Profit/ 
Loss 
Net Working 
Capital = 
Net Worth= 
t I 
'+' 
'+' 
I. 
2. 
3. 
Cash Profit/ 
Loss 
Net Working 
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Net Worth= 
'+' 
'+' 
'+' 
From the above figure it is evident that in healthy stage, the key 
parameters like cash profit, net working capital and net worth are positive 
values. As it tends towards sickness, the parameter cash profit may become 
negative but the unit will still continue to pay its instalments to the term-
lending institutions, when it moves towards higher intensive zones, two or 
more financial parameters may become negative. At this juncture, the financial 
analyst or the financing agency should review the overall situation and take 
appropriate corrective measures to prevent the unit from becoming sick. If 
the above trend is not arrested, this will lead to total failure or closure of 
the unit. 
Bidani & Mitra explained the process of industrial sickness in a 
different way [Bidani & Mitra; 1982:23]. A unit is called normal when all 
its functional areas like production, marketing, finance and personnel are 
functioning efficiently. In other words, it is earning profits, the current ratio 
is more than one, net worth is positive and debt-equity ratio is good, it can 
be declared healthy. It also indicates that, the management are doing well. 
If the unit tends towards sickness and shows some signals, then some 
appropriate preventive measures can be considered after going into the 
various causes of unsatisfactory functioning. If the deterioration in the 
Total 
Sickness 
or 
Closure 
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functional areas continues, it may result in the actual setting in of sickness 
i.e. incipient sickness is a stage where the unit incur cash losses but im-
balance in the financial structure may not be apparent. At this stage, a banker 
should review the overall situation and take suitable corrective measures 
to prevent the unit from becoming sick. Actually, the best time for corrective 
action is when the sickness is at the incipient stage. If corrective measures 
are either not taken or are inadequate at the incipient stage and the causal 
factors continue to adversely affect the functional areas, the unit finally 
becomes sick. 
An understanding of the process of sickness can help in its timely 
detection and corrective action. Any delay treatment at early stages can lead 
to the unit becoming gravely sick. In such a stage, the treatment may be 
far more costly and time consuming. So it can be said that, if the problem 
is detected at an early stage, corrective measures can be taken easily and 
effectively. This would help in tackling the grave consequences. 
2.3 Stages of Sickness 
An industrial unit may become sick at any time from the date of 
establishment. There are various reasons for sickness at different stages. 
(a) Sickness in the Project Formulation Stage : A project may be sick 
before sanction and disbursement of loan and establishment as industrial 
unit. This may be due to faulty product selection, wrong location, dependence 
on foreign collaboration, false investment decisions and conflict among the 
entrepreneurs etc. Here, if the situation is beyond control, it is justifiable 
to close the project because of low risk and cost involvement. 
(b) Sickness in the Project Implementation Stage : A unit may become 
sick in the project implementation stage i.e. before commencement of operations. 
This may be due to installation of defective machinery, failure to bring 
promoter's contribution or the share of financial institutions, complexity in 
obtaining capital etc. Some appropriate preventive measures are required to 
save the unit from going to the next stage of sickness. 
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(c) Sickness is First Production Stage : A unit may be sick after the 
commencement of commercial production but before starting of marketing 
operations. This may be due to accident in factory, major defect in plant 
& machinery, defect in production planning, inadequate working capital, 
liquidity crunch etc. At this stage management should pay more attention 
and take corrective action. 
(d) Sickness in Marketing Operation Stage : A unit may become sick just 
after starting of marketing operations. This may be due to easy availability 
of similar goods in the market, inefficiency in marketing strategy, shortage 
of raw materials, power failure etc. At this stage management should remain 
aware of the overall situation and take suitable corrective measures to 
prevent the unit from becoming real sick. 
(e) Sickness in Fully Operations Stage: This is the final stage of sickness. 
After the commencement of commercial operations and marketing, if cor-
rective measures are not taken the situation adversely affect the functional 
areas of the unit and ultimately it finally becomes sick. This may be due 
to easy availability of similar goods at a cheaper price, sudden change in 
the government policy, natural disaster, increase in the cost of raw-material, 
power, labour etc., shortage of working capital, unfavourable labour laws 
and adverse industrial relations, mis-management, frequent breakdown of 
plant & machinery, change in demand of customers etc. 
An understanding of the various stages of industrial sickness with 
various financial characteristics can help in its timely detection and cor-
rective action. 
2.4 Signals and Symptoms of Industrial Sickness 
Industrial sickness is a time phenomenon, all of a sudden- an industrial 
unit does not become sick unless there is a major accident, or catastrophe, 
causing heavy irrecoverable loss to the units. Normally sickness does not 
set in overnight or develop all at once. It is a gradual process which corrodes 
the units in several stages. It shows some signals & symptoms of weakness 
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and if they are not removed, they get settled. 
The warning signs in several functional areas are termed as signals; 
Normally, In the initial stage, the management of an enterprise does not pay 
heed to the early warning signals of sickness but they become aware and 
serious only when the sickness is in the advanced stage. In fact, the timely 
identification of various signals makes the detection of sickness easier. 
Therefore, the various signals need to be identified and monitored at an early 
stage of sickness. 
The signals which are persistent/neglected over a long period of time, 
become symptoms of sickness. The symptoms are the initial red signals which 
if identified in the incipient stages, could avert the units form sickness and 
divert them towards improvement. 
The symptoms of an industry's sickness are first noticed by the 
management. Subsequently they are observed by others like employees, 
creditors, customers and the government. It is also a point to remember that 
no one symptom by itself would be an indicator of weakness and it is only 
when several of these factors appear simultaneously, there should be a cause 
for enquiry. Some sick units are born in sickness, some live in sickness an 
some die in sickness. To diagnose whether sickness exists or not in an 
industrial unit, there are a number of signals/symptoms which may be as 
follows : 
(1) Continuous shortage of cash; 
(2) Deteriorating financial ratios; 
(3) Frequent requests for loans to DIFs and banks, i.e. heavy dependence 
on external funds; 
(4) Delay in the audit of annual accounts; 
(5) Failure to pay statutory dues to employees, creditors, financial insti-
tutions and banks; 
(6) Morale degradation of employees and desperation among the top and 
middle management level; 
(7) Sudden/frequent changes in the management and rapid turnover of key 
30 
personnel and /or dominated by one man/few individuals; 
(8) Continuous cash losses; 
(9) Higher rate of rejection of goods manufactured and increase in cus-
tomer complaints; 
(10) Decrease in working capital on account of : 
(a) increase in debtors and particularly dues from selling agents, 
(b) decrease in creditors due to falling market reputation, 
(c) increase in inventories which may include large number of slow 
or non-moving items, 
(11) Frequent breakdown of plant and Machinery; 
(12) Non-submission/delayed/incorrect submission of stocks/book debts 
statements and other control statements to banks, financial institutions 
and corporations; 
(13) Frequent dishonour of bills / delay in retirement of bills/return of bills; 
(14) Requests for reduction in margin or over-valuation of stocks; 
(15) Existence of a large number of law suits against the industrial unit; 
(16) Continuous fall in sales, market share and collection of inventories; 
(17) A general decline in that particular industry; 
(18) Frequent labour unrest/disputes; 
(19) Decline in capacity utilization/stoppage of production; 
(20) Reduction in credit summations wherever the companies are in finan-
cial difficulty, they open a separate account with another bank and 
deposit all collections therein [Goiporia 1989]; 
(21) Shortage/non-availability of raw materials, electricity, gas, water, 
technical personnel & labour; 
When the signals are noticed and symptoms are exhibited, it is nec-
essary to analyzes the trends of these signals and symptoms for determining 
the level of sickness in the light of their nature. 
Sources of Signals and Symptoms 
For early detection of signals and symptoms of industrial sickness, 
it is important to know its sources. Generally, the information on early 
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warning signals can be obtained from two sources, viz., internal and external. 
The most relevant source of symptoms of sickness is internal i.e. operating 
results of the unit. Internal sources include ledger data, stock statements, 
factory visits, discussion with borrowers and analysis of financial state-
ments. External sources of early warning signals include market reports, 
press reports, other firms dealing in the same industry and the transacting 
banks. To get signals of industrial sickness and then take appropriate pre-
ventive action, it is essential to use certain techniques with some important 
information. Sources of such information are stock statement, ledger data, 
quarterly operating statements, market reports, financial statements, funds 
flow and cash flow statements [Kaveri; 1983]. 
2.5 Diagnosis of Sickness 
Before a policy is evolved and successfully implemented to deal with 
the problem of industrial sickness, it is absolutely necessary to have a correct 
diagnosis of the problem. If factors that are responsible for causing industrial 
sickness are correctly diagnosed, it will be possible to prevent the sickness 
in the initial stage itself. Actually, the diagnosis is invariably the first step 
in the process of treatment, but before undertaking a study on diagnosis, 
it is essential to know the different causes of industrial sickness. The causes/ 
problems of sickness are numerous. One single reason for sickness, if not 
effectively controlled, may create some new problems resulting in chronic 
sickness or closure of the unit. A sick unit brings causes much hardship in 
terms of production disruption, loss of employment and income. "Prevention 
is better than cure", so in order to prevent the incidence of sickness, it should 
be properly diagnosed at an early stage through its financial and non-
financial symptoms. 
The approach of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to diagnose industrial 
sickness has two criteria. They are: (1) cash losses of the previous year, 
the current year and anticipated for the next year and (2) the deteriorating 
debt-equity ratio. In order to diagnose the process of sickness of an industrial 
unit, the cash profit, net working capital and net worth are the important 
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indicators/financial symptoms which distinguished a healthy unit from a sick 
one. 
Non-financial symptoms are also distinctly marked in case of a sick 
unit. Low morale of management and employees, deterioration in the quality 
of product or raw materials are supplies, resistance to pay increase and other 
benefits indicate the depressing climate of a failed unit. If the diagnostic 
study reveals that the factors of sickness are uncontrollable and the unit is 
incurable i.e. beyond revival, than it is most justifiable to close it down 
without spending any more amount of money on it, on the other hand, nursing 
programme may be taken for which units are potentially viable. So it is 
necessary to undertake proper diagnosis of the root causes of sickness of 
an industrial unit through a thorough examination and review of the oper-
ations almost from its very inception. 
2.6 Consequences of Industrial Sickness 
The main consequences of industrial sickness on an economy have 
been locking up the country's limited financial resources, loss of production, 
wastage of capital assets, reducing employment potential and centralizing 
industrial base. Thus, the main consequences of industrial sickness can be 
summarized as follows : 
(i) Huge Financial Losses to the Banks and the Financial Institutions: 
Industrial sickness to the banks and financial institutions is the question of 
sinking large funds and valuable assets remaining idle. The effect of the 
problem on banks and financial institutions is to make their operation less 
productive. Profitability of banks is eroded by writing off interest and loan, 
revenue losses due to reduced interest rates and non-availability of funds. Thus, 
these all bear an adverse effect on the financial health of the banks and the 
financial institutions. 
(ii) Loss of Employment : One of the serious consequences of industrial 
sickness has been loss of employment, income generation and thereby aggravating 
the most dangerous socio-economic problem of unemployment in a labour 
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surplus economy like Bangladesh. Workers lose jobs on account of closure 
of sick units with the result that the economy bears additional problem of 
unemployed labour force. 
(Hi) Reduction of Export Earnings : There will be a reduction in earning 
of foreign exchange in the unit falling sick on account of sale of its finished 
products abroad. 
(iv) Mis utilization of Institutional Funds : The sickness in any sector on 
account of this factor results ultimately in stagnation of capital investment 
which is a scarce factor in the developing country like Bangladesh. 
(v) Emergence of Industrial Unrest: The closure of particularly large sick 
industrial units employing a large number of workers causes not only 
unemployment, but the trade unions of both sick and non-sick units opposed 
it and resorted to widespread industrial strikes ultimately leads to industrial 
unrest. 
(vi) Adverse Effect on the Prospective Investors and Entrepreneurs : Due 
to sickness, the share price of the unit tumbles down which adversely affects 
the stock market of the country. In this way, the growing phenomenon of 
industrial sickness reduce the confidence and trust in the entrepreneurs and 
creates and psychology of despair for investments amongst the investors. 
Added to this, the failure and closure of a unit acts as an unhappy example 
of disincentive to the prospective entrepreneurs who are planning to plunge 
into the same lines of production. On the whole, the industrial climate 
becomes non-conductive for the industrial development of the economy. 
(vii) Increase in Social Evil : Growing of industrial sickness indirectly 
increases in social crime among the unemployed youths, e.g. hijacks, drug 
addiction, morale turpitudes etc., from frustrations about life. 
(viii) Wastage of Scarce Resources : In an slow developing country like 
Bangladesh, the resources are already scarce. If these scarce resources are 
invested in sick industries particularly in large scale sick industries where 
substantial investment has been made in plant and machinery, it becomes 
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the wastage of the scarce resources. Loss of production in sick units bears 
two adverse effects on the economy as a whole. Firstly, it results in a decline 
in production and secondly, it also blocks up valuable savings and capital 
equipments which otherwise invested would have yielded substantial returns 
to the economy [Khanka; 1995]. 
(ix) Loss of Contribution to the Public Exchequer : When a large number 
of industrial units becomes sick, the possibilities for raising substantial 
contribution from the sick units by way of various levies and VAT are greatly 
reduced. The shortage of revenue collection ultimately adverse\y affects the 
functioning of the economy as a whole. 
(x) Repercussion of the other Industries : When an industry is affected, 
there are adverse repercussions on the other industries which may be sup-
plying raw materials or may be consuming the end-products of the sick 
industry. 
(xi) Adverse Effects on Politics : Industrial sickness leads to formation of 
pressure groups and parties for nourishing the sick industries and increase 
of foreign control on the country's administration and affairs, particularly 
in formulation and implementation of industrial and commercial policies, 
fiscal administration etc. 
Going through the various consequences of industrial sickness, now 
it can be concluded as, if the increasing trend of sickness is allowed to grow 
without taking preventive and curative measures, it will seriously impede 
the utilization of installed capacity, reduce output, block scarce capital, 
create further unemployment, increase in social crime, check further invest-
ment and tax revenue of the government. 
2.7 Causes of Industrial Sickness 
There are several causes of sickness and a unit could become sick 
due to one or in conjunction with other causes. The causes of sickness differ 
form industry to industry, area to area, size to size, product to product of 
the industrial units. They are innumerable and may range from improper 
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project planning and appraisal to internal disorders in the major functional 
areas of production, marketing, finance, personnel and management. Some 
external which may be called as environmental factors like social, economic 
& political conditions and Government legislation & control are also respon-
sible for causing sickness to industrial units. Internal causes of sickness are 
those which are within the control of the industry. External or environmental 
factors on the other hand are those on which the unit has no control and 
are crucial at the same time in pursuing down the unit into sickness. 
A good number of research studies have been conducted on this 
problem by various experts form time to time. Different experts on the subject 
have classified and reclassified the causes of industrial sickness in various 
ways according to the nature, scope and purpose of their respective studies. 
Whatever the purpose of the study, the following internal and external factors 
can be cited as some of the important causes for industrial sickness. 
Some Common Causes of Industrial Sickness 
A. Internal Causes : 
1. Project Planning : 
- Inadequate technical know how 
- Locational disadvantage 
- Outdated production process 
- High cost of inputs 
- High break-even point 
- Uneconomic size of the project 
- Underestimation of financial requirement 
- Unduly large investment in fixed assets 
2. Project Implementation : 
- Delays in getting licences/sanctions resulting cost escalation 
- Inadequate mobilization of finance 
- Dislocating suppliers of plant & machinery and placement of orders 
- Changes in project concepts by entrepreneurs/collaborators/con-
sultants etc. 
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Managerial : 
- Lack of management expertise and supervising 
- No proper manpower development programme 
- Inability to maintain proper accounts 
- First generation entrepreneurs, mostly coming from trading activ-
ities with little or no experience 
- Lack of feed back / MIS 
- Over centralisaiton 
- Lack of adequate control 
- Dishonest management 
Technical : 
- Wrong choice of location, location of industry far too distant from 
raw materials and customers 
- Improper layout of the plant 
- Working below installed capacity 
- Obtaining machinery without spares 
- Absence of modernization of the product 
- Lack of technically trained skills 
- Lack of modern machinery and technology 
Production : 
- Poor quality of raw materials 
- Poor maintenance and replacement of machinery 
- Poor collection of power (gas, chemical, oil etc.) and other inputs 
- Delayed supplies from subcontractors 
- Obsolescence 
- Lack of product diversification 
- Improper planning for the life of the product 
- Poor quality control 
- High rate of wastage 
Marketing : 
- Poor pricing system 
- Poor products and product mix 
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- Non-compliance with delivery schedule 
- Lack of sales promotion 
- Lack of sufficient advertisement 
- Lack of sales planning and forecasting 
7. Financial : 
- Lack of finance and working capital 
- Adverse debt-equity ratio 
- Too much bad debts and uncollectables 
- Underestimation of cost of product 
- Lack of proper financial planning and control 
- Continuous losses 
- Diversification of working/loan capital to sister concerns, misuse 
of funds by investment in windfall trading 
8. Personnel : 
- Weak organizational set-up 
- Poor labour relations resulting in strikes and lock outs 
- Absenteeism/labour turnover 
- Excessive manpower 
- Dishonesty and lack of integrity 
- High expectation and low labour productivity 
- Lack of training 
- Lack of motivation and job satisfaction 
9. Others : 
- Dishonesty of the entrepreneurs 
- Quarrels among partners/shareholders 
B. External Causes : 
1. Infrastructural Bottlenecks : 
- Inadequacy of essential inputs like power, fuel, water, transport etc. 
- Inadequate supply of raw materials both quantitatively and qual-
itatively 
- Non availability of spare parts, manpower etc. 
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Financial Bottlenecks : 
- Heavy financial burden due to Taka devaluation/foreign exchange 
rate fluctuations and accumulation of interests and debt servicing 
liability 
- Price rise of raw-materials, fuel, spare parts, power, water and other 
inputs 
- Fixation of loan instalments by the bankers/ financial institutions 
without taking into account the gestation period 
- Non-availability of adequate funds 
Government Controls and Policies : 
- Changes in the govt. Policies like export-import restricitons, increase 
in customs duty, sales tax, VAT, excise duty etc., hike in wages 
due to new policy, sudden withdrawal of subsidy, tax holiday, 
exemptions etc. 
- Easy availability of substitute/similar goods in the market through 
smuggling, illegal production and liberal imports 
- Government price control 
- Deterioration of law and order situation in the country 
- Dumping practices of multinational companies 
Market Constraints : 
- Market saturation point 
- Sudden and wide fluctuations in the demand 
- Technological advances resulting product obsolescence 
Extraneous Factors : 
- Sudden and ultimately death/departure/removal of a key person 
- Natural calamities like fire, flood, cyclone etc. 
- Political influence over the workers and patronage of unhealthy 
trade union practices leading to overmanning 
- Political situation (domestic as well as international) 
- Sympathetic strikes and closure of production 
39 
2.8 Remedial Measures of Industrial Sickness 
In a competitive economy the problem of industrial sickness is likely 
to come up occasionally depending upon phases of business cycles. In 
advanced economies, survival of the fittest and weeding out of inefficient 
industrial units is a common feature. However, in a county like Bangladesh, 
the problem of industrial sickness cannot be left to the market forces because 
of its adverse repercussions on the economy as a whole. There are no social 
security measures to provide financial relief to unemployed persons. It is, 
therefore, important that measures should be taken to prevent incipient 
sickness among the industrial units, and also every care and precautionary 
measures should be taken to save the industry from future sickness. To check 
the growing phenomenon of sickness some remedial measures will have to 
be taken by all concerned viz., management itself, DFIs, the sponsors, the 
commercial banks and the Government. These remedial measures may be 
of two forms, viz., prevention of sickness and nursing schemes for reha-
bilitating sick industries. Both the types of remedial measures are discussed 
as under: 
2.8.1 Prevention of Sickness 
It is well established that "Prevention is better than cure". Continuous 
use of the predictive models, either the traditional ratio analysis or the 
statistical models, by the management in assessing a firm's health and taking 
necessary preventive steps to prevent any sickness of an industry getting 
worse. Besides the management, financial institutions like banks and term 
lending institutions and the government have also a significant role to play 
in preventing sickness. Among various preventive measures, the importants 
are : proper and unbiased appraisal of project, proper and adequate super-
vision, follow-up, reporting and monitoring of industries. The entrepreneurs 
have, also a vital role to play in all these exercises right from the selection 
of the project to their successful implementation and operation. In case, the 
sickness is noticed then some immediate steps should be taken to turnaround 
the sick industry into an economically viable one. Turnaround means 'a 
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substantial and sustained positive change in the performance of a business' 
[Bibeault; 1982]. Inclination towards sickness is warned by couples of 
signals before the industry goes through the incipient and advanced stages 
of sickness. Thus the concerned agencies should be vigilant not only during 
the implementation but thereafter also to give necessary timely guidance to 
the entrepreneurs/management. Similarly, concerned parties should ensure 
technical advice to the entrepreneurs/management during difficult time so 
that the weak industries be saved at the right time. 
2.8.2 Revival and Rehabilitation of Sick Industries 
The objective of rehabilitation is to restore the capacity of generating 
the internal surplus rather than immediately recovering the amount. Only 
such industries may be considered for revival or rehabilitation which have 
chances of becoming viable and would be able to dispose of all the outstandings 
including new funds raised for revival. To try to revive an industry which 
would remain permanently sick would ultimately prove to be highly costly 
to the national economy, unless there are compelling reasons to keep an 
industrial unit running on non-financial considerations. An opportunity for 
rehabilitation should be given only to those borrowers whose bonafides and 
character are beyond doubt and they are willing to cooperate because at the 
juncture the attitude of the borrower is very important [Reddy; 1988]. So, 
it is essential to prepare a thorough feasibility study prior to the undertaking 
of rehabilitation programme and carefully monitoring of the performance 
during the nursing period. 
The main object of nursing is to cure the sickness of an industry for 
its revival/restoration/rehabilitation. Industrial sickness may be cured, by 
giving some reliefs and concessions to the sick industry, providing raw-
materials on time, providing efficient marketing facilities for the marketing 
of the finished products, keeping a check on the managerial competence, 
allowing labour rationalization in cases where the industry is overstaffed, 
providing funds for modernization, if the state of sickness is not advanced, 
providing the help of technical/professional managers to sick industries, 
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exempting the sick industry from payment of excise duty, sales tax, increase 
the tax holiday period etc. till the time the industry is in a better condition. 
In order to rehabilitate potentially viable sick industries, concerned 
parties formulate nursing programme to revive them and bring them to health. 
In depth study is necessary to determine the new break-even point or the 
viable level at which the sick industry will have to operate to generate 
reasonable surplus, i.e., a surplus which will over a period of time wipe-out 
the existing irregularities and build up adequate equity to meet normal 
margins and allow gradual withdrawal of the special concessions if any, 
granted to the industry. Actually, potentially viable industries can only be 
taken under a nursing programme. Potentially viable industries are those 
where situation is not completely out of control and the borrower also is 
willing to cooperate and submit to the discipline laid down by the bank. 
Having decided to nurse the industry, the bank/financial institution 
has to undertake the follow-up activities. It is necessary to check the progress 
of the nursing efforts from time to time. The following activities should be 
performed here for monitoring the industry properly [Kavari; 1983:140] : 
(a) Information System : For the purpose of nursing, necessary information 
such as stock statements, monthly/quarterly budgets and actual figures for 
production, sales, purchases, overhead expenditure etc., cash flow statements 
balance sheet is asked frequently. 
(b) Review of the Account: It is essential to know the performance of the 
industry on regular basis through the review of the accounts. 
(c) Monitoring the Areas of Weakness : After detecting the areas of 
weakness, a detailed study of such areas would suggest the line of action 
to be taken. 
(d) Monitoring Meetings : There must be at least monthly meetings between 
the borrower and the institutions to assess the progress of implementation. 
Such meetings should review the progress achieved during the period. If any 
adverse variances are observed, suitable corrective actions could be taken 
up for review at these meetings. 
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(e) End-use of Addition Funds : Since the nursing programme usually 
involve outlay of additional funds, it is necessary to ensure that these funds 
are properly used for the purpose intended. This would enable the borrower 
to get timely payment from all concerned agencies. 
(f) Inspection/Visits : The main aim is to ensure that all the assets are not 
only intact and well maintained but also to optimum use. During inspection, 
position in respect of physical stocks could be examined. A dialogue with 
few workers/staff sometimes give a lot of information about what is hap-
pening in the industry. 
Careful monitoring of the performance during nursing programme of 
a sick industry back to health is indeed a very difficult task. Fro successful 
implementation of the nursing programme to rehabilitate the sick industry 
is a joint responsibility of banks / financial institutions, the government, 
labour and borrowers. If there are chances of recovery of health, the bank/ 
rehabilitation agency will continue to nurse the industry. Even after a close 
follow-up, monitoring of key factors and active managerial support in re-
habilitation, the sick industry do not show any improvement, and if there 
are no signs of recovery, the nursing programme should be concluded and 
necessary steps be taken to call-up that account. 
Nursing is not a magic, it is hard exercise based on strict discipline, 
sincerity, efficiency and honesty. There should be coordination and coop-
eration on an on-going basis amongst the participating agencies. If mon-
itoring the nursing programme is done properly there is a every possibility 
of a potentially viable sick industry back to health. 
2.9 Studies Conducted for Prediction of Industrial Sickness 
Sickness never enters with a bang but creeps in slowly. In financial 
terms [Bidani; 1982:53], a sick industrial unit initially shows the signs of 
financial distress starting with short-term liquidity, disturbing the produc-
tion cycle, progressing to revenue losses and then operating losses and 
moving in the direction of excessive use of external credit. Finally a stage 
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is reached when it is overburdened with debts and cannot muster sufficient 
funds to meet its obligations. A healthy unit may have positive parameters 
which may become negative gradually. The sickness increases when financial 
parameters become more and more negative. So, it is more than necessary 
to foresee the incipient sickness and initiate preventive and curative action. 
During the past few decades, sickness in industries, financial insti-
tutions and business organizations has become a very thought provoking and 
obvious off-shoot of the modern jet age industrial society. In response to 
the rising incidence of business/industrial ill-health or failure, a number of 
detailed investigations have been conducted both by individual researchers 
and organizations to identify the causes of sickness and suggest remedial 
measures. The need to detect the possible symptoms of sickness and to 
protect the 'safety and soundness' of organizations, to forewarn or prevent 
the recurrence of failures, was highly felt. As a result , a plethora of studies 
have appeared in the recent past. In this section the important empirical 
research studies on corporate failure are reviewed and attempts also being 
made to show them under two broad approaches, viz., univariate basis and 
multivariate basis. 
2.9.1 Univariate Empirical Studies 
Ramser and Foster [1933] were the pioneers of quantitative studies 
of financial ratios to predict bankruptcy. They analyzed 11 ratios for 173 
firms whose securities were registered in the State of Illinois. It was found 
that the less successful firms and the firms subsequently failed had ratio 
values lower than the more successful firms. However, two turnover ratios, 
sales to net worth and sales to total assets exhibited an opposite tendency 
but, the attributes to this opposite tendency were not well explained. 
Winakor and Smith [1935] in their study critically examined a 
sample of 183 firms which failed during 1923-31. They started the use of 
financial ratios as a potent tool4br predicting financial difficulty, for predicting 
sickness they used a set of 21 ratios for each of the firms and the mean ratios 
of the middle half of all the firms were examined to compare the individual 
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changes, if any, for the whole group of the firms. The study concluded that 
the ratio of net working capital to total assets (NWC/TA) was the most 
accurate, reliable and steady indicator of firm's failure. 
Marwin [1942] examined the trend of unspecified number of ratios 
on a sample of 939 continuing and discontinuing firms which failed during 
the period 1926-36. A comparison was made between industry mean ratios 
of discontinuing firms and estimated normal ratios and found that the ratios 
of the discontinuing firms were consistently below the established by the 
surviving firms. A persistent decline from the estimated normal was also 
found beginning with the sixth year prior to discontinuance. He concluded 
that three ratios (i) net working capital to total assets (ii) net worth to total 
debt and (iii) current ratio were very sensitive predictors of discontinuance 
of business. Four to five years prior to actual discontinuance, 'Net working 
capital to total assets' ratio was found to be the best single indicator of 
failure. 
Beaver [1967], then an eager young assistant professor of Accounting 
at the University of Chicago, was the pioneer of the first extensive work 
and performed one of the classic works to predict corporate failure. He 
studied the predictive power of 30 different financial ratios and developed 
a univariate model of corporate failure. He tested each of 30 ratios to find 
out the relative efficiency to predict its value in discriminating between two 
sets of data of 79 failed and 79 non failed companies for a period of 5 years 
prior to failure during 1954-64. 
The major findings of the study was that the ratio of cash flow to 
total debt was the best single predictor of failure because it showed the least 
percentage of error. This ratio mis-classified 13 per cent of the companies 
one year prior to failure and the rate of mis-classification was only 22 per 
cent five years prior to failure. The other five ratios found the greatest 
predictive value were : (i) net income to total assets (ii) total debt to total 
assets (iii) working capital to total assets (iv) current ratio and (v) no-credit 
interval. Beaver also concluded that all the financial ratios have different 
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degrees of accuracy in predicting failure. His work though pioneering, was 
consider as having some limitations due to its univariate approach. 
2.9.2 Multivariate Studies 
To overcome the shortcomings of the univariate models efforts were 
being made by the scholars to develop multivariate models for corporate 
failure prediction. The strategy for formulating multivariate models was 
preoccupied with the selection of few important variables and the calculation 
of their respective weights on the basis of their significance in defining the 
event. Some of the important multivariate models on prediction of corporate 
sickness are outlined below. 
Tamari [1966] conducted a study for the first time on multivariate 
basis on 28 companies in Israel over a period of five years prior to bankruptcy 
during 1956-65 and compared them with industrial companies as a whole. 
The results revealed that five years prior to bankruptcy, financial ratios of 
the companies were lower than those for the industry, and in most cases, 
some of the ratios showed a downward trend during the study period. Profit 
trend and equity capital & reserves to total liabilities ratios were given 
maximum weights relatively showing that those ratios were considered to 
be the best indicators of failure. One of the important criticisms of Tamari's 
study was about the selection of ratios and arbitrary fixation of weights to 
them. 
Prof. Altman [1968] in his 'Z-score' model, popularly known as MDA 
(Multiple Discriminant Analysis) model, tried to improve upon the traditional 
ratio analysis under the theory that ratios, if analyzed with a multivariate 
framework, will take on greater statistical significance than the common 
technique of sequential ratio comparisons. In simple words, when several 
financial ratios are combined, they provide the best predictive ability as 
compared to the best single predictor of failure. 
33 bankrupt and 33 non-bankrupt firms were considered to analyze 
the problems of corporate bankruptcy in the United States. Out of a set of 
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22 ratios examined, the five were found to be the best predictors of bank-
ruptcy and the value of 'Z ' is calculated on the basis of these five ratios. 
Finally, he constructed 'Z score' by the formula : 
Z = 0.012x, + 0.014x2 + 0.033x3 + 0.006x4 + 0.010x5 
where 
x, = Net working capital/Total assets 
(measure of net liquid assets of the firms) 
x2 = Retained earnings/Total assets 
(measure of cummulative profitability over time) 
x3 = Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)/Total assets 
(measure of true productivity of firm's assets) 
x4 = Market value of equity/Book value of total debt 
(measure of how much a firm's assets can decline in value) 
x5 = Sales/Total assets 
(measure of sales generating ability of a firm's assets) 
Z = Overall index 
(All the above ratios are to be expressed as percentages). 
Altman marked the range of 'Z-score' between 1.81 to 2.99 for making 
a classification of companies into the bankrupt and non-bankrupt group. If 
Z is less than 1.81, the company is almost certain to fail and if it is more 
than 2.99, the company is in sound health. He concluded that Z-score of 2.675 
was the best cut-off point which maintained minimum mis-classification. 
His study attracted wide attention because of low percentage error i.e. 
only 5 per cent for one year prior to bankruptcy. But, in fact, his classification 
error jumped to 28 per cent two years before bankruptcy and it reached the 
absurd level of 71 per cent in the prediction made four years before 
bankruptcy. 
Deakin [1972] used all the 14 ratios, which had been used by Beaver 
to construct an overall indicator on the lines of Altman's analysis. He 
investigated the financial health of 32 failed firms (which experienced either 
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bankruptcy or were liquidated for the benefit of the creditors) that failed 
during 1964-70 in the United States and a matching sample of 32 non-failed 
firms were taken. Each failed firm was matched with a non-fialed one on 
the basis of industry, size and year of financial data. Deakin's, original model 
included 14 ratios and his revised model included only 5 best ratios which 
could predict corporate failure in each of the five years prior to failure. To 
convert the results of various ratios into a single summary number, he used 
a series of letters and signs of plus and minus to communicate the condition 
and trend of the firm's health. He used different 'letters' to represent the 
level of the ratios and 'a plus or minus1 sign to project the direction of the 
trend in the ratio. 
It was concluded by Deakin that the discriminant analysis can be used 
to predict business failure using ratios as prediction variables three years 
in advance with a fairly high degree of accuracy. However, the accuracy 
declined significantly when validated against a holding sample. 
Edmister's [1972] purpose was to develop and test a number of 
methods of analyzing financial ratio to predict the failure of small business. 
19 ratios were tested and he developed 7 variables Zero-line linear regression 
equation with the use of ratios of a firm divided by its respective industry 
average and classifying ratios by an quartics. He concluded that the predictive 
power of ratio analysis depends upon both the choice of analytical method 
and the selection of ratios. 
Blum Marg [1974] developed the 'Failing Company Model' (FCM) 
to assess the probability of business failure. He used 12 variables mainly 
divided into three groups : (1) liquidity (ii) profitability and (iii) variability 
and trends. He evaluated the prediction accuracy of his model by using the 
discriminant analysis technique applied to a paired sample of 115 failed and 
115 non-failed firms. By applying his model, he distinguished failing firms 
from non-failing firms with more accurately. The accuracy of the model was 
94 per cent one year prior to the failure date. The accuracy was 80 per cent 
when the failure occurred within two years from the date of prediction. Later 
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until 5 years the prediction rate of the model was approximately 70 percent. 
Libby (1975] analyzed all the 14 ratios used by Beaver and Deakin 
in their studies to find out the most important ratios. The five variables 
chosen by him were : (1) Profitability (ii) Activity (iii) Liquidity (iv) Asset 
balance and (v) Cash position. The five ratios viz. (a) Net income/Total assets 
(b) Current assets / Total assets (c) Cash/Total assets (d) Current assets / 
Current liabilities and (e) Current assets / Sales were selected to represent 
the aforesaid five financial variables. A sample of 63 companies, which 
failed between 1966 and 1971 were taken and the financial data were obtained 
for fiscal years ending from 1964 to 1969, was used to comprise the clas-
sification 'failing' for development of the model. 
2.9.3 Empirical Studies in India and Bangladesh 
Several studies have made to apply different models to Indian data 
by some researchers and eminent persons in the field. Some important of 
these studies and one attempt has made to apply Altman's model in Bangladesh 
on prediction of industrial sickness are stated below : 
Sarma and Rao [1976] applied Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 
to financial characteristics of 60 cotton textile industry members in India. 
26 ratios belonging to five categories, viz., liquidity, profitability, leverage, 
solvency and activity were considered. The analysis revealed that given 
favourable external factors, the firms' soundness is reflected by its earning 
power, dividend policy, management of current assets and net worth. The 
test of predictive accuracy showed that 95 per cent of the firms were 
classified correctly. The model seemed to be accurate for periods as early 
as three years to failure. 
Satyanarayana [1979] examined the relevance of Altman's model in 
the context of the Indian industry. Z-scores were calculated for three par-
ticular Indian companies and a group of 486 profit making and 185 non-
profit making companies. Considering that high gearing profits before in-
terest and taxes may show opposite trends so, Z* (modified Z-score) were 
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calculated on profits after interest & before taxes. It was concluded that 
though the Altman's model was not useful in predicting health of an Indian 
company, it was helpful to know whether it (a company) was borrowing 
beyond its capacity. The results showed that the impact of interest was very 
significant on Z*. 
Kaveri [1980] attempted to predict the borrower's health by using 
financial ratios. He developed a multiple discriminant model for predicting 
sickness in small scale industries from bankers point of view. The data were 
collected from 524 small units belonging to paper, leather, engineering, 
textile and chemical industrial groups, covering the period 1967-73. The 
study considered events as good, irregular and sick. 22 ratios were examined 
for identifying the health of small scale industries. Of these only 5 ratios 
belonging to five different categories were selected, ensuring that they 
possess higher predictive ability and bankers' acceptability. The five ratios 
are : (i) current assets to current liabilities (ii) stock to cost of goods sold 
(iii) current assets to net sales (iv) net profit (before tax) to total capital 
employed and (v) net worth to total outside liabilities. This study achieved 
76 per cent classification accuracy at one year advance to sickness which 
declined gradually with increase in number of years prior to the event. The 
model projected higher degree of prediction in the short-run than in the long-
run. The study suggested that there should be periodic appraisal of the results 
of the model, should be updated using additional information or by intro-
ducing new variable if necessary. 
Srivastava [1981] used a combination of operational, technical and 
financial parameters to discriminate between the sick and healthy units. He 
developed a linear discriminant function comprising of seven ratios for 
predicting sickness : x, = Net worth / Total assets ; x2 = Net block / Net 
worth; x3 = Net profit / Total assets; x4 = Total liabilities / Net worth; x5 
= Current assets/Current liabilities; x6 = Capacity utilization ratio and x7 
= Plant utilization ratio. The mis-classification error was 10 per cent when 
five financial ratios were used. It further reduced to 5 per cent when first 
three financial ratios were combined with technical and operational ratios. 
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The model developed by using all the seven variables had a predictive 
accuracy of almost 100 per cent. 
Bhattacharya f 1982] attempted to develop a model using multiple 
discriminant analysis in order to identify the different symptoms which 
explain the sickness phenomena, their relative contribution in determining 
the extent of sickness. He selected 28 sick and 26 healthy companies and 
constructed two sets of model for the study. He claimed his first model 
superior to the second one on the basis of less number of sick companies 
mis-classified as healthy companies. 
Bidani and Mitra [1982] have formulated a clinical model to study 
and examine the internal and external causes of sickness dividing the func-
tional areas into four namely : finance, production, marketing and personnel. 
According to them , if there is a certain disorder in any of the functional 
system within the unit, its health shall be affected. They have suggested some 
guidelines for correct identification of sick units to remove some of the 
apprehensions or doubts which might arise in the course of identification. 
They have stated that the sickness develops gradually and is not an overnight 
phenomenon. But the financial institutions are usually kept in the dark till 
the concern enters into a critical stage. The authors emphasized on constant 
and continuous watch on the transactions in the accounts of borrowers with 
the banks. It had not gone into the depth of the problem that with the root 
cause of such problem of sickness in industry. 
Gupta [1983] attempted to identify the best set of financial ratios 
which would not only identify potentially sick firms but also order them 
according to their financial health. He examined both Altman's model and 
Beaver's method for predicting corporate failure and concluded that Beaver's 
method would be more suitable for predicting a practical forewarning system. 
He studied the predictive power of 56 financial ratios grouped into two broad 
categories and revealed that profitability ratios are relatively more potential 
than balance sheet ratios in predicting the corporate health status. The current 
ratio, for example, showed an average classification error almost three times 
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greater than profitability ratio in case of textile companies. Among the 
balance sheet ratios, he found that the ratio of net worth/total debt and all 
outside liabilities/tangible assets had the least classification of error. His 
study showed that the following five ratios had the highest predictive value 
and the least classification error when applied to homogeneous industry 
groups :, (i) EBDIT /Net sales (ii) OCF/Net sales (iii) EBDIT/Total assets 
plus accumulated depreciation (iv) OCF/Total gross assets (v) EBDIT/In-
terest + 0.25 Debt. 
He applied all the above mentioned ratios on a sample of 38 sick and 
42 non-sick units from 41 textile and 39 non-textile companies during 1962-
74 and remaked that among the above mentioned ratios, first two are the 
best ratios of about equal mertit. The classification of error for the two best 
ratios was 11 to 13 per cent in 1962 and about 8 per cent in 1964 which 
further declined over the years. In other words the accuracy increased 
gradually. 
Srivastava and Yadav [1986] collected data from the financial state-
ments of sick and non-sick companies belonging to the private manufacturing 
sector, one to six years prior to the event. A sample of 39 non-sick companies 
and 39 sick companies which became sick during 1966 to 1980 was classified 
according to industry and size, measured by the paid-up capital employed. 
A set of 36 financial ratios were selected representing profitability, sol-
vency, liquidity and turnover ratios. The univariate as well as multivariate 
factor and discriminant analysis were adopted. The discriminant analysis 
included 15 variables. Profitability and turnover ratios emerged to be sig-
nificant discriminators. The model gave encouraging results for two year 
prior to failure. It was observed to predict well for short period. When tested 
on a validity sample including textile companies, it was found to predict 
sickness very accurately upto six years prior to the event. Next, some non-
financial ratios like capacity utilization and production cost were also used 
for predicting sickness in nine industry groups, with a predictive reliability 
of 95 per cent. This indicated that the Z-score method is fairly reliable 
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indicator of the state of health of industrial units. 
Mahmood and Bhattacharya [1989] in their study examined the 
applicability of some ratios to predict the financial health of industrial 
enterprises in Bangladesh. They selected 23 public sector enterprises under 
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) for the study and tested 
five best predictive ratios identified by Prof. Altman and some other financial 
ratios for prediction of financial health of selected enterprises and found 
them as having a higher rate of predictive value. They also found that Z-
score of profitable enterprises was higher than that of losing enterprises. 
Joshi and Ramani [1991] attempted to identify a set of significant 
financial ratios for controlling the company level performance in the paint 
industry, as reflected in higher profitability and productivity. To achieve 
this objective, a list of seven companies in the paint industry was selected 
and the data on 27 financial ratios were obtained for the period of 1981 to 
1987 from the Bombay Stock Exchange Directory. The results of the multiple 
discriminant analysis showed that good performance of the paint industry 
depend on liquidity management and sales turnover. 
Panigrahy and Mishra [1993] made an attempt to design a cash flow 
variable model to predict corporate sickness. In their study, a sample of 45 
sick and 45 non-sick companies was selected. The sample of sick companies 
in which sickness was reported between the period 1977-87 was drawn at 
random from 12 different industry groups. The MDA was applied as an 
appropriate statistical technique under the multivariate analysis. Besides 
this, scaled vector technique, t-test and multivariate F-test were also used. 
Based on the V and 'F' values, altogether 14 cash flow ratios, seven each 
from Traditional Cash Flow (TCF) and Operating Cash Flow (OCF) groups, 
were found statistically significant. Later, when multivariate F-test was 
applied to each of the MDA models, the OCF model was rejected because 
it was not statistically significant. Finally, they selected seven ratios of TCF 
group were : (i) TCF/Total assets (ii) TCF/Total liabilities (iii) TCF/Net 
sales (iv) TCF/Net worth (v) TCF/Current assets (vi) TCF/Current liabilities 
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and (vii) TCF/Total capital. Putting the actual values of variables in the 
discriminant equation, a score known as the Y-score is finally obtained. 
Y - 4.99x, - 13.97x2 - 1.87x3 - 0.12x4 + 0.76x5 + 2.28x6 + 1.24xg 
The cut-off point for Y-score value was determined at -0.4221. Based 
on this cut-off point, the classification accuracy of the model one year prior 
to sickness was estimated at 86.67 per cent. The classification accuracy rate 
decreased from the second year to fifth year i.e. 85.56, 79.89, 75.56, 62.22 
per cent respectively prior to sickness. Their concluding remark was that 
cash flow ratios have a higher rate of accuracy in predicting as well as 
signalling corporate sickness in advance. 
In a recent attempt Rameshan [1996] has attempted an exploratory 
analysis of the change in the financial health of selected public enterprises 
based on multiple discriminant analysis by using separately the discriminant 
variables of Robertson and Altman. The study covered a sample of 20 public 
sector non-departmental & non-financial enterprises. Ten of these enterprises 
were the profit leaders as per the Public Enterprise Survey 1992-93 whereas 
the other ten the loss leaders in the same year. The analysis carried out for 
a period of seven years, viz. 1987-88 to 1993-94. The four years of the study 
fall in the pre-liberalisation period while the last three years have witnessed 
the liberalisation drives. He found that there has not any dramactic improvment 
in financial health during liberalisation years. In fact, the multiple discrim-
inant co-efficients have implied deterioration in most cases. Even in the case 
of the ten profit leaders, the financial health went down during the last three 
years of the study. His concluding remark was that atleast in the first three 
years of liberalisation, no break-through has achieved by the major public 
enterprises in areas of efficiency or overall financial strength. Actually, this 
attempt of the author was in view of the experimental nature of work. He 
mentioned that the analysis can be extended to all non-departmental pro-
duction enterprises operating with a profit or loss record. The author has 
a plan to continue more and more research on this line. 
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2.9.4 A Critical Evaluation of the Studies 
The studies conducted before 1960 were quite useful in analyzing and 
predicting the financial difficulties of business but none of them found the 
desired accuracy and perfection to the model because (i) Ramser and Foster 
covered in their study a large sample of 173 firms and their two turnover 
ratios had exhibited an opposite tendency; (ii) Winakor and Smith had 
studied a big sample of 183 firms but they did not cover the successful firms. 
They analyzed the data of unsuccessful or likely to be unsuccessful firms 
only; (iii) Marwin tried an unspecified number of ratios on a very large 
sample of 939 firms. 
The shortcomings of these studies can be ignored while considering 
the importance of their contribution in the development of financial ratio 
analysis as a potent tool for predicting the business difficulties. Moreover, 
the ratios which they had choosen as their best ratios are still credible. Undoubt-
edly, EJeaver's contribution on empirical findings to the failure prediction 
is a commendable job particularly, the accounting data have shown the ability 
to predict failure for at least five years prior to failure. His work though 
pioneering, has criticized on the ground that the work is based on univariate 
approach, but in reality it set the stage for the multivariate attempts by others. 
Tamari conducted a study on multivariate basis for the first time. The 
main criticism against his study is that he had chosen ratios and fixed the 
weights to them on arbitrary basis. Not only this, the study is not supported 
by any conceptual or empirical evidence. Altman made a significant break-
through in the area of corporate bankruptcy prediction by developing Z-score 
model popularly known as MDA model. He developed the Z-score model 
based on the theory that ratios, if analyzed with a multivariate framework, 
will take on greater statistical significance than the common technique of 
sequential ratio comparison. This idea made him famous. The most remark-
able shortcoming of Altman's model is that it tends to be accurate only for 
the year before the corporate bankruptcy i.e. the model did not give more 
accuracy when the lead time increases. This shortcoming of the model has 
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decreased its practical utility to predict corporate bankruptcy. Beaver's 
method is certainly more reliable then Altman's because of the less percent-
age of error on prediction of corporate failure. 
Deakin's study on firm's failure attempted to develop an alternative 
model to the same developed by Altman and Beaver. He used all the 14 ratios 
of Beaver and obtained improved predictability upto 3 years prior to failure 
(average 5 per cent) but in the forth and fifth year prior to failure error rates 
increased to 21 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. Later, some other 
researchers like Edmister, Blum Marg, Libby conducted studies by using the 
technique of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to improve upon the 
earlier studies. No doubt, all these studies have shown a significant rate of 
accuracy for the prediction of business failure but a common limitation is 
that all these studies have a separate discriminant function for each of the 
5 years before failure. For this limitation, it is difficult to know which 
particular discriminant function is to be applied in a particular case. Though 
the studies, conducted in the western world, have unearthed the fact that 
financial ratios have the ability to predict the survival or failure of business 
firms but there have no similarities in ratios or combination of ratios perform 
well. 
All the univariate and multivariate empirical studies discussed earlier, 
can not be apply to the industries of India and Bangladesh verbatum, because 
of certain difference in basic concepts. In most of the empirical researches, 
on prediction of firm failure conducted in the western world, firm failure 
has been synonymous with bankruptcy, which is not correct. Bankruptcy is 
a legal term which means insolvency but a large number of industries do 
not close their business operations even after several years of continous 
losses. They run their business despite accumulated losses, with the help 
of financial assistance from commercial banks and financial institutions. 
Acutally, bankruptcy is the culmination of failure i.e. a firm may fail and 
yet can remain far away from bankruptcy. Therefore, failure of a concern 
can be regarded as sickness whereas bankruptcy is to be considered as its 
last ritual. 
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In a pioneering attempt Kaveri conducted a study on prediction of 
sickness in small scale industries. The study has given 76 per cent classificaiton 
accuracy prior to one year of sickness. Srivastava developed a linear dis-
criminant function comprising of seven ratios to discriminate between the 
sick and healthy units. Bhattacharyaalso has done studies by using multiple 
discriminant analysis. Bidani & Mitra developed a clinical model of the 
anatomy of an industrial unit. Gupta identified a set of financial ratios to 
monitor the sickness of an industrial unit. Without these, few attempts have 
been made to apply different models to Indian data by Sarma & Roa, 
Satyanarayana, Srivastava & Yadav, Joshi & Ramani, Panigrahi & Mishra, 
Rameshan and also some other eminent persons in the field. 
Only one study on prediction of industrial sickness has carried out 
in Bangladesh though the sickness in this country has posed serious threat 
to the national economy. Existing financial models should be modified to 
suit the industrial data of Bangladesh. So more and more studies are essential 
to calculate those financial ratios which are more relevant to our criteria 
for detecting the industrial sickness. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the present chapter, a review of the existing literature concerning the 
causes and remedies of industrial sickness in Bangladesh as well as abroad 
(especially in India), giving emphasis on textile sector, have presented. The total 
review of the literature has been divided into two parts. First part comprises the review 
of industrial sickness studies alongwith some studies which have covered the different 
aspects of BTMC and second part covers the review of studies conducted abroad. The 
purpose of these literature survey is to review the relevant research done on the 
subject and to find-out the research gap. 
3.1 Studies Conducted in Bangladesh 
Shahid [1982] mentioned, in his paper, due to lack of proper supervision, 
follow-up, reporting and monitoring by the bank, as well as the entrepreneur, 
an enterprise may lead towards sickness. The author identified four main indicators 
such as production, cash management, sales and profit which may help in as-
certaining whether an enterprise is in good health or has fallen sick. The article 
is good only for conceptual development on the area without any numerical support. 
Hossain [1985] found that, most of the selected mills of BTMC could not 
fulfil their financial obligations and operating at losses. He observed that, the 
percentage of cash to working capital is very low, investment in inventories is 
high and that negative profitability adversely affecting the liquidity position of 
the selected units. The author suggested some remedial measures to overcome 
the adverse situation. He discussed only the problems in management of working 
capital but did not touch the other important problem areas of textile industries 
in Bangladesh. 
Saha [1986] in a study entitled "LendingProgramme of BSRS: An Evaluation" 
found that most of the projects financed by BSRS have become sick. BSRS 
executives opined that for the rapid sickness several factors are responsible viz. 
managerial incompetence, shortage of working capital, shortage of raw materials, 
marketing inefficiency, weakness in project appraisal, defective industrial policy 
and operational problems etc. 
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Ishaque [1988], in his article, covered all the 41 enterprises under 
the control of BTMC and indicated that mis-management is the main cause for 
the problem of working capital. He mentioned that operation of sick mills, pricing 
policy, inventory of raw materials, liquidity crisis, surplus manpower & tax burden 
are also liable for the problem of working capital and recommended some remedial 
measures to overcome the situation. The paper is limited to the discussion of only 
one problem, i.e. the problem of working capital management; the other problems 
with the enterprises under BTMC are not discussed. 
Sen [1989], in his study based paper, mentioned the breakup of the sick 
units registered with BSB and BSRS upto 30th June, 1985 with their debt burdens. 
He identified some internal causes of sickness viz. faulty project planning, defective 
management, inadequate plant maintenance, lack of technical knowledge, de-
creasing trend in sales, lack of BMRE and the problems of financial and labour 
etc. External problems are: natural calamities, non-availability of raw materials, 
price rise of electricity, gas etc., high production cost, heavy debt burden ,dearth 
of spare-parts, wrong specification of plant, lack of necessary cooperation from 
financing agencies etc. He has suggested some remedial measures like a policy 
of self correction (through change in product mix, BMRE of machineries etc.), 
changes in government policy, extensive rehabilitation programme, financial assistance, 
introduction of modern technology, amalgamation of sick units with healthy ones, 
systematic training programme, providing some infrastructural facilities etc. The 
author has suggested the remedial measures according to sector-wise not sick 
project-wise. He neither interviewed any entrepreneur nor any DFI executive. 
The study conducted on the basis of secondary data. He did not touch the sick 
units which are not listed with BSB and BSRS and cover any large scale industry. 
Begum [1990] specified, in her article, four criteria to identify an industrial 
project as sick. She mentioned some causes of sickness in a particular industry 
in terms of those criterias and grouped them into four viz. (i) causes for net loss 
(ii) causes for crippling debt-servicing burden (iii) causes for gradually falling 
share price and (i v) causes for under-utilization for industrial capacity. She also 
prescribed some remedial measures for revival and rehabilitation of sick industries 
to create the pace of new industrial investment in Bangladesh. The author has 
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not selected any specific industry either sector or unit wise and it is, in her study, 
not clear that in what basis or process she specified four criteria to identify an 
industry as sick. 
Islam [ 1990] identified some problems, in his article, relating to marketing 
of textile products in Bangladesh and offered some suggestions to solve it. The 
author emphatically expressed the opinion that if the problems are solved, the 
mills under BTMC would be able to market their products effectively and in turn 
be able to contribute to the welfare of the people of Bangladesh. The study is 
limited to only marketing of textile products among various functional areas of 
textile mills under BTMC. 
Hossain & Chowdhury [1991] found that there is deficiency of cash and 
both the size & percentages of cash to current assets are abnormally low in all 
the selected mills of BTMC except one. They identified the reasons for the unhappy 
situation and these are : non-implementation of the techniques to regularize cash 
flows, absence of adequate policy in determining the optimum cash balance and 
non-introduction of the techniques to maximize the availability of cash. They have 
suggested to prepare an effective cash planning and control and apply the different 
procedural techniques for obtaining the required volume of cash, reducing the 
volume of inventories & receivables (according to the prescribed norms of the 
BTMC) etc. In concluding remark the authors expected to have a broad based 
'internal control system' for an effective control over cash but did not cover other 
important problem areas of financial management of BTMC mills. 
Karim [1991], in his survey paper, provided empirical support through 
ten sick projects financed by BSB and BSRS under the caption 'A' to 'J ' . In 
all the ten cases, he mentioned, bad planning, faulty planning/design and weak 
management are the main causes of sickness and suggested some rehabilitation 
measures for those sick projects separately. Although the cases were very 
interesting and thought provoking but the paper was silent about the method of 
selecting the sample-cases and no medium or large scale sick projects have been 
considered in the study. 
Nabi [1991] highlighted some causes of sickness and recommended twenty 
63 
nine remedial measures to rehabilitate the sick projects on the basis of respondent's 
opinions. Finally, he suggested for a thorough study on the sick projects of Bangladesh. 
The author selected the medium and large scale sick projects which were in private 
sector and only financed by BSB and BSRS. 
Quayyum (1991] mentioned, in his article, some causes of business failure 
in Bangladesh like lack of experience, wrong identification of the project, lack 
of proper feasibility study, problems in project appraisal, lack of technical know-
how, problems of capital, unfavourable impact of currency devaluation on in-
dustries, managerial inefficiency, imbalance between policy formulation and 
implementation, lack of business ethics, absence of appropriate guidance and 
counselling, power failure, bureaucratic rigidities, poor infrastructure and so on. 
The author has suggested some remedial measures to solve the problems but no 
practical example has given. 
Rahman [1991] mentioned some causes of sickness of industrial units 
in Bangladesh and prescribed some remedial measures to overcome the situation. 
The maj or causes of sickness identified by him, are : failures in timely prediction, 
managerial failures, inadequate industrial infrastructural facilities, adverse socio-
political environment, deficiency of working capital, frequent changes in govt, 
policie s, corporate structure, increasing trend of costs, under-utilization of pro-
duction capacity etc. He emphasized on proper project appraisal and improve-
ment of industrial environment. He recommended to establish an independent 
board manned by highly technical and professional staffs for identifying of actual 
sick units, initiating of the process of rehabilitation, designing the nursing programme, 
negotiating with concerned parties and monitoring the nursing programme to 
rehabilitate the sick industrial units. The significant limitation of the paper is that 
it did not cover any specific industrial sector either in nature or in size. 
Task Force [1991] in its report mentioned that almost 50 per cent of 
the industries in Bangladesh, both in the public and private sector, are sick. 
The report contained a large number of causes for sickness like technological 
backwardness, low demand ofthe local products, over-crowding of investors in 
the same sub-sector, inappropriate creditpolicy, inefficient protection policy etc. 
The report emphasized on proper evaluation and identification ofthe problem to 
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prepare an effective industrial policy and recommended to set up a board/committee 
manned by competent official and legally qualified persons and prepare an incentive 
package for rehabilitation of viable sick industries. The Task Force also empha-
sized on close down the sick industries which are economically non-viable. 
Ather (1992] analyzed the under-utilization of capacity of 8 public cotton 
spinning mills in Bangladesh and pointed out that among the causes, just four, 
viz. power failure and load-shedding (30.28%), absenteeism (21.46%), shortage 
of spare parts (14.24%) and maintenance (10.93%) together accounted for 76.91 
per cent of idle capacity. The author recommended some remedial measures for 
the avoidance of under-utilization of capacity or maximizing the use of existing 
capacity installed but did not touch the factors which are liable for idle capacity. 
Karim [1992], in his unpublished Ph.D thesis, covered 24 industrial units 
financed by BSB, belonging to six industrial sub-sectors viz. textile food, chemical 
& pharmaceuticals, paper & paper products, electrical goods and cold storage. 
He identified a large number of problems and suggested some remedial measures 
to overcome the situation. He suggested the management to pay proper attention 
to prepare and maintain up-to-date books of accounts and to calculate accounting 
ratio analysis in regular basis in order to know the financial status & performance. 
He also suggested for amending of all existing legal provisions affecting industry 
viz. Companies Act 1913, Income Tax Act 1922 and other fiscal & monetary 
regulations. Such amendment has suggested to improve the quality of transport & 
communication facilities, ensure the regular supply of electricity at a reasonable 
cost, ensure coordination among Bangladesh Bank, DFI, NCB, MOI, MOF etc., 
adopt a common strategy regarding industrial financing and promotion etc. The 
study has not covered industrial units financed by BKB, BSRS, NCB, Private 
Commercial Bank and Islami Bank and also not covered public sector enterprises. 
Ministry of Industries [1992] formed a cell in June 1991 to identify 
the sick units and suggest recommendations. The cell submitted their report in 
1992 and identified 1583 units as sick. The cell mentioned 30 causes of sickness 
and suggested a large number of remedial measures. Though the attempt was 
the first initiative in govt, level but the main limitation is that the cell identified 
only those units as sick which applied for and a large number of public as well 
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as private sick units did not apply for registering as sick unit. Another limitation 
is, the cell identified sick units on the basis of the information which the entre-
preneurs had provided. The cell has not used any established model to identify 
an unit as sick or not suggested any model to predict the sickness of an unit a 
few years earlier than the year of occurrence. 
Saha and Dey (1992], in their study, found that all the five silk producing 
units are suffering from sickness due to some problems in production & marketing 
of silk goods. The authors identified some causes of sickness separately (unit-
wise) but combindly suggested some remedial measures to improve the situation. 
The study is limited to only five private sector silk industries and one district 
of Bangladesh. 
Ather [ 1993] highlighted the stages, effects of sickness etc. and mentioned 
some causes and their remedial measures to rehabilitate the sick units & prevent 
from future sickness. He has recommended for close coordination among the 
Government, DFIs, the commercial banks and the sponsors to remove industrial 
sickness. He has not provided any empirical support in favour of his findings 
and covered any particular type of industries. 
Momin [1994] discussed three predictive financial models of industrial 
sickness based on financial ratios developed by W.H. Beaver, E.I. Altman and 
L.C.Gupta. The author mentioned that no attempt has been made or no research 
work has yet been taken to select the best financial ratios for sickness prediction 
of industrial units in Bangladesh. He suggested to consider the value added figure 
in liew of profit figure as the performance indicator of the business. The author 
has not suggested any specific model which could suit the context of Bangladesh 
or not developed any model to predict the industrial sickness of Bangladesh. 
Rashid & Karim [1994] studied a sample of 8 textile mills which had 
been operating under BTMC and found that there was a higher degree of idle 
capacity in all the sample mills varying from 25 per cent to 54 per cent during 
1985-86, 1988-89 and 1989-90. They mentioned some causes of idle capacity 
and statistically proved the impact of such higher degree of idle capacity but they 
have not suggested the remedial measures to overcome the situation. 
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Jahangir [1995] provided a short overview on industrial sickness of small 
scale industries (SSls) in Bangladesh in general and the present status of SSIs 
in Kushtia district in particular. The paper highlighted the localization of sick units 
and identified some causes of sickness. He recommended some remedial measures 
to solve the problem. The author suggested that after correct diagnosis of the 
problem, joint efforts of all relevant parties like BSCIC, Commercial Banks, 
Entrepreneurs and the Government are essential to successfully deal with this 
grave industrial problem. The main limitation of his study is that it has not covered 
either any medium or large scale industry or any small scale industry which is 
not assisted by BSCIC. 
Karim [1995] made an attempt to identify the causes and symptoms of 
industrial sickness on accounting view point. He suggested the management to 
be alert about symptoms of sickness and also mentioned that the professional 
accountants have an important role to detect the weakness/symptom of sickness 
at an early stage so that the management may take appropriate preventive action. 
The author observed that a good number of industrial units in Bangladesh maintains 
their accounts on historical basis so that these types of accounting information 
hardly enables the management to predict and determine the causes of sickness. 
The article is narrative without any empirical support. 
In a recent attempt, Ali [1997] hasmentioned that the selected mill had 
incurred losses in 16 years out of last 18 years and identified some reasons for 
not achieving the institutional success, viz. irregular supply of electricity, frequent 
breakdown of machinery, shortage of working capital and a large quantity of 
cotton yarn incoming through smuggling etc. The author suggested some remedial 
measures, such as: to increase the volume of production by using the idle spindles, 
to confirm the required raw material supply in time, to give the power to take 
all the decision regarding production to the mill authority, to give an emphasis 
on the modernization of machineries, to take initiative to sell the produced yarn 
at a reasonable price, to install a generator, to take initiative to protect the 
smuggling etc. The mill is facing some financial difficulties but the author has not 
suggested any immediate ways & means to overcome that difficulties. 
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Without the above studies many professionals, economists, and research-
ers observed a large number of problems of the industrial enterprises of Bangladesh, 
especially of the public sector cotton textile industries. Some of them, in briefly, 
are the following : 
The Planning Commission [1973] indicated some deficiencies in the area 
of financial management of the cotton textile industry of Bangladesh viz. lack 
of clearly defined financial objectives; absence of production target; weak man-
agement information system (MIS); defective purchase and sales policies etc. 
Habibullah [1974] mentioned that the cotton textile industries of Bangladesh 
are suffering from low productive efficiency and high cost of production. 
Islam [1977] pointed-out some of the weaknesses experienced in 
the financial management of the cotton textile industry of Bangladesh. Some of 
them are : problems in administrative procedure relating to budget approval; 
execution and implementation; inappropriate pricing system etc. 
Sobhan & Ahmad [1980] indicated some loopholes in the working capital 
management of the public sector industries especially in the cotton textile industry. 
These are : working capital gap, defective policy relating to the procurement of 
raw cotton and spare parts etc. 
Hoque [1987] mentioned that overcapitalization and problem of working 
capital are permanent drags on the profitability of public sector industries in 
Bangladesh. He also mentioned that in Bangladesh cash receipts and disbursement 
policies are unsound in the case of public sector industrial undertakings. 
Saha [1989], in a study, mentioned that capacity has remained theoretically 
under-utilize leading to idle capacity, which adversely affects to the productivity 
and profitability of the textile industrial sector of Bangladesh. It is not an in depth 
study. The author has not suggested any specific remedial measures to solve the 
problem. 
3.2 Studies Conducted Abroad 
A study made by the Indian Institute of Economics, Hyderabad, revealed 
that tedious procedures of obtaining credit, delay in supplies of raw materials, 
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transportation bottlenecks, delay in allotment and distribution of raw materials, 
lack of good quality raw materials, lack of financial management and finance are 
the important causes of sickness. The study did not recommend any specific solution 
to overcome the adverse situation [Mazumdar & Nag; 1977]. 
According to a study [Bidani & Mitra; 1982], conducted by the Economic 
and Scientific Research Foundation, New Delhi, a large number of industrial 
projects particularly in large scale sector have become economically unviable 
due to a sharp increase in capital costs. The study highlighted that there are wide 
differences in project costs due to various factors like scale of production and 
technology used. The study also highlighted that cost over-runs being one of the 
common causes of industrial sickness. The study did not cover any specific industrial 
sector. 
The Report of the Task Force set up by the Union Government of Gujarat 
in 1972 in connection with the formulation of policies and programmes for the 
development of the textile industry referred to a number of adverse factors faced 
by it such as the severe and increasing competition, demand recession, shortage 
and high costs of raw materials, labour trouble etc. [Piramal; 1982] 
The Planning Commission [1982] had sponsored a study on sickness 
through the Management Development Institute. The report submitted in October 
1982 indicated that in most of the cases, the determinant of failure as well as 
success has been the "Management". The management are responsible for failure 
due to faulty project formulation, inappropriate timing of decisions and adoption 
of outdated technology. The paper had come to the conclusion that Government's 
own policies were also responsible for sickness in industry. It pin-pointed three 
main reasons for the sickness of industrial units. They were (a) licensing of 
capacity in an industry unrelated to demand; (b) price and distribution controls; 
(c) infrastructure constraints. The paper highlighted somecauses but didnotsuggest 
the measures to overcome the situation of sickness. 
Kuchhel [1984] investigated into the success and failure of 46 industrial 
units drawn from a vast group of 12 industries comprising of tractors, automobiles, 
tyres, detergents, synthetic yarns, mini steel, steel tubes, scooter, automobile 
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gears, fibre-glass, steel trips and tools, sheet glass and hotels. All these units 
were provided financial assistance by the national level financial institutions. He 
mentioned that 25 units (54 percent) were successful and the remaining 21 units 
(46 per cent) were sick. The study revealed that only 6 units (13 per cent) could 
implement their projects in the scheduled time and cost. Of the remaining 40 
units, as many as 26 units (57 per cent) faced both time and cost over-runs in 
varying degree averaging 57.3 per cent cost over-runs and 27 months time over-
runs. About two-third (17 units) of these 26 units were sick and the remaining 
one-third (9 units) were successful. The author has not been indicated for what 
reasons and for whom the implementation delayed. 
In order to identify the main causes of industrial sickness, the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) called for information from the banks on the causes of 
sickness of 378 large and medium sick industrial units which include mainly sick 
textile mills under the management of the National Textile Corporation/State 
Textile Corporation, sick sugar mills managed by the State Sugar Corporation 
and other sick units whose managements had been taken over by the Government 
under the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act at the end of December 
1979. The cause-wise analysis revealed that mis-management accounted for 52 
per cent of the units studied, other factors accounted for sickness were faulty 
planning and other technical drawbacks (14%), market recession (23%), other 
reasons such as power-cuts, shortage of raw materials (9%) and the much talked 
about labour trouble accounted for the sickness of only 2 per cent. The analysis 
by the RBI also revealed that the industrial workers who are least responsible 
for the phenomenon of sickness are its worst victims [Roonga; 1984]. 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Bombay, appointed a committee to 
examine the legal and other difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions 
in rehabilitations of sick industrial undertakings and suggest remedial measures, 
including the changes required in various laws relating to Taxation Companies 
Act, Industries (Development & Regulation) Act etc. on June 14, 1981 headed 
by Shri T. Tiwari. The report highlighted that among the internal factors an 
overwhelming cause of business failure are management deficiency, mis-manage-
ment and management dissensions whereas marketing and technical cause of 
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external category are the main reasons for sickness of industrial units. The report 
suggested some strategies to combat sickness; these are: (a) take-over or change 
of management; (b) reconstruction; (c) transfer of lease; (d) sale as running 
concern; (e) take-over by purchase of shares by a healthy unit; (f) liquidation; 
(g) merger/amalgamation; and (h) rehabilitation. The report also suggested that 
the reliefs and concessions should be given by the Government, sacrifices to be 
made by the management, labour, shareholders and creditors etc. [Tiwari Committee 
Report; 1984]. 
Srivastava & Yadav [1986] conducted a study on causes of sickness 
on the basis of collected data from 223 industrial projects which were in default 
during June 1970 to December 1980. Their studies confirmed that mis-manage-
ment is the single most important factor responsible for sickness in industries. 
The study revealed on cause-wise distribution of new projects in default that 
lack of good management contributed 22.19 per cent to the sickness in projects 
followed by poor implementation (>21.70%), marketing problems (15.81 %), non-
availability of raw materials (13.45%), shortfall of working capital (7.20%), 
labour trouble (5.74%), technical/operational problems (5.55%) and other prob-
lems (8.36%). In terms of internal and external causes, majority of the projects 
(62.38%) are found in default due to internal causes like problems of poor 
management, poor implementation, shortage of working capital and labour prob-
lems. In fact, the problems identified by the authors are directly and indirectly 
related to mis-management in the respective operational areas of the projects. 
The authors identified a large number of causes but didnot suggest clearly, either 
sector-wise or unit-wise, the remedial measures to solve the problems. 
Das [1987] presented a brief statistical profile to illustrate the magnitude 
of sickness of public enterprises. He found that the number of loss making units 
are increasing gradually. He categorized the public sector sickness into three 
parts, viz. (i) Born sick (ii) Sickness thrust and (iii) Turned sick. He suggested 
some recommendations of curing the units of sickness problems and hoped that 
if the macro and micro-level recommendations are adopted, the public sector 
would no longer remain a hospital bed for sick industries. The paper is narrative 
in nature without any case study. 
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Dave (1987) in her published Ph. D. thesis on the topic "Industrial 
Sickness and Some Key Areas of Management (A Study of Textile Industry : 
Guj arat), selected 9 mills out of 114 textile mills in Gujarat and classified the mills 
into three groups. 3 mills from each group, on the basis of purposive sampling 
method, were selected and covered a period of six years i.e. from 1977 to 1982 
for the study. She examined the strengths and weaknesses of management prac-
tices against the norms laid down by various authorities of management science. 
The most significant contribution of her study is to examine the linkage between 
quality of management practices and the problem of industrial sickness. Quality 
of management in sick units and would be sick units has found to be lower than 
that of in healthy units i.e. there is a close and important relationship between 
the quality of management and health of industrial units. The study was mainly 
confined to the management view point. She did not consider the factors which 
are beyond the control of the management. 
Khandwalla [1988] made an attempt to know the perceptions of officials 
of financial institutions andidentified 40 causes of industrial sickness. The relative 
importance of all the causes based on average score was assessed by classifying 
them into three categories (i) major causes, (ii) moderate causes, and (iii) minor 
causes. On the basis of this classification, 10 out of 13 major causes were 
management related including corrupt management, inadequacies in financial 
management, poor general management and poor initial choices of technology 
and investment. 15 moderate causes were relating to external factors. 12 causes 
were seen related to interference by politicians, financial institutions in the man-
agement of the unit and poor law and order situation prevalent in the unit. 
Sandesara [1988], in his paper, delineated sickness from the angle of 
stages in which it may be rooted. He mentioned that in the planning and con-
struction stage, the unit may be found at an uneconomic condition because of 
adopting an inefficient method of production or planning to produce an absolute 
product. In the second stage of sickness the unit may have made some mistakes 
in recruitment and training of the workers, underestimates for various inputs such 
as power, funds etc., which mistakes are very difficult to correct. In his opinion, 
the third and final stage of sickness may arise even when the unit is in full swing 
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. The unit may be caused sick when the demand for the product may have changed, 
new and advanced methods of production may have devised and mean while new 
producers/competitors may also have emerged. As a result of all these changes, 
the unit may not have been in a position to cope with the changed and changing 
situations and thus, may not have been earning expected profits from the new 
opportunities in the market. The paper did not cover the remedial measures to prevent 
the sickness at different stages. 
Sahu [ 1990] found, in his article the increasing rate of industrial sickness 
causes widespread losses in production, income and employment to the concerned 
units and to the nation. He also found the problems of sickness generally stem 
from bad management, high rate of capital gearing and several other financial 
and non-financial factors. He has suggested some steps which may follow by the 
management, financing institutions and the government in turning a sick unit into 
an economically viable one. He has also suggested that rigorous management 
control systems should be implemented at various levels of operations. This article 
is helpful for conceptual framework but it does not show the ways and means 
to solve the problem. 
A study conducted in Canada and USA on industrial sickness in small 
industries revealed that incompetent management, which was the single most 
important cause for failure, accounted for 50 per cent followed by lack of 
managerial experience (20%), imbalance managerial experience (15%), lack of 
experience in the area of business (5%) and miscellaneous causes were 10 per 
cent [Aima; 1994J. The study is not clear about methodological design and did 
not suggest any remedial measures to stop the failure of small industries. 
Sharma and Rani [1994] mentioned that in India nearly 29,000 units are 
adding to the sick list every year, i.e. 90 units falling sick every working day. 
They observed that SSI units comprised nearly 99 per cent of the total sick units 
in the country. They emphasized on correct diagnosis of the problem, withdraw 
some rehabilitation benefits and allow to die the economically non-viable sick 
units. They have suggested the government to ensure and adopt an effective training 
on encrepreneurship who are entering in industrial world and to solve the marketing 
problem by creating specialized marketing network but did not cover any large 
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scale industrial sector particularly textile sector. 
Chudasma [1996] made an attempt to study the industrial sickness of 
selected textile enterprises. He used Altman's Z-score model to find-out the 
industrial health of the selected companies. He found that 11 companies having 
less than 1.8 score i.e. these are sick companies. The remaining companies fall 
in the score between 1.8 to 3 which indicate that these 9 companies are ap-
proaching sickness if appropriate measures are not taken immediately. He mentioned 
that Z-score gives an important information to the management about the liquidity, 
productivity, capacity to absorb economic and financial shocks, debt service 
capacity and efficiency in assets utilization. One limitation is that, Z-score is assets 
based model and is more quantitative and does not take qualitative aspects into 
consideration like management strength, product quality, changing market etc. 
The paper did not find-out the causes of sickness of selected enterprises. 
Jahangir [1997] made an attempt to highlight some common causes, 
signals and symptoms of sickness in small scale industries in India. He emphasized 
on prevention than cure and also identified some preventive measures viz. proper 
& unbiased appraisal of project, proper & adequate supervision, follow-up, 
reporting & monitoring etc. The author has emphasized on correct diagnosis before 
taking the decision of rehabilitation of any sick unit and to give proper attention 
to monitor the nursing programme in order to cure the sickness of an industry 
for its revival / restoration / rehabilitation. He has also suggested to take appro-
priate steps to ensure the implementation of rehabilitation programme according 
to schedule The article is narrative on the basis of some literature on the area 
without any empirical investigation. 
Without the above studies, some researchers identified some causes and 
suggested remedial measures of sickness in textile industries. A brief review of 
some studies are discussed below. 
Balasubramanian, K [1985] mentioned that in 1983-84, the textile units 
had to face severe power cuts, high raw material cost, market recession and 
rising wages. He has suggested to set up a separate full-fledged organization 
charged with the specific responsibility of studying general as well as individual 
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cases of sickness in industries which would help prediction of the malady in time 
and suggest solutions long before the illness reaches a serious stage. He did not 
cover, in his paper, any particular size (large, medium or small) of textile industry. 
Buch 11988J mentioned that mis-management is one ofthe important factors 
for sickness of textile mills in the initial stages but in the present context it is no 
longer valid. According to him, among other factors, the lending policies followed 
by banks and other financial institutions and lack of modernization contributes 
to sickness and closure of mills. The article is fully personal opinion based without 
any numerical supportings. 
Srinivasan {1989] mentioned that since the 1960s the cotton textile 
industry faced competition from unbated smuggling of man made fibers, filaments 
& fabrics; unwise expansion of textile industry is also contributed to sickness. 
He has suggested some strategies for reviving of sick textile industries such as: 
old dilapidated and obsolete units should be closed down and uneconomic 
operations should be discontinued; surplus unusable production capacity should 
be contracted and cancelled; strict quality control should be adopted and imple-
mented in the industry on a voluntary basis; tax reduction and rationalization 
measures should be adopted; old and obsolete units should be allowed to die 
and replaced with new modern functional units to serve as models for future 
expansion in the industry. He made an attempt to solve the problem of industrial 
sickness on the basis of personal opinion and existing literature on the area of 
industrial sickness without giving any empirical support. 
Kathar [1990] identified some reasons for the weak financial position of 
TEXCOM are: (i) inadequacy of share capital (ii) paucity of working capital (iii) 
unfavourably capital structure (iv) heavy interest burden (v) social objectives (vi) 
high cost of production (vii) low sales and lower selling prices (viii) under-
utilization ofthe installed capacity (ix) rigidity in the operational flexibility etc. 
The author suggested some remedial measures viz. change in product mix, change 
in capital structure, utilization of full capacity, conversion of borrowing into equity 
share capital and reorganization ofthe project. He did not apply any statistical 
technique to evaluate the economic performance and classify the causes into internal/ 
controllable and external/uncontrollable group. 
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3.3 Research Gap 
On the basis of foregoing literature review it can easily be concluded that 
a large number of studies have conducted in India on industrial sickness although 
the most of these studies highlighted on the magnitude of sick industries, the 
number of sick units with the debt burden, increasing trend of sick units in state-wise/ 
region-wise, causes, symptoms and remedial measures of sickness etc. A good 
number of studies has focussed on sickness in small scale industrial sector but a 
little attempt has been made to study the large as well as medium scale sick 
industries. Nalini V Deve, in her in-depth study, has covered the sickness of textile 
industries in Gujarat, but she emphasized mainly to examine the linkage between 
the quality of management practices and the problem of industrial sickness. 
In Bangladesh, some professionals researchers and scholars in the field 
have written several articles on causes, symptoms, rehabilitation and remedial 
measures of sick industries which are mostly narrative in nature; but a few have 
dealt the topic of industrial sickness in a systematic and integrated manner. A 
few articles have discussed and analyzed some specific problem areas of textile 
industries but no in-depth study has done on the vital issue of industrial sickness 
and the causes thereof giving emphasis on textile sector which is badly called 
for. 
The present study is undertakento make an in-depth analysis of the causes 
of sickness and to suggest remedial measures for improving performance of the 
public sector cotton textile mills presently operating under Bangladesh Textile 
mills Corporation (BTMC). Furthermore, an attempt is made to examine the 
financial health with the help of ratio analysis and by using some well-established 
financial models for predicting the chances of survival or failure of the mills under 
B TMC. It is therefore hoped that the present study on the problems of public sector 
textile industry, Bangladesh, will makeamodest contribution to the present knowl-
edge on the issue of industrial sickness in Bangladesh. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
The present chapter covers the methodological design and sample techniques 
used in this study. The various aspects of the research design follow the 
objectives, hypotheses, scope, methodology and limitations of the study. 
These steps are described in the following paragraphs. 
4.1 The Objectives 
The present study has been undertaken to achieve some general as well 
as specific objectives. The general objective of the study is to ascertain the 
factors liable for sickness of the industrial enterprises in Bangladesh. The 
specific objectives of the study are as follows : 
(a) To analyse the growth & development of public sector textile mills 
in Bangladesh. 
(b) To analyse the overall position of sick industries in Bangladesh with 
a view to ascertain whether sickness in public textile industry is real 
or fake. 
(c) To review the policies & measures taken by the government of Bangladesh 
to tackle the problems of sick industrial units. 
(d) To evaluate the financial performance and operational efficiency of 
textile mills under Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC). 
(e) To identify the factors causing sickness of public textile industrial 
enterprises under BTMC and suggest some possible measures to overcome 
the situation. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
The study broadly aims at examining the following hypotheses with 
the help of available data & information : 
1. In Bangladesh, most of the public textile mills operating under BTMC 
are sick. 
2. The sickness of the BTMC mills results from some important factors 
like shortage of working capital, under-utilization of capacity, adverse 
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debt-equity ratio, entry of yarn & cloth through smuggling & some 
unauthorized way etc. 
3. The mills under Group-B (which mills are probable profitable & nearest 
to the break-even) have better operational efficiency and financial 
performance than that of the mills under Group-A. (losing mills). 
4. The difference between the state of financial health of the mills under 
Group-A & B is significant which can be analysed with the help of the 
selected ratios. 
4.3 Scope of the Study 
The scope of the study is limited in terms of industry and period 
coverage. The details are as under : 
4.3.1 Industry Coverage 
Among the different sectors/sub-sectors of industrial enterprises in 
Bangladesh, textile sector has been chosen for the purpose of the study. Within 
the textile sector, only public sector cotton textile mills have been included 
within the scope of the study. The selection of the public textile mills 
operating under BTMC is guided by several factors. First of all, it is one 
of the earliest established & organized industries in Bangladesh. Secondly, 
public textile mills are spread over the country more widely than several 
other traditional industries. Thirdly, most of the textile mills under BTMC 
are incurring heavy losses and a large number of mills have been closed 
& denationalized since the last decade. Last but not the least, BTMC is the 
second largest public sector corporation on the basis of investment, capital 
machineries, the number of the mills and employment. The largest public 
sector corporation, on the basis of the above mentioned criteria, Jute mills 
under BJMC have not been included in this study, because a lot of works 
have already been done in this sector. In view of the large diversity of the 
public sector as well as private sector, it is neither feasible nor desirable 
to attempt a pathology of sickness among all public or private industries 
and suggest a panacea. 
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4.3.2 Period Coverage 
The study basically covered a period of five years beginning from 
1992-93 to the year 1996-97. In case of the historical background of BTMC, 
the time profile of denationalization of BTMC mills and the contribution 
of the corporation to national exchequer, the period has been included twenty 
five years from March, 1972 to June, 1997. This is the period beginning from 
nationalization of the mills till the last financial year. 
4.4 Methodology 
The present study is based on certain objectives as mentioned earlier. 
In the light of these objectives, an attempt has been made to analyse the 
main functional areas like production, sales, marketing, capacity utilization, 
plant & machinery, profitability and overall financial position of selected 
industrial units for the study. The basic statistical techniques have been used 
in the course of study. The details are as follows : 
4.4.1 Selection of Sample 
In 1995, the BTMC authority had classified the mills into three groups 
on the basis of past financial trends & operational achievements. These three 
groups were : 
A. Heavily losing mills 
B. Losing mills 
C. Probable profitable & nearest to the break-even mills. 
Under the Group-A there were eleven mills. During the financial year 
1996-97, these eleven mills were laid-off due to heavy operating losses. Some mills 
were disinvested and others are in the pipe line of disinvestment. Under the Group-
B there were ten mills (eight spinning & two composite) and under the Group-
C there were nine mills (eight spinning & one specialised) in June 1997. 
The present study is limited to ten mills (nine spinning & one composite), 
out of a total number of nineteen mills presently running under BTMC, thereby 
covering roughly 53 per cent of the total running mills. Five mills from Group-
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B and five mills from Group-C have been selected purposively. The selected 
mills are scatteredly located throughout the country. 
4.4.2 Use of Code Name 
Ten selected mills are classified into two groups i.e. Group-A & 
Group-B. Group-A contains five losing mills and Group-B contains five 
probable profitable & nearest to the break-even mills. In order to avoid 
frequent mentioning of the names of the selected mills, code names have 
been used. The name of the mills & their code name, used in the study, are 
given below : 
SI. No. Name of the Mills. Code Name 
GROUP-A 
1. Ahmed Bawany Textiles A, 
2. Quaderia Textile Mills A2 
3. Kurigram Textile Mills A3 
4. Magura Textile Mills A4 
5. Sylhet Textile Mills A5 
GROUP - B 
6. Sundarban Textile Mills B, 
7. Dinajpur Textile Mills B2 
8. Rangamati Textile Mills B3 
9. Rajshahi Textile Mills B4 
10. Bengal Textiles B5 
4.4.3 Sources of Data 
With a view to achieving the objectives of the study and testing the 
hypotheses, both primary and secondary data have been used. The main 
secondary sources of data were: 
- Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) 
- Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Government of Bangladesh 
- Ministry of Finance (MOF), Government of Bangladesh 
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- Ministry of Textiles (MOT), Government of Bangladesh 
- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 
Different types of reports of BTMC have mostly been used as the sec-
ondary source for the purpose of the study. Besides these secondary sources, 
primary data have also been used in the study. One executive (GM/DGM/AGM/ 
Manager/Accounts Head) from each often selected mills i.e. ten respondents filled 
up the questionnaire. Informal discussions have also been made, with the Chief 
Accountant, Additional Chief Accountant (MIS) and some other Senior 
Executives of BTMC alongwith the Leaders of labour unions of four mills under 
BTMC, to know their feelings & opinions regarding sickness/continuous 
losses incurring by the BTMC mills. 
4.4.4 Methods of Data Collection 
Various methods for data collection have been used for completing 
this study. Published and unpublished secondary materials viz. annual re-
ports (audited & provisional), performance reports & annual MIS reports of 
BTMC. research reports, economic reviews, industrial policies of the govt., 
survey reports, etc. have been collected by th researcher personally from the 
BTMC head office, different ministries, offices, & institutes. Existing liter-
ature like books, journals, newspapers, magazines, published & unpublished re-
search works etc. (available in different libraries in Bangladesh as well as in India) 
have been consulted. The statistical year books, economic reviews and government 
policies on different aspects have also been consulted to supplement the available 
infmation. 
In order to get the necessary primary data, a questionnaire was pre-
pared, which was partly structured & partly open-ended (vide in appendix-
1), in the light of the objectives of the study. Before the finalization of the 
questionnaire, some discussions were made with some experts on all its 
aspects and also tested it in Magura Textile Mills (A4 ). After piloting the 
questionnaire, some changes were made and prepared the final questionnaire 
for collection of required data. Four mills (three spinning i.e. A4 , B, , & B5 
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and one composite i.e. A, ) were visited personally by the researcher which 
were selected purposively. Informal discussions were also held, with the 
officials & the leaders of the employees unions of the visited mills, to gather 
knowledge on different functional areas & obtain valuable information, and 
proved helpful and some opinions were very appreciative which have been 
duly incorporated at appropriate places. 
4.4.5 Data Analysis Techniques 
The collected data from the primary & secondary sources have been 
processed, analysed and presented in order to make them suitable for the 
purpose of the conclusions. For data analysis purpose, various statistical 
measures & techniques such as percentage, ratio analysis, mean, standard 
deviation, t-test etc. have been used. Three multi-variate models have also 
been applied in the study to measure the degree of sickness. 
The collected primary data have been presented in different tables. The 
common-size percentages of profit & loss statements have been calculated 
to analyse the individual cost items to sales of the selected mills during the 
study period. 
For the purpose of evaluation of past trend of financial health as well 
as the prediction of future of the selected mills, twenty seven different 
financial ratios, mean values and standard deviations have been calculated under 
univariate approach for each year understudy from 1992-93 to 1996-97. The 
"t-test" has also been applied to measure the statistical significance of the 
difference between the mean values of selected financial ratios with the 
ultimate object to test the difference between the state of financial health of 
two groups of mills. Under multivariate approach, three important multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) models based on financial ratios (Altman's Z-
score, Satyanarayana's Z* value & Yadav's Y-score) have been applied to 
ascertain the financial health & measure the degree of sickness of the selected 
mills. 
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4.5 Limitations of the Study 
The study has some limitations. The main limitations are : 
(a) Though there are a large number of state-owned manufacturing enter-
prises under six industrial sector corporations but the study covered 
only one public sector industry due to time & resource constraints. 
(b) At present, there are nineteen textile mills operating under BTMC but 
ten mills have been selected for the study and the remaining nine public 
textile mills have not been included in the present study. 
(c) The commercial audit of annual accounts of BTMC enterprises was 
found complete only the year of 1992-93. In case of incomplete audit 
work of the annual accounts some inconsistency, on the figures be-
tween annual MIS reports and provisional accounts of BTMC enter-
prises, were observed. Thus, the limitations of the secondary data have 
remained a constraint of this study. 
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BANGLADESH TEXTILE MILLS 
CORPORATION (BTMC): AN OVERVIEW 
5.1 Historical Background of BTMC 
Bangladesh was liberated on 16th December, 1971. The first Government 
of Bangladesh led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was Politically committed to 
socialism and also to fill the vacuum, created by the Liberation War and for 
the departure of West Pakistani owners, managers and entrepreneurs from East 
Pakistan, took control of all the abandoned properties including 725 industrial units 
by declaring Abandoned Properties Ordinance (President's Order No.l, dated 
January 3,1972). [Chisty; 1985]. The government also inherited a number of 
enterprises owned by the central government of Pakistan and again the govern-
ment announced the decision through the President's Order No.27 of 1972 
to nationalize the key industries viz. Jute, textile, sugar etc. as well as insurance, 
banking and some other enterprises in service & transport sector which were 
owned by the Bangladeshis. Through these legal framework and process, gov-
ernment increased public ownership and control over the economy. The gov-
ernment created 11 sector corporations to manage the industries in the public 
sector. 
Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) was brought into existence 
on March 26, 1972 with the promulgation of Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalization) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 27 of 1972). It started 
formal function from 1st July, 1972. The authorized capital of the corporation 
is Taka 1.00 crore to be subscribed by the government, in the manner determined 
by the government from time to time, according to the requirement of the 
corporation. It started with an initial share capital of Tk.5.00 lacs fully paid-
up and subscribed by the government. According to the second schedule of the 
Nationalization Order, 64 textile units were placed under the administrative 
control of the corporation. Subsequently 10 more mills were brought under the 
administrative control of BTMC and increased the total number of enterprises 
to 74. Of these 8 had no tangible assets. Over the passage of time it was found 
that the performances of the textile mills under BTMC were not satisfactory. A 
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good number of the mills were continuously running into losses. In 1977, the 
BTMC was placed under newly created Ministry of Textiles. 
The change in government in 1975 brought about a significant change in 
the attitude towards nationalized industries. According to the Industrial Policy, 
the government disinvested 10 specialized textile units during February, 1977 
to November, 1979. Another 4 textile mills having installed capacity of 82,440 
spindles and 2046 looms were put under liquidation from February, 1982. 
Actually, since 1977, but more vigorously since 1982, the government has started 
denationalization of public textile mills. In pursuance of the New Industrial Policy 
declared by the government in June 1982, 22 operating textile mills having 
4,12,680 spindles and 2583 looms were transferred to the former Bangladeshi 
shareholders during 1982-83. 3 units having no tangible assests were also 
transferred to the related Bangladeshi owners. Later on, the denationalization 
process continued and at the same time some new units/mills were commissioned 
by BTMC. 
The corporation had 34 textile mills (12 composite and 22 spinning mills) 
and 5 specialized textile mills (including one workshop) in operation as on 
30.6.1985. The total number of installed spindles in those 34 running textile mills 
was 6,61,864 and the total number of looms was 3111. In 30th June 1985, 
5 units having no tangible assets, 2 new projects under construction, project 
suspended/capital had withdrawn from 2 units were also under the administrative 
control of BTMC. During 1985-86 to 1995-96,10 more textile mills (including 
7 running mills) were denationalized/transferred to the private sector and 2 under 
construction projects were completed and commissioned. During that period, 
2 mills were commissioned by BTMC, one weaving mill had converted into spinning 
and 12 heavily loosing mills including one Embroidering mill were laid-off under 
denationalization policy of the government. In that manner, 27 running textile mills 
(7 composite and 20 spinning mills) and 3 specialized mills were in operation 
at the beginning of the year 1996-97. During 1996-97 some laid-off mills were 
transferred and some were in the pipe-line of the transfer process. On the 
otherhand, 11 more heavily loosing textiles mills (9 running textile and 2 spe-
cialized textile mills) have been laid-off during 1996-97. 
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There were, thus a total number of 40 mills under the control of BTMC 
at the beginning of the financial year 1997-98. Of these 3 mills had no tangible 
assests, 16 mills were in laid-off, project suspended/capital had withdrawn from 
2 Units, which were in the process of denationalization, i.e. as on 30th June, 
1997, there were only 19 running textile mills under the control and supervision 
of BTMC. These included 16 spinning mills, 2 composite mills (which are 
producing both Yarn and Cloth) having 428112 spindles and 562 looms, and 
one specialized mill (Valika Woollen Mills which areproducing Knitting Wool 
& Woollen Fabrics). 
Table 5.1 shows the time profile of denationalization of BTMC mills as 
well as the information on new projects, mills commissioned by BTMC, installed 
capacity of running textile mills etc. at a glance. 
5.2 Operational Activities of BTMC 
Some operational activities of BTMC like administrative and marketing 
system, procurement of raw materials and manpower development and training 
facilities are discussed below. 
5.2.1 The Administrative System and Functions 
The system for management and administration of textile industries under 
BTMC is a three-tier system which is shown as follows: 
Ministry : Maximum power and authority 
Corporation : Limited power and authority 
Enterprise : Nominal power and authority 
Ministry Level 
At the ministry level three ministries are involved in the public sector textile 
industries. Ministry of Textiles is responsible for general supervision based on 
government directives/policies such as captial investment, production & pricing, budget 
and management information system etc. The Ministry of Planning reviews and 
approves the annual and long-term development plans. The Ministry of Finance 
is responsible for budgeting and controlling including capital budgeting without 
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becoming over-involved in the day to day management [PC; 1985] 
Alam [ 1982] mentioned, in his paper, while evaluating ministerial control 
in the case of public enterprises, sometimes control may come from the Office 
of the President in the form of policy decisions, appointment of corporation board 
members and enterprise executives, removal of chairman/directors of the board 
and ordering an inquiry into the affairs of specific industries. Some other ministries, 
at macro level, viz. Ministry of Industries, Home Ministry etc. as well as the 
Cabinet of Ministries are also involved in the decision making process. 
Corporation Level 
The second tier of the management system of public textile industries is 
the Board of Directors of BTMC. The Board consists of a Chairman and 
5 Directors appointed by the Government for a period with terms & conditions 
determined by the Government. All the general and administrative directions 
or functional responsibilities of the affairs, the business of the corporation and 
its enterprises are vested on the Board of Directors and Chairman. The Chairman 
is the chief executive officer of BTMC. The boardacts under the supervision 
and control of the Government via Ministry of Textiles from time to time. The 
exact administrative approach of the corporation towards the enterprises placed 
under the board and the range of functions to be performed by the corporation 
are contingent upon the policies pursued by the Government. Some important 
functions of BTMC are as follows : 
a. To help and coordinate with the government in preparing national plans and 
policies for commercial operation of its existing enterprises; 
b. To identify, initiate and prepare portfolio of new development projects 
including BMRE in consultation and with the approval of the govt, and take 
measures to implement the same; 
c. To identify and initiate feasibility studies for setting-up new projects with 
the approval of the government; 
d. To monitor the implementation of development activities as included in the 
ADP for the sector and to report achievement, shortfall, problems, revision 
and policy issues requirements, if any, to the government agencies; 
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e. To implement the govt, policies in respect of procurement, production, distribution, 
pricing, labour and management, etc. in the textile sector; 
f. To set physical and financial targets and objectives for the enterprises; 
g. To monitor performance of the enterprises, effective and efficient use of 
resources, identify problem areas of the enterprises and to render assistance 
and guidance to the enterprises; 
h. To take measures for improving work methods, product quality, minimize 
wastages and costs; 
i. To introduce and maintain management information system in order to provide 
the corporation and the government with adequate, accurate and timely 
information for decisionmaking; 
j . To develop and train human resources both in fields and factories 
with a view to catering requirement of skilled personnel; 
k. To set policy and procedure for procurement of machinery, spares & raw 
materials- both imported & local for enterprises; 
1. To set procedure for sale of products, by-products and other items of the 
enterprises; 
m. To maintain stable price of items produced by the enterprises through 
constant market monitoring system, devising distribution policy as necessary 
for the benefit of general customers; 
n. To develop measures on social welfare including community services to 
workers/employees; 
o. To supervise, coordinate, monitor and control affairs of enterprises; 
Without the above functions, the corporation is to furnish to the government 
a statement of accounts audited by the auditors together with the annual report 
on the conduct of its affairs for each financial year in compliance with the 
requirement of section 22 (2) of the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nation-
alization) Order, 1972 [P.O. No. 27; 1972]. 
Enterprise Management Board 
The third tier of control structure for public textile enterprises is the 
enterprise management board. It generally consists of the enterprise chief 
executive (designated as project head/general manager/deputy general manager/ 
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mill manager) and representatives from the head office (appointed by the board 
of directors of BTMC), Ministry of Textiles, Ministry of Finance and bankers. 
A limited power and authority has been delegated to the enterprise managements. 
The enterprises under BTMC are faced delayed and sometime wrong decisions 
since all decisions, except a few, are made at the apex of the management level 
by the ministry or corporation who are either unaware or little aware of the local 
conditions of the field where the decision will be applied. Recently the enterprise 
management boards have been granted wider powers compared to those available 
to enterprise managements headed by managers or general managers. The 
Chairman of an enterprise management board is usually a senior official of the 
corporation head office. Whatever delegation of authority there is from the 
corporation to the board, the board itself has remained under strict control of 
the corporation [Ahmed; 1978]. Very recently, the corporation has delegated 
some extra powers to take quick decision on purchase and sales of raw-cotton 
& yarn but the enterprises can not using such autonomy for financial crisis. 
Total administrative systems analysis, of the public sector textile indus-
tries, reveals that the administrative process depends on a formal and informal 
chain of command and it is alleged that decisions are frequently delayed because 
of the complex chain of authority. Actually, no functional area is fully free from 
government control, directly or indirectly. However, it is apparent that the 
chairman, the members of the board of directors of BTMC and the enterprise 
management boards are totally controlled by the government directly and indirectly 
by the bureaucrats. Not only that, the powers and responsibilities of the different 
tiers have not been clearly demarcated; the accountability can not, therefore, 
be properly established and implemented. So it can be concluded from the above 
discussion that the hierarchy and structure of the enterprises under BTMC is highly 
complicated and bureaucratic. 
5.2.2 Marketing System of BTMC Products 
The mills under BTMC Produce different types of products viz. Saree, 
Dhuti, Markin, Poplin, Shirting, Addi, Voil, Printed Cloth, Polyester etc. alongwith 
Cotton blankets. Woollen cloth, Knitting wool. These products have largely 
95 
Again, the distribution system was modified with effect from October 1,1986 and 
under the modified system, the total salable yarn was distributed among the different 
sector of buyers. Under the system, a fixed security deposit was introduced 
for appointment of buyers. In case of failure to lift monthly quota, the unlifted 
quota could be offered to other appointed buyers without any binding. However, 
the mill authority had the full right to sell the unlifted stock to any of the outside 
buyers holding valid yarn dealing licence. 
High price of yarn is one ofthe major problems behind the non-utilization 
of many operational looms in the country. According to a researcher, the high 
price of yarn is the number one problem ofthe weaving industry as reflected 
in the opinion of respectively 52.89%, 60.72% and 83.33% in handloom firms 
within small, lower medium and medium size groups (Islam; 1979). The handloom 
weavers are the principal buyers of yarn, but the existing distribution system 
compels them to purchase yarn at a high price. They are now purchasing yarn 
from retailer or local agent. They are unable to purchase of yarn directly from 
wholesale dealers for financial crisis or directly from BTMC mills for complex 
and rigid system of sale. There is no suitable facility of insitutional credit for 
these weavers. Besides this, high prices of dyes, chemicals and spare parts 
discourage the weavers to produce enough cloth that might lead to larger demand 
for yarn. So the demand of yarn is decreasing day by day which in turn result 
in a large quantity of stockpiling in most ofthe mills under BTMC. 
CLOTH 
The enterprises under BTMC has full autonomy for sale of cloth under 
a procedure laid-down by the Ministry of Textiles. Basically cloths produced 
in BTMC enterprises are distributed through the following channels : 
a. Wholesale cloth dealers 
b. BTMC sales & display centres (Bastro Samvers) 
c. Family Planning Directorate, Health Service Directorate, Relief & Rehabil-
itation Directorate, Bangladesh Consumers Supplies Corporation (COSCOR), 
Other Govt. & Semi-govt. Organizations, Co-operatives, Social Welfare 
Organizations and Freedom Fighters Firms etc. 
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d. Processing units (Grewcloth only) 
e. DGP, BDR, Police, Ansar, VDP, Jails, BNCC, Cadet Colleges, BTMC Mills 
and other Corporate Bodies etc. 
A committee consisting of the three members supervisors allotment and 
sale of cloth. Three members are Chief executive, Head of the accounts de-
partment and Head of the commercial department of the mill. Cut-pieces and 
defective cloth, if any, are sold to the cloth dealers at approved reduced rates 
varying from 5% to 20% on the existing ex-mill prices through press advertisement 
and on approval of the corporation. 
The demand for cloth produced by the enterprises under BTMC, is facing 
a serious set back due to influx of cloth in markets from garments factories and 
availability of imported/smuggled fabrics. BTMC authority, therefore, had to 
allow discounts on ex-mill prices of all varieties of cloth in several times for 
expeditious disposal of stock but the stockpiling problem has not been improved 
as smuggling could not be controlled effectively by the concerned authority of 
the government. 
Islam (1990) identified some marketing problems of BTMC cloths viz 
poor quality of weaving, lack of attractiveness of print, smooth finishing, fastness 
of colour and no attention to consumers preferences. Foreign cloths particularly 
Chinese and Japanese cloths have captured the market for their better quality, 
fine prints, smooth finishing and fastness of colour in spite of their higher prices. 
Besides, BMTC cloths are facing stiff competition from second hand cloths 
because of their cheap prices. In order to popularize the BTMC made fabrics 
among the general mass at a fixed and fair price, a total of 45 sales centres 
named 'Bastra Samvers' are in operation all over commercially important places 
in Bangladesh but most of the centres do not advertise or has been hardly any 
effort to popularize BTMC cloths. Actually, customers want to purchase standard 
products even in high prices but the quality of BTMC cloths are not standard. 
5.2.3 Manpower Development and Training Facilities 
Skilled and motivated manpower is a vital factor for any organization to 
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attain its objective. Need for manpower development and training was keenly 
felt by BTMC to create skilled and motivated manpower for maximizing pro-
duction, improving quality of product, strengthening management and also for 
financial management, economic planning and control of the enterprises efficiently. 
In order to attain the desired aforesaid goal, a training institute had set-
up by BTMC known as Textile Industry Development Centre (TIDC) in 1979 at 
Savar, Dhaka. It is the only textile based training and research centre in 
Bangladesh. The objective of the centre is to improve the performance of textile 
industry by providing need based practical oriented training to officers, staff and 
workers, already engaged in BTMC and private sector mills with the aim to 
develop their skills as to improve the quality and productivity of yarns and fabrics. 
Special emphasis on maintenance, quality control, waste control, modern tech-
nological and managerial know-how gives by TIDC while they prepare any training 
programme. 
The training area includes spinning, weaving, dyeing, printing and finishing, 
maintenance, quality control, electrical and mechanical engineering and manage-
ment. AH the technical personnel in textile technology from managerial level down 
to supervisors, non-qualified technical staff and even the operators are being 
trained in different training courses held in this institute. Besides the training 
programme held at the TIDC compound, the centre also offers such programme 
at the different mill site for the operators and workers who are directly connected 
with the machines. This method of training makes it easier for a large number 
of trainees to be trained up at a time. In addition to the training activities, the 
operation division of the centre offers a trouble-shooting, problem-solving, testing 
and quality control services to the industry. Not only that, the centre has a testing 
and quality control laboratory which equiped with most up-to-date testing equip-
ments and has the facility to carry out all most all nature of tests for textile materials 
(fibre to fabric) [AR; 1992-93]. 
In Plant Training : Under Learners Training Scheme conducted by TIDC the 
persons engaged in production are also given training in different mills at the plant 
level. 
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Special Training Arrangement In TIDC : In addition to technical training 
facilities, TIDC conducts some training programme for personnel in other areas 
such as management, finance, accounts, marketing etc. 
Other Local Training : In additions to training at TIDC, officers, staff and 
workers under BTMC are also sent to different training institutes in the country 
such as BMDC, Rapport Bangladesh Ltd., IBA, IPM, Administrative Staff College 
etc. for participating in various training courses on personnel management, labour 
management, financial accounting & management, marketing management and 
computer programming etc. 
Foreign Training : Besides local training, officers are also sent to different 
countries of the world for participating in various training courses, seminars, 
workshop and study tours in response to invitation received from different 
countries and agencies and also under various bilateral technical assistance 
programme with foreign countries. The training is centrally managed and looked 
after by BTMC Secretariat in close co-operation with concerned agency in 
accordance with a pre-determined foreign training plan. 
Since its inception in 1979 and upto 30th June, 1993, a total number of 
11830 and upto 30th June 1997, a total number of 15,000 (approx.) trainees 
from the mills under BTMC, Govt. & Semi-govt. organizations and mills under 
private ownership have attended at various training programmes organized by 
the TIDC [AR; 1992-93]. 
5.2.4 Procurement of Raw Materials 
Raw cotton is the basic raw material for almost all the mills under BTMC. 
Besides raw cotton, man-made fibres like viscose and polyester are also used 
in the cotton textile mills as raw materials in producing blended yarn. Nylon chips 
and wool tops are used in Valika Woollen Mills Ltd. Cotton textile mills depend 
entirely on imported raw cotton, viscose and other fibres. 
Normally, raw cotton, polyester, nylon chips and wool tops are imported 
under different foreign exchange sources namely : USPL-480 programme, the 
Netherlands Grant, U.K. Grant, OECF Loan, Federal Republic of Germany 
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(FRG) Grant, IDA Credit, Bulgarian Barter and SEM/WES. BTMC is to adhere 
to different rules and procedures for utilizing different sources of foreign currency. 
The procurement operation thus becomes very difficult and highly complicated. 
Problems like failure on contracts, non-maintenance of shipment schedule, non-
availability of required types of cotton at required time, variation in quality, high 
price etc. are frequently faced by the corporation. BTMC can not avail low price 
advantage in the market due to tied nature of certain sources of finance. Cotton 
market is a volatile commodity market which further aggravates its procurement. 
Thousands of spindles remains idle due non-availability of required type of cotton 
in each financial year. BTMC imports raw cotton mainly from Pakistan, India, 
Sudan, Mexico, Argentina, USA, Russia and China; nylon chips mainly from Japan, 
South Korea & Germany; viscose & polyester from U. K. and Japan; wool tops 
from Japan, France and Germany. 
Procurement of Local Seed Cotton 
As a part of implementation of government policy, to encourage the 
cultivation of seed cotton in the country, BTMC procures seed cotton at govt, 
approved incentive rates directly from the growers through the different BTMC 
purchase centres and also from Cotton Development Board. Procurement of seed 
cotton could not reach in a remarkable quantity because of poor quality due to 
poor harvesting and also for diversion to private cotton ginning mills. A small 
quantity of ginned cotton procures from Cotton Development Board & private 
ginners and viscose from Karnaphuli Paper and Rayon complex by BTMC. 
5.3 Contribution of BTMC to National Exchequer 
Public textile enterprises are, indirectly, owned by the people. The profit 
earned by them including taxes are to be paid to public exchequer i.e. to the people. 
The loss, if any, similarly is to be borne by the citizens. Every year BTMC 
contributes a considerable amount to the national exchequer in the form of customs 
duty, sales tax, excise duty, income tax and profit contribution. Since inception 
of BTMC in 1972 to 1995-96, year wise contribution to national exchequer is 
given in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 : Contribution to National Exchequer 
Custom 
Duty 
Sales 
Tax 
Excise 
Duty 
W Income 
Tax 
Profit 
Contribu-
tion 
TUTAT 
(Taka in Lac) 
%incre-
ase/de-
crease 
Year 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
846.00 
226.00 
873.00 
813.00 
1156.00 
1201.69 
1000.00 
1004.93 
1061.55 
966.26 
1889.00 
1995.78 
1468.87 
905.52 
523.63 
607.42 
1273.06 
949.45 
945.00 
1471.30 
928.14 
850.00 
20.00 
25.00 
1006.00 
616.00 
1602.00 
1621.00 
1613.00 
1668.71 
2041.00 
2031.64 
2931.59 
3312.40 
568.00 
452.50 
300.40 
191.23 
21.90 
105.46 
7.97 
23.21 
38.51 
27.00 
27.00 
35.00 
336.00 
662.00 
693.17 
829.91 
819.96 
760.15 
618.13 
595.70 
542.70 
464.27 
452.67 
602.03 
625.20 
499.03 
849.88 
844.10 
458.07 
513.67 
408.90 
647.70 
126.53 
188.01 
1058.80 
1296.81 
1356.97 
768.00 
377.81 
449.79 
411.99 
114.66 
240.30 
126.02 
300.00 
226.62 
2.28 
36.44 
180.13 
111.85 
249.70 
137.36 
99.03 
17.85 
6.13 
4.68 
80.49 
125.00 
300.00 
398.64 
100.00 
200.00 
348.38 
736.20 
544.00 
50.00 
3062.80 
2465.81 
4265.61 
3638.00 
3808.81 
4013.36 
4482.90 
3971.19 
4993.59 
5022.81 
3701.08 
3953.80 
2779.82 
1585.86 
1327.69 
1449.93 
2029.76 
2009.90 
1926.64 
1615.68 
1580.35 
1368.35 
428.90 
753.19 
-19.49 
72.99 
-14.71 
4.70 
5.37 
11.70 
-11.41 
25.75 
0.59 
-26.31 
6.83 
-29.69 
-42.95 
-16.28 
9.21 
39.99 
-0.98 
-4.14 
-16.14 
-2.19 
-13.41 
-68.66 
75.61 
(Prov.) 
Total 
Average 
23000.60 2015252 1231224 
958.36 1060.66 513.01 
314.54 
62.91 
7653.71 2802.22 66235.83 
318.90 116.76 2759.83 
Source : Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises (1995-96); p. 6. 
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Table 5.2 shows that total contribution of BTMC to national exchequer 
from 1972-73 to 1995-96 stands at Tk. 66235.83 lac. (The government of 
Bangladesh introduced value added tax (VAT) from 1991 -92 instead of sales 
tax. In calculating average amount of contribution, it is taken into account). On 
an average, during 1972-73 to 1995-96, customs duty, sales tax, excise duty, VAT, 
& income tax have been paid Tk, 958.36, 1060.66, 513.01, 62.91, & 318.90 
lacs respectively. 
5.4 Financial Trends and Operational Achievements 
The operational achievements of the mills under BTMC deteriorated during 
the study period 1992-93 to 1996-97. The achievements of last financial year 
(1996-97) worsened when 29 mills, out of 30, suffered losses Tk. 163.55 crores. 
During 1992-93 to 1996-97, the amount of sales has beendeclined whereas total 
operating cost has been increased. The trend of some important financial perfor-
mances and operational achievements of BTMC mills are depicted in Tables 5.3 
to 5.5. 
Table 5.3 : Consolidated Profit/Loss of BTMC Mills 
(Taka in Crore) 
Particulars 
Total Income 
(Sales +Non-operating 
income) 
Total Operating 
Cost 
Net Profit 
before tax 
Net Profit 
before tax (% 
of total income) 
Accumulated Profit 
No. of Total Mills 
No. of Mills Earned 
Profit 
No. of Mills Sustained 
Loss 
Percentage of Losing 
Mills 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
(41mills) 
325.16 
469.75 
-144.59 
^14.5 
-585.73 
41 
3 
38 
93 
1993-94 
(Prov.) 
(31mills) 
238.82 
392.64 
-153.82 
-64.4% 
-514.47 
31 
1 
30 
97 
1994-95 
(Prov.) 
(30mills) 
236.65 
353.69 
-117.04 
^19.5% 
-630.09 
30 
0 
30 
100 
1995-96 
(Prov.) 
(30mills) 
170.31 
304.67 
-134.36 
-78.9% 
-788.15 
30 
0 
30 
97 
1996-97 
(Prov.) 
(30mills) 
86.66 
250.21 
-163.55 
-188.7% 
-951.70 
30 
1 
29 
97 
Source : Annual report and provisional accounts of BTMC enterprises of respective years. 
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Table 5.3 shows a consolidated picture of total profit/loss position of 
BTMC mills for the period of 1992-93 to 1996-97. During 1992-93, three mills 
earned a pre-tax profit of Tk. 1.13 crore and 38 mills sustained loss of Tk. 145.72 
crore resulting in overall pre-tax loss of Tk. 144.59 crore as against the pre-
tax loss of Tk. 55.20 crore in 1991-92 i.e. loss increased by 162%. In 1993-
94, only one mill earned profit of Tk. 10.41 lac and 30 mills sustained loss of Tk. 
15392.71 lac resulting in overall pre-tax loss of Tk. 153.82 crore which was 6.38% 
higher compared to previous year though the total number of mills under BTMC 
decreased by 24%. The total pre-tax loss was Tk. 117.04,134.36 and Tk. 163.55 
crore respectively in 1994-95,1995-96 and 1996-97. During study period from 
1992-93 to 1996-97, in 1996-97, the amount of pre-tax loss was highest Tk. 
163.55, i.e. loss increased by 13.11%, 6.33%, 39.74% & 21.73% respectively 
as compared to 1992-93, 1993-94,1994-95 & 1996-97. During 1994-95 & 1995-
96, not a single mill earned profit whereas in 1996-97 one mill earned a pre-
tax profit of Tk. 14.01 lac. The percentage of deficit units was 93, 97, 100, 
100 and 97 respectively during 1992-93 to 1996-97. 
For reflecting the exact financial condition of BTMC mills during the period 
1992-93 to 1996-97, some important consolidated financial ratios are calculated 
and presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 represents some important consolidated financial ratios of the 
mills under BTMC. Current ratio is a measure of short term financial liquidity 
and this ratio should be more than one (standard ratio 2:1) to provide safety 
margin against any shrinkage in the realizable value of current assets. But the 
current ratio of BTMC mills during the period 1992-93 to 1996-97 shows an 
unfavourable position. In 1992-93 and 1993-94, this ratio was only 0.47 and 
0.38 respectively. Though the ratio was slightly better in 1994-95, but again it 
decreased in 1995-96 and this trend continued in 1996-97. Quick ratio measures 
the absolute liquidity position of an enterprise but this ratios of BTMC mills were very 
low. In the year 1994-95, quick ratio was 0.30, which was 58% higher compared to 
previous year and 114% higher compared to 1992-93, but again it decreased by 33% 
in 1995-96 and by 40% in 1996-97, i.e. it reached to only 0.18 in 1996-97. 
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Table 5.4 : Consolidated Ratios of BTMC Mills 
(Taka in Crore) 
Particulars 
A. Total Assets 
B. Current Assets 
C. Quick Assets 
D. Current Liabilities 
E. Net Working Capital 
F. Net Sales 
G. Total Revenue Earned 
H. Gross Profit/Loss 
1.Earnings before Int.S Tax 
J. Earnings before Tax 
K. Long Term Debt 
L. Equity 
M. Capital Employed 
RATIOS : 
Current Ratios (B/D) 
Quick Ratio (C/D) 
Debt-Equity Ratio (K/L) 
Assets Turnover (G/A) 
Gross Profit Ratio (H/F) 
EBT to Net Sales (J/F) 
EBT to Net Worth (J/L) 
EBIT to Capital Employed 
(l/M) 
EBIT to Total Assets (l/A) 
Net Working Capital to 
Total Assets (E/A) 
1992-93 
(41mi!ls) 
727.35 
328.35 
97.79 
696.34 
-367.99 
321.44 
325.16 
-64.41 
-91.36 
-144.59 
196.21 
294.70 
31.01 
0.47 
0.14 
100:00 
0.45times 
-20.1% 
-45.0% 
-49.1% 
-294.6% 
-12.6% 
-50.6% 
1993-94 
(31mills) 
503.73 
207.36 
120.91 
552.27 
-344.91 
236.17 
238.82 
-88.97 
-110.66 
-153.83 
169.69 
-308.80 
-48.54 
0.38 
0.19 
100:00 
0.47times 
-37.7% 
-65.1% 
-49.8% 
-228.0% 
-22.0% 
-68.5% 
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 
(30mills) (30mills) (19mills) 
451.74 
174.67 
121.26 
398.00 
-223.33 
234.49 
236.65 
-59.80 
-80.10 
-117.04 
-378.38 
-420.59 
53.73 
0.44 
0.30 
100:00 
0.52times 
-25.5% 
-49.9% 
-27.8% 
-149.1% 
-17.7% 
-49.4% 
437.58 
175.21 
92.42 
466.84 
-291.63 
167.18 
170.31 
-78.38 
-98.07 
-134.36 
370.29 
-501.74 
-29.26 
0.38 
0.20 
100:00 
0.39times 
-46.9% 
-80.4% 
-26.8% 
-335.2% 
-22.4% 
-66.6% 
260.70 
98.54 
51.61 
279.19 
-180.65 
69.06 
71.34 
-65.48 
-76.37 
-100.05 
245.66 
-330.97 
-18.49 
0.35 
0.18 
100:00 
0.27times 
-94.8% 
-144.9% 
-30.2% 
-413.0% 
-29.3% 
-69.3% 
Source : Annual report 1992-93 and Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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The debt-equity ratio of BTMC mills was negative which represents an adverse 
position of the liquidity and profitability of the mills,. Problem of liquidity isan 
inherent factor in most of the BTMC mills and every year, a lion share of cash 
generated from operation is eaten up through payment of huge bank interest as 
well as for liquidating loan. To overcome this adverse liquidity position, capital 
restructuring of some mills in the ratio of 60:40 was accepted by the government 
in principle during 1979-80. 
Government also released fund to meet the equity gap. On the basis of 
the proposal submitted by BTMC in several times, government has contributed 
a huge amount as cash infusion and also has converted ADP loan in equity. The 
equity position of the corporation has slightly improved but the overall situation, 
still now, is in adverse. 
Table 5.4 also shows the adverse situation of BTMC mills which represents 
some other important consolidated ratios viz. Assets turnover, Gross profit ratio, 
Net profit ratio, EBT/Net worth, EBIT/Capital Employer, EBIT/Total assets,Net 
Working Capital/Total assets etc. These ratios represent a dangerous scenario and 
the overall situation of sickness of the mills under BTMC. 
Table 5.5 depicts that during 1992-93 to 1996-97, the capacity utilization 
of spindles and looms was decreased. During the year 1992-93 'average installed 
capacity utilization' of running textile mills was recorded at 5.09 lac spindles and 
2113 looms which represents 68% in spinning and 60% in weaving. After 1992-
93 this percentage showed a decreasing trend. In 1993-94, 94-95, 95-96 and 
96-97 the capacity utilization were 42%, 46%, 39% and 17% respectively-in 
spinning and in weaving it represents 40%, 27%, 22% and 13% respectively. 
For the low capacity utilization, both the spinning and weaving units failed to 
achieve production target in each year. The working efficiency during 1992-93 
to 1996-97 were 79%, 80%, 80%, 66% & 43% respectively in spinning and 52%, 
43%, 40%, 38% & 31% respectively in weaving. 
Annual production of the mills is carried on according to production plan 
submitted by the constituent mills and approved by BTMC Board. The plan 
allocates specific counts of yarn and variety of cloth to each mill. On an average 
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the mills under BTMC attained 70% to 80% of production target of yarn and 
60% to 70% of cloth. In 1996-97, the production of cotton yarn decreased by 
82.38% as compared to 1992-93 and production of cotton fabrics decreased 
by 98.52% as compared to same year. The production of knitting wool and 
woollen fabrics was also decreased during the study period. The percentage of 
wastage in weaving is tolerable but in spinning it represents (which varied from 
8% to 13%) the unsatisfactory scenario. 
Table 5.5 : Some Indicators of Operational Efficiency of BTMC Mills 
Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-% 1996-97 
(41mills) (31mills) QOmills) (30mi!ls) (19mills) 
2.50 2.68 2.32 1.29 
1161 732 512 84 
42% 46% 39% 17% 
40% 27% 22% 13% 
80% 80% 66% 43% 
43% 40% 38% 31% 
170.88 170.03 149.03 59.93 
141.39 51.70 31.07 4.99 
A.I Capacity Utilization : 
(a) Spindles (In Lac) 
(b) Looms (In Number) 
A.2 Capacity Utlization : 
(a) Spinning 
(b) Weaving 
B. Working Efficiency : 
(a) Spinning 
(b) Weaving 
C. Production : 
(a) Cotton yarn 
5.09 
2113 
68% 
60% 
79% 
52% 
340.06 
(Lac kg. 32 counts average) 
(b) Cotton Fabrics 337.65 
(Lac mtr. 54 Pick average) 
D. Wastage : 
(a) Spinning 
(b) Weaving 
12.9% 
2.9% 
13% 8.3% 9.5% 8.9% 
3.2% 2.9% 3.1% 1.8% 
Source : Annual report 1992-93, Provisional accounts of BTMC enterprises from 1993-94 to 1996-97 and MIS report 
1996-97. 
The trend of capacity utilization in both the spinning and weaving sectors 
shown in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 represents the major reasons for idle capacity, viz. shortage 
of raw cotton, shortage of back process, power failure etc. In 1996-97, the idle 
installed capacity was 83% in spinning sector which was 36% higher compared 
to previous year and 156% higher compared to 1992-93. In case of weaving 
sector, the idle capacity during 1996-97 was 87% which was 11% higher com-
pared to previous year and 115% higher compared to 1992-93. In 1996-97, 
the most responsible reason for idle capacity was shortage of raw cotton (66%) 
in spinning sector and shortage of back process (81 %) in weaving sector. Power 
failure was the second highest reason for idle capacity in 1996-97. On an average 
(during 1992-93 to 1996-97) the idle capacity was 57.71% and 67.79% respec-
tively in spinning and wearing sectors of BTMC mills. 
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6.3.5. Solvency/Leverage Ratios 
6.3.6 Mean & t-values of Selected Ratios and Statistical Significance 
of Mean Differences 
Identification of Sickness Through Multi-variate Models 
6.4.1 MDA Model : Altaian's Z-score 
6.4.2 MDA Model : Satyanarayana's Z* Value 
6.4.3. MDA Model : Yadav's Y-score 
Opinions of the Respondent's on Different Aspects of Sickness 
6.5.1 Causes of Sickness/Continuous Losses and Remedial 
Measures 
6.5.2 Effects of Sickness/Continuous Losses 
6.5.3 Suggestions to the Government to Overcome the Adverse 
Situation of the Mills 
Testing of the Hypotheses 
Summary 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The present chapter deals with the findings from primary & secondary 
sources and discussions. At the beginning, some information, about the sample mills 
are presented in a table & discussed. Analyses of the operational efficiencies, 
financial performances, and different ratio trends are done and some established 
multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) models to predict the sickness of the 
selected mills are also applied. Opinions of the executives of the mills on different 
aspects of sickness are produced as well as the hypotheses have been tested in this 
chapter. 
6.1 Selected Mills : At a Glance 
The objective of the analysis of the findings, in this section, is to show the 
particulars of the selected sample mills at a glance. Ten textile mills operating under 
Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) have been selected for the study. 
In order to avoid frequent mentioning of the names of the sample mills, code names 
are used. BTMC has divided the running mills into two groups i.e. losing mills 
and probable profitable & nearest to the break-even mills. In this study, five losing 
mills are assumed as sick mills and used the code names as A,, A2, A3, A4 & A5 
under Group-A. Five probable profitable & nearest to the break-even mills which 
are assumed as non-sick and used the code names as B,, B2, B3, B4, & B5 under 
Group-B. Table 6.1 shows the particulars of the sample mills viz. actual name of 
the mills, sponsor, year of establishment, month/year of commercial production, 
products, installed capacity etc. The table also represents the code names which 
are used to identify the mills. 
Table 6.1 shows that within ten mills under study- A,, A2 & Unit-I of B5 
were established before Independence of Bangladesh (i.e. before 1971) and nation-
alized under President's Order (P.O. No. 27 on 26.3.1972). Other 7 mills & Unit-
II of B5 are sponsored by BTMC. A, is a composite mill, which is producing yarn 
and cloth and others are spinning mills which are producing only yarn. 
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6.1.1 Year of Establishment 
Generally, 20-year is considered a normal life span of the machinery in 
Bangladesh. In the absence of proper maintenance arrangement in the industry, it 
could be assumed even less than 20 years. A,, A2 & Unit-I of B5 have already 
exceeded the age limit of 20-year long before. Others, without Nilkamal unit of 
B,, Unit- II of Bs, A3, A4 & A5 are almost in the last stage of normal life span. 
The classification of mills by year of establishment (Table 6.2) reveals that most 
of the mills/units (91.67%) under study came into existence before 1986. All the 
mills (100%) of Group-A and 85.71 per cent of Group-B were established before 
1986. On an average, 25 per cent of the total mills/units (40% of Group-A and 
14.28% of Group-B) were established before 1971 (during the year 1954, 1961 
& 1962) i.e. the installed spindles and looms are 35 to 43 years old. Only 8.33 
per cent of the total mills (Nilkamal unit of B,) established during 1986-97. Heavy 
loss incurred by the public sector textile mills under BTMC and private sector-
biased industrial policy of the Government of Bangladesh are the main reasons 
for this low percentage. 
Table 6.2 : Year of Establishment of the Selected Mills 
Year of Establishment 
Before 1971 
1972 - 1975 
1976 - 1980 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
1991 - 1995 
1996 - 1997 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
2 40.00 
-
1 20.00 
2 40.00 
-
-
-
5 100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
1 14.28 
2 28.57 
2 28.57 
1 14.29 
-
1 14.29 
-
7 100.00 
Total 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
3 25.00 
2 16.67 
3 25.00 
3 25.00 
-
1 8.33 
-
12 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 2 in Appendix-1. 
Note : B, and B5 have two units. For that, total number of mills reached to 12 instead of 10. 
6.1.2 Time Gap between Establishment and Commercial Production 
Normally, the project implementation of a mill/unit comes to an end 
with the successful start of commercial production and the 'reasonable time' for 
112 
project implementation is 1 year to 2 years. But it is found (Table 6.3) that in large 
number of cases (75%) the time gaps between establishment and commercial 
production were too much wider (more than 2 years), mostly due to the financial 
difficulty, delay in decision for bureaucratic administration etc. Table 6.3 reveals 
that 80 per cent of Group-A mills faced wider time gap (more than 2 years) to 
commence the commercial production as against 71.43 per cent of Group-B mills. 
On an average, 33.33 per cent of the mills under study have taken more than 4 
years for project implementation. 
Table 6.3 : Time Gap between Establishment & Commercial Production 
Duration 
Less than 2 years 
2 years and above 
but below 4 years 
4 years and above 
but below 6 years 
6 years and above 
but below 8 years 
Total : 
Group-:A 
No. of 
Mills 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5 
%of 
Total 
20.00 
40.00 
20.00 
20.00 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of 
Mills 
2 
3 
2 
-
7 
%of 
Total 
28.57 
42.86 
28.57 
-
100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Mills 
3 
5 
3 
1 
12 
%of 
Total 
25.00 
41.67 
25.00 
8.33 
100.00 
Source : Based on Table 6.1 
Note : Each of B, and B5 having two units. 
6.2 Operational Efficiencies and Financial Performances 
To ascertain and know the status of financial health of any industrial 
enterprise, the analysis of operational efficiency is an important tool. An 
attempt is made in this section to analyze the data which are collected 
through the questionnaire (primary source) and from the materials provided 
by the BTMC head-office (secondary source). Some specific issues viz. 
procurement of raw materials, capacity utilization, market share of BTMC, 
demand and stockpiling of products, product development, production cost 
and also some important operational efficiency indicators are discussed. 
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Analysis of financial performance is also important to ascertain and 
evaluate the actual financial conditions of an industrial enterprise. Financial 
statements provide a summary of an enterprise. Proper analysis of these 
statements can help to know better about the financial strengths and weak-
nesses of the enterprises. There are some commonly used techniques of 
financial statement analysis viz. Ratio analysis, Trend analysis, Funds flow 
analysis, Cash flow analysis, Break-even analysis, Common-size statement 
analysis etc. In the next section (6.3) of this chapter— ratio analysis 
technique has used. In this section 'common-size statement analysis tech-
nique' has taken for the analysis of financial data. Some suggestions, to 
solve the problems faced by the mills, given by the respondents are also 
presented in this section. 
6.2.1 Trend of Operational Efficiency Indicators 
A trend of some important operational efficiency indicators during 
1992-93 to 1996-97 (viz. installed production capacity with the operation 
rate, actual production of yarn and cloth with rated and targeted capacity 
and achievement therein, wastage of cotton & yarn, manpower and also the 
overall financial results) are presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.14. The trend of 
operational efficiencies of individual mill is shown in Tables 6.4 to 6.13 
and the average results of the mills under Group-A & B are presented in 
Table 6.14. 
Table 6.4 to 6.13 represent the trend of some important operational 
efficiencies between 1992-93 & 1996-97. In all the sample mills, utilization 
of installed capacity declined in 1996-97 as compared to previous years. 
Capacity utilization of intalled spindles in 1996-97 were only 6, 15, 15, 
5, 6, 44, 15, 40, 12 & 42 per cent in A,, A2, ... A5, B,, B2 , . . . B5 respectively. 
Not a single mill utilized more than 50 per cent of installed production 
capacity. Utilization of production capacity has declined but the volume 
of net and accumulated losses increased during the study period. 
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Table 6.4 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of A, 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Spindle : Installed 
(In Number) Targeted 
Operated 
Operation Rate : Installed 
(In %) Targeted 
Loom : Installed 
(In Number) Targeted 
Operated 
Operation Rate : Installed 
(In %) Targeted 
Production : 
Yarn Rated 
(lac kg.) T a r g e t e d (Revised) 
Actual 
Cloth : Rated 
( lac mtr.) T a r g e t e d (Revised) 
Actual 
Achievement (In %) : 
Rated : Yarn 
Cloth 
Targeted : Yarn 
Cloth 
Wastage (Unusable; In %): 
Cotton : Targeted 
Actual 
Yarn : Targeted 
Actual 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual „ 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
33116 
27009 
25858 
78 
96 
312 
239 
237 
76 
99 
24.84 
20.47 
16.95 
55.99 
43.50 
34.31 
68 
61 
83 
79 
7.66 
9.85 
2.50 
3.80 
48 
278 
2039 
2365 
118.41 
-530.81 
213921 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
33116 
16273 
11219 
34 
69 
312 
210 
209 
67 
100 
24.69 
11.43 
6.80 
55.11 
35.85 
24.52 
28 
44 
59 
68 
7.80 
13.20 
2.50 
3.89 
36 
212 
1676 
1924 
116.36 
-993.50 
3218.02 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
33116 
14901 
13584 
41 
91 
312 
122 
142 
46 
116 
21.71 
10.07 
7.78 
36.73 
13.89 
9.25 
36 
25 
77 
67 
7.80 
10.81 
2.50 
3.77 
33 
204 
1582 
1819 
-370.23 
-802.38 
4025.15 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
33116 
13406 
7511 
23 
56 
312 
215 
131 
42 
61 
21.71 
9.06 
4.54 
36.72 
17.42 
10.32 
21 
28 
50 
59 
7.66 
10.08 
2.50 
3.84 
34 
193 
1343 
1570 
-143.71 
-880.43 
498727 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
33116 
5970 
1980 
6 
33 
312 
115 
118 
38 
103 
21.71 
4.03 
1.19 
18.37 
6.97 
4.16 
5 
23 
30 
60 
7.83 
8.23 
2.50 
3.75 
33 
185 
1307 
1525 
-77.73 
-928.62 
611021 
Average 
33116 
15512 
12030 
36 
78 
312 
180 
167 
54 
93 
22.93 
11.01 
7.45 
40.58 
23.53 
16.51 
32 
41 
68 
70 
7.75 
10.43 
2.50 
3.81 
37 
214 
1589 
1840 
-71.38 
-827.15 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : The figures of Yarn and Cloth are converted to 32 counts average and 54 Pick average 
respectively. 
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Table 6.5 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of A, 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual „ 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
16800 
13864 
12805 
76 
92 
13.96 
12.24 
11.01 
79 
90 
7.69 
11.04 
23 
128 
647 
798 
-21.84 
-308.69 
1122.57 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
16800 
14798 
10316 
61 
70 
14.97 
12.71 
8.48 
57 
67 
7.49 
11.48 
19 
107 
578 
704 
25.10 
-449.95 
178137 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
16800 
10260 
10442 
62 
102 
13.26 
8.35 
7.56 
57 
91 
7.66 
7.79 
18 
108 
548 
674 
-240.19 
-321.92 
2080.66 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
16800 
8675 
6613 
39 
76 
13.26 
7.06 
4.81 
36 
68 
7.55 
11.60 
17 
106 
531 
654 
-40.90 
-442.82 
246634 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
16800 
5535 
2453 
15 
44 
13.26 
4.50 
1.84 
14 
41 
7.77 
10.94 
18 
104 
529 
651 
-100.85 
-589.51 
3177.98 
Average 
16800 
10626 
8526 
51 
80 
13.74 
8.97 
6.74 
49 
75 
7.63 
10.57 
19 
110 
567 
696 
-75.74 
-422.58 
— 
Source 
Note 
Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
: The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.6 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of A3 
" Particulars 1992-93 1593-94 1954-55 1995-96 19&5-97 Average 
(Audited) IPfovisional) IProviiioml) (Provisional) (Prowsjonal) 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) „ 
Actual 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual „ 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
12528 
10217 
8492 
68 
83 
9.20 
7.53 
5.84 
63 
78 
8.10 
10.54 
17 
84 
474 
575 
-95.26 
-428.95 
1337.95 
12528 
9897 
8367 
67 
85 
8.94 
7.43 
6.00 
67 
81 
8.03 
13.03 
15 
83 
470 
568 
-164.95 
-437.15 
1859.66 
12528 
8815 
7550 
60 
86 
8.94 
6.62 
5.05 
56 
76 
8.24 
7.29 
16 
81 
461 
558 
-309.82 
-391.31 
2159.67 
12528 
7164 
6345 
51 
89 
8.94 
5.38 
4.04 
45 
75 
7.74 
10.35 
13 
74 
455 
542 
-250.48 
-411.73 
2593.08 
12528 
4414 
1930 
15 
44 
8.94 
3.31 
1.16 
13 
35 
7.48 
10.66 
11 
78 
438 
527 
-257.47 
-535.86 
3100.15 
12528 
8101 
6537 
52 
80 
8.99 
6.05 
4.42 
49 
73 
7.92 
10.37 
14 
80 
460 
554 
-215.60 
-440.99 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
117 
Table 6.7 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of A4 
Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-9(5 1996-97 Average 
(Audited) (Provisional) (Provisional) (Provisional) (Provisional) 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) „ 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual „ 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
25056 
20436 
19012 
76 
93 
16.98 
13.18 
12.04 
71 
91 
7.75 
15.30 
25 
153 
858 
1036 
33.89 
-607.16 
3098.61 
25056 
21047 
19756 
79 
94 
17.18 
15.18 
12.58 
73 
83 
7.69 
14.45 
15 
140 
812 
967 
-92.41 
-644.14 
382329 
25056 
16536 
15863 
63 
96 
17.18 
11.93 
9.81 
57 
82 
7.58 
10.89 
16 
139 
786 
941 
-250.75 
-459.11 
4171.66 
25056 
12129 
8981 
36 
74 
17.18 
8.75 
5.27 
31 
60 
7.73 
11.85 
15 
134 
751 
900 
-185.18 
-704.42 
4800.91 
25056 
4414 
1166 
5 
26 
17.18 
3.18 
0.57 
3 
18 
7.84 
12.51 
11 
139 
743 
893 
-249.43 
-741.35 
5466.54 
25056 
14912 
12956 
52 
87 
17.14 
10.44 
8.05 
47 
77 
7.72 
13.00 
16 
141 
790 
947 
-148.78 
-631.24 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.8 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of As 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Oparation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capcity (lac kg.) 
Targeted {Revised) 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unuseable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgated (Taka in lac) 
Actual ,, 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
1 Audited) 
25056 
20436 
12064 
48 
.59 
19.77 
15.99 
7.96 
40 
50 
7.63 
13.46 
19 
114 
722 
855 
56.12 
-428.26 
160325 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
25056 
9772 
3270 
13 
33 
18.95 
7.27 
2.18 
12 
30 
7.66 
15.80 
16 
118 
621 
755 
-48.66 
-647.71 
2268.20 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
25056 
9415 
6280 
25 
67 
18.95 
7.34 
4.25 
22 
58 
7.46 
9.61 
17 
115 
597 
729 
-230.70 
-457.62 
2689.75 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
25056 
11776 
7292 
29 
62 
18.95 
9.18 
5.12 
27 
56 
7.47 
10.18 
17 
116 
576 
709 
12.43 
-454.88 
363720 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
25056 
5188 
1380 
6 
27 
18.95 
6.52 
1.78 
9 
27 
6.58 
5.59 
16 
117 
573 
706 
-57.78 
-498.80 
4129.88 
Average 
25056 
11317 
6057 
24 
54 
19.11 
9.26 
4.26 
22 
46 
7.36 
10.93 
17 
116 
618 
751 
-53.72 
-497.41 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : (i) The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
(ii) The figure of Production of Yarn on service charge basis (which started from 
May, 1997) is inclusive of actual production in 1996-97. 
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Table 6.9 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of B, 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual 
Accumulated Profit („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
24960 
20946 
22081 
88 
105 
21.79 
18.21 
16.30 
75 
90 
7.70 
11.66 
32 
206 
1244 
1482 
282.67 
4.68 
2338.41 
1993-94 
(Provisional! 
24960 
20717 
20221 
81 
98 
21.88 
18.51 
14.82 
68 
80 
7.54 
13.70 
28 
193 
1150 
1371 
229.62 
-345.83 
2013.04 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
24960 
18170 
17807 
71 
98 
21.88 
16.42 
12.80 
59 
78 
7.92 
8.02 
21 
188 
1038 
1247 
-3.15 
-150.66 
1937.67 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
39360 
20101 
20018 
51 
99 
33.77 
19.69 
13.23 
39 
67 
7.81 
9.09 
23 
185 
1023 
1231 
479.46 
-530.55 
1393.23 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
39360 
21741 
17166 
44 
79 
37.79 
21.01 
10.81 
29 
51 
7.62 
11.49 
27 
186 
1008 
1221 
-3.67 
-699.51 
691.95 
Average 
30720 
20335 
19459 
63 
96 
27.42 
18.77 
13.59 
50 
72 
7.72 
10.79 
26 
192 
1092 
1310 
196.99 
-344.38 
-
Source 
Note 
: Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
: The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.10 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of B2 
Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1594-95 1995-96 1996-97 Average 
(Audited) (Provisional) (Provisional) (Provisional) (Provisional) 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
25056 
20436 
22415 
89 
110 
25056 
21296 
18483 
74 
87 
25056 
14657 
13689 
55 
93 
25056 
18039 
14565 
58 
81 
25056 
7898 
3701 
15 
47 
25056 
16465 
14571 
58 
88 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) „ 
Actual 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual „ 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
17.24 
14.12 
14.68 
85 
104 
7.56 
11.09 
22 
154 
781 
957 
106.51 
64.67 
714.85 
17.24 
15.19 
12.70 
74 
84 
7.48 
14.27 
16 
154 
762 
932 
52.62 
-153.97 
951.68 
17.24 
10.40 
8.76 
51 
84 
7.48 
7.76 
16 
152 
751 
919 
-14.85 
-175.58 
1137.18 
17.24 
12.80 
9.24 
54 
72 
7.56 
9.13 
17 
139 
696 
852 
65.30 
-228.41 
1405.80 
17.24 
5.60 
2.40 
14 
43 
6.53 
9.24 
15 
141 
689 
845 
19.58 
-471.79 
1873.54 
17.24 
11.62 
9.56 
55 
82 
7.32 
10.30 
17 
148 
735 
900 
45.83 
-193.02 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.11 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of B 3 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) „ 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual ,, 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
12528 
10217 
10347 
.83 
101 
10.01 
8.14 
7.66 
77 
94 
7.55 
11.95 
16 
110 
458 
584 
40.67 
-73.17 
114733 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
12528 
7517 
5735 
46 
76 
9.58 
5.65 
4.20 
44 
74 
7.78 
13.36 
12 
98 
431 
541 
-32.96 
-273.11 
145726 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
12528 
5885 
8074 
64 
137 
9.58 
4.64 
4.18 
44 
90 
7.68 
8.69 
12 
98 
418 
528 
-131.09 
-224.65 
1640.41 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
12528 
7051 
8121 
65 
115 
9.58 
5.56 
5.18 
54 
93 
6.57 
6.58 
12 
97 
413 
522 
37.21 
-198.29 
1858.93 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
12528 
6474 
5020 
40 
74 
9.58 
5.10 
3.53 
37 
69 
4.98 
6.90 
13 
93 
404 
510 
-32.79 
-349.80 
216830 
Average 
12528 
7429 
7459 
60 
100 
9.67 
5.82 
4.95 
51 
85 
6.91 
9.50 
13 
99 
425 
537 
-23.79 
-223.81 
-
Source 
Note 
Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
: The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.12 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of B4 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual 
Accumulated Loss (,,) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
25056 
20254 
16905 
67 
83 
17.26 
12.94 
10.02 
58 
77 
8.17 
13.04 
24 
169 
761 
954 
77.74 
-202.92 
1214.47 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
25056 
18792 
12737 
51 
68 
16.88 
12.56 
7.99 
47 
64 
8.16 
15.29 
18 
149 
672 
839 
62.32 
-294.45 
154027 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
25056 
13383 
14329 
57 
107 
16.88 
9.39 
8.65 
51 
92 
7.99 
8.36 
18 
149 
672 
839 
-152.91 
-212.46 
1715.80 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
25056 
14495 
13720 
55 
95 
16.88 
10.17 
8.14 
48 
80 
7.75 
10.90 
19 
146 
646 
811 
21.80 
-255.78 
2279.06 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
25056 
10040 
2887 
12 
29 
16.88 
7.04 
1.75 
10 
25 
7.52 
10.64 
19 
146 
645 
810 
9.33 
-446.49 
261728 
Average 
25056 
15393 
12116 
48 
79 
16.96 
10.42 
7.31 
43 
70 
7.92 
11.65 
19 
152 
679 
850 
3.66 
-282.41 
-
Source : Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
Note : The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.13 : Operational Efficiency Indicators of Bs 
Particulars 
Production Capacity : 
Installed Spindle (In No.) 
Targeted (In No.) 
Operated (In No.) 
Operation Rate (In %) 
Installed 
Targeted 
Production of Yarn : 
Rated Capacity (lac kg.) 
Targeted (Revised) „ 
Actual ,, 
Achievement (In %) 
Rated 
Targeted 
Wastage (Unusable) : 
Targeted (In %) 
Actual (In %) 
Manpower (In person) : 
Officer 
Staff 
Labour 
Total 
Profit / Loss : 
Budgeted (Taka in lac) 
Actual 
Accumulated Loss („) 
(after prior years 
adjustment) 
1992-93 
(Audited) 
37488 
30937 
30900 
82 
100 
36.85 
30.88 
28.95 
79 
94 
7.89 
15.00 
39 
211 
1329 
1579 
64.97 
-604.87 
1170.84 
1993-94 
(Provisional) 
37488 
29409 
19310 
52 
66 
36.82 
28.12 
17.49 
48 
62 
7.77 
15.08 
21 
171 
1202 
1394 
-155.49 
-1014.18 
2266.12 
1994-95 
(Provisional) 
37488 
21677 
20666 
55 
95 
32.10 
19.17 
16.89 
53 
88 
7.56 
8.37 
23 
167 
1179 
1369 
-532.83 
-633.00 
2814.48 
1995-96 
(Provisional) 
37488 
23381 
22179 
59 
95 
32.10 
20.58 
17.96 
56 
87 
5.48 
7.67 
25 
164 
1168 
1357 
-162.26 
-764.72 
3701.85 
1996-97 
(Provisional) 
37488 
23967 
15782 
42 
66 
32.10 
21.15 
12.79 
40 
60 
7.71 
11.59 
28 
163 
1142 
1333 
-212.84 
-990.76 
4690.71 
Average 
37488 
25874 
21767 
58 
84 
33.99 
23.98 
18.82 
55 
78 
7.28 
11.54 
27 
175 
1204 
1406 
-199.69 
-801.49 
-
Source 
Note 
: Compiled from Annual Report, Provisional Accounts and Annual MIS Reports of 
BTMC of respective years. 
: The figures of Yarn is converted to 32 counts average. 
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Table 6.14 reveals that installed capacity utilization during 1996-97 was 
only 9 per cent in Group-A and 31 per cent in Group-B as compared to 69 & 82 
per cent respectively during 1992-93. The mills could not utilize their production 
capacities to fulfil the targets during study period except a very few cases. Though 
the achievement of production was 4 per cent more than the target in B2 during 
the financial year 1992-93 but the same percentage of this mill had declined during 
next years. On an average, Group-A & Group-B mills have achieved 40 per cent 
& 52 per cent respectively of rated capacity and 62 per cent & 76 per cent respectively 
of targeted capacity during 1992-93 to 1996-97. The percentage of actual unusable 
wastage was higher in each year than targeted. During 1992-93 to 1996-97, in case 
of Group-A mills, actual wastage was on an average 11.05 per cent though the 
target was 7.68 per cent and in case of Group-B mills, actual wastage was average 
10.75 per cent though the target was 7.43 per cent. In both cases, the overall human 
resource strength during the study period was declined. During the year 1996-97, 
Group-A and Group-B mills sustained loss on an average Tk. 658.83 lac and 591.67 
lac respectively which were 43 per cent and 265 per cent higher as compared to 
1992-93. The overall analysis of the Table 6.14 shows that though the operational 
achievements of the mills under both groups were below satisfactory level but the 
condition of Group-A was comparatively worse. 
6.2.2 Procurement of Raw-materials 
Raw cotton is the basic raw-material for almost all the sample mills under 
BTMC. Besides raw-cotton, cotton yarn, dyes & chemical of cloth are also used 
in A, (composite mill). Majority of the selected mills depend almost entirely on 
imported raw-cotton. Individual mills had no authority to import or purchase raw 
cotton from domestic sources. BTMC had the full authority in procurement of raw-
materials. Recently BTMC empowered the mills to collect raw cotton upto a certain 
limit from domestic sources on emergency basis. Table 6.15 shows the sources 
of main raw material and Table 6.16 represents the problems faced by the mills 
in procurement of raw materials. 
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Table 6.15 : Sources of Main Raw Materials Procured 
Sources & Percentages of 
Main Raw-materials 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
lolal 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
3 
1 
1 
_ 
60.00 
20.00 
20.00 
— 
1 
1 
2 
1 
20.00 
20.00 
40.00 
20.00 
4 
2 
3 
1 
40.00 
20.00 
30.00 
10.00 
Domestic 
0% 
I — 5% 
6 — 10% 
II — 15% 
16 — 85% - _ _ _ _ _ 
86 — 90% - _ _ _ _ _ 
91 — 95% - _ _ _ _ _ 
96 — 100% - _ _ _ _ _ 
Total 5 HJ0.00 5 HJoToO 10 Fo"o.Oo" 
Import 
0% _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1—5% _ _ _ _ _ _ 
6—10% _ _ _ _ _ _ 
11 — 15% - - - -
16 — 85% - _ _ _ _ _ 
86 — 90% 
91 — 95% 
96 — 100% 
Total : 5 100.00 5 100.00 io 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 6(ii) in Appendix-1. 
Table 6.15 shows that out of 10 respondent mills, 6 (2 from Group-A & 
4 from Group-B) which represents 60 per cent of the sample mills procure only 
1-15 per cent raw materials from domestic source and 4 mills (40%) procure zero 
per cent i.e. they do not use any main raw materials from domestic source. On 
the other hand, 90 per cent mills procure 91-100 per cent raw materials from 
imported source, this scenario clearly indicates that all the selected mills depend 
on imported raw materials. 
-
2 
3 
-
40.00 
60.00 
1 
2 
2 
20.00 
40.00 
40.00 
1 
4 
5 
10.00 
40.00 
50.00 
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Table 6.16 : Problems in Procurement of Raw Materials 
Problems 
(a) Shortage of Fund 
(b) Absence of Grading 
(c) Lengthy Procedure 
(d) Complexities of 
Import Policy 
(e) Political Unrest 
(f) No Response 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of 
Mills 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
10 
%of 
Total 
40.00 
10.00 
20.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of 
Mills 
3 
2 
3 
2 
0 
2 
12 
%of 
Total 
25.00 
16.67 
25.00 
16.67 
0 
16.66 
100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Mills 
7 
3 
5 
3 
1 
3 
22 
%of 
Total 
31.82 
13.64 
22.73 
13.64 
4.54 
13.63 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 6(iii) in Appendix-1. 
Table 6.16 represents that 70 per cent of the respondent mills faced the 
problem of shortage of fund in procurement of raw materials. Other major problems 
are lengthy procedure of procurement, absence of grading, complexities of import 
policy etc. 
6.2.3 Capacity Utilization : 
Maximum utilization of capacity is very important to improve productivity 
and for bringing down the cost of production because capacity is a fixed cost, any 
under or over-utilization of capacity has a direct bearing on the increase or decrease 
of per unit manufacturing costs respectively. Maximum utilization of capacity may 
be considered as one of the major practical approaches for any mill in earning profit 
through minimization of per unit cost or increasing the efficiency. To be profitable 
the textile mills under BTMC should avoid any sort of under-utilization of capacity. 
It has been observed that low rate of capacity utilization is a common feature of 
BTMC mills. It is found that during the study period, the idle installed capacity 
of the sample mills was the lowest 11 per cent in B2 during 1992-93 (Table 6.10) 
and the highest was 95 per cent in A4 during 1996-97 (Table 6.7). The actual 
achievement of targeted production capacity during study period was the lowest 
26 per cent in A4 during 1996-97 (Table 6.7) and the highest 137 per cent in B3 
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during 1994-95 (Table 6.11). The average idle installed capacity for five years from 
1992-93 to 1996-97 was the lowest 37 per cent in B, (Table 6.9) while the same 
was the highest 86 per cent in A5 (Table 6.8). During the study period, the average 
idle installed capacity of the mills under Group-A was 43 per cent as against 58 
per cent of Group-B (Table 6.14). The percentages of capacity utilization of two 
groups of mills (Table 6.14) clearly reflects that Group-B was in better position 
than Group-A. Table 6.4 to 6.14 reflect the declining trend of capacity utilization 
of sample mills which represent the most unsatisfactory scenario. 
Table 6.17 : Average Annual Capacity Utilization 
Group-A Group-B Total 
Installed Capacity Utilization No. of %of No. of %of No. of %of 
Mills Total Mills Total Mills Total 
00 - 20% - - - -
21 - 40% 
41 - 60% 
61 - 80% 
81 - 100% - - -
Total : 5 100.00 5 100.00 10 100.00 
Source : Tables 6.4 to 6.13. 
Table 6.17 shows the overall situation of installed capacity utilization of 
the sample mills during the study period. Out of 10, 7 mills have 41-60 per cent 
capacity utilization between 1992-93 & 1996-97, 9 mills (90 per cent) utilized 
21-60 per cent installed capacity while only one mill crossed 60 per cent. An 
investigation into the reasons for low capacity utilization of the sample mills reveals 
(Table 6.18) that all the executives have voiced shortage of working capital. Table 
6.18 also highlights (which represents the opinions of the executives of the selected 
mills) that frequent breakdown of electricity was the second important reason for 
low capacity utilization followed by machinery breakdown, low/sluggish demand, 
shortage of spare parts, shortage of back-process, shortage of raw cotton, labour 
unrest and absenteeism of workers. 
2 
3 
_ 
40.00 
60.00 
_ 
-
4 
1 
-
80.00 
20.00 
2 
7 
1 
20.00 
70.00 
10.00 
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Table 6.18 : Reasons for Low Capacity Utilization 
Reasons 
(a) Shortage of Working Capital 
(b) Frequent Breakdown of 
Electricity 
(c) Machinery Breakdown 
(d) Low/Sluggish Demand 
(e) Shortage of Spare-parts 
(f) Shortage of Back-process 
(g) Shortage of Raw Cotton 
(h) Labour Unrest 
(i) Absenteeism of Workers 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of 
Mills 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
-
1 
21 
%of 
Total 
23.81 
19.05 
19.05 
14.29 
9.52 
4.76 
4.76 
-
4.76 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
5 25.00 
4 20.00 
3 15.0 
2 10.00 
2 10.00 
2 10.00 
1 5.00 
1 5.00 
-
20 100.00 
lelal 
No. of 
Mills 
10 
8 
7 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
%of 
Total 
24.39 
19.51 
17.07 
12.19 
9.76 
7.32 
4.88 
2.44 
2.44 
41 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 7(i)(a) in Appendix-1. 
6.2.4 Demand of BTMC Products 
Demand of products is considered as an important factor for increasing the 
sales and also profitability, on which the mills have no control. In Bangladesh, 
the cloth market is not well-organized. Different types of cloths are demanded in 
different seasons. Moreover, demand for different types of cloths depends inter 
alia on the economic condition of the people. Actually shift or change in demand 
is a gradual process and not a process which takes place abruptly. The demand 
for high quality of cloths is increasing due to change of fashion. But the BTMC 
composite mills do not pay any attention to consumer preferences. The design & 
print of BTMC cloths are not able to meet market demand. Low quality of yarn 
compared to imported yarn is a significant reason for demand recession. High price 
of yarn compared to smuggled yarn is another major reason behind the low sales 
resulting in non-utilization of many operational looms. The channel of distribution 
system of yarn is also responsible for decrease in demand. At present the problem 
of decrease in demand becomes very crutial for the BTMC mills. There are many 
reasons which are responsible for decrease in demand. Some of the important reasons 
identified by the respondents, are given in Table 6.19. 
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Table 6.19 : Reasons for Decrease in Demand of Products 
Reasons 
(a) Smuggling/Unauthorized 
Entry of Yarn 
(b) Low Quality of Products 
(c) High Price 
(d) Inconsistency in Selling 
Price of Yam 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
5 55.56 
2 22.22 
2 22.22 
-
9 100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
4 66.66 
1 16.67 
-
1 16.67 
6 100.00 
lolal 
No. of 
Mills 
9 
3 
2 
1 
15 
%of 
Total 
60.00 
20.00 
13.33 
6.67 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 11.1 in Appendix-1. 
Table 6.19 throws light on the problems faced by the BTMC mills that 
smuggling/unauthorized entry of yarn is the main reason behind the decrease in 
demand. Out of 10 respondents as much as 9 opined that the yarn is available at 
cheaper price in the local market which is coming through smuggling from neighbouring 
countries. Low quality of yarn & cloth, identified by 3 respondents, is the second 
reason for decrease in demand followed by high price and inconsistency in selling 
price of yarn in different mills under BTMC. The respondents offered some 
suggestions (Table 6.20) to increase the demand of BTMC products. 
Table 6.20 : Suggestions to Increase the Demand of Products 
Suggestions 
(a) Check the Smuggling/Free 
Entry of Yarn & Cloth 
(b) Modernization of Machineries 
(c) Application of Cost Control 
& Reduction Technique 
(d) Selling Price of Yarn 
should be Equal 
(e) Reducing the Selling Price 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
5 45.46 
3 27.27 
2 18.18 
-
1 9.09 
11 100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
4 50.00 
2 25.00 
1 12.50 
1 12.50 
-
8 100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Mills 
9 
5 
3 
1 
1 
19 
%of 
Total 
47.37 
26.32 
15.79 
5.26 
5.26 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 11.2 in Appendix-1. 
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Table 6.20 represents that out of 10 respondents, 9 proposed to check the 
smuggling/free entry of yarn & cloth for increasing the demand of products. 5 
respondents suggested to modernize the machinery for producing the high quality 
of products at lower cost, 3 respondents mentioned to apply cost control & reduction 
technique. Removal of inconsistency in selling price of yarn and reducing of selling 
price have also been suggested by two respondents each from one group. 
6.2.5 Market Share of BTMC 
Before 1980's the market share of BTMC was very high but after expansion 
of private textile mills in the country and allowing import of yarn & cloth, the 
market share of BTMC products has declined and this trend is still continuing. 
A large number of Garments factory has been established during the last decade. 
Normally they use foreign cloths more than 90 per cent and a huge quantity of 
different foreign cloths are being marketed in Bangladesh by garments factories 
and also through some unauthorized way. Foreign cloths particularly Chinese cloths 
are very popular to the customers than BTMC cloths for their excellent print and 
smooth finishing at cheaper price. Besides, BTMC cloths are facing stiff competition 
from second hand cloth which are available in all over the country. These second 
hand cloths are cheaper than that of BTMC cloths. Customers usually want to 
purchase standard products but the quality of BTMC cloths is below-standard i.e. 
not satisfactory to meet customers demand. Not only cloth, yarn is also facing the 
problem of low quality. Smuggled yarn is available at cheaper price than that the 
same quality of yarn produced by the BTMC mills. The executives of the sample 
mills also opined (Table 6.21)) that smuggling is the main reason for reducing the 
market share of BTMC products. 
Table 6.21 reveals that 9 respondents (90 per cent) identified the entry of 
yarn through smuggling as the number one problem for low market share of BTMC 
products followed by low quality, sluggish demand, high price, liberal import etc. 
So it is clear that BTMC mills are facing an unfair competition in the local market. 
An investigation into the unfair competition in the local market supports the above 
comment. 
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Table 6.21 : Reasons for Low Market Share 
Reasons 
(a) Entry of Yarn through 
Smuggling 
(b) Low Quality 
(c) Low/Sluggish Demand 
(d) High Price in Comparison 
to Smuggled Yarn 
(e) Stiff Competition with 
Imported Yarn & Cloth 
(f) Inconsistency in the Selling 
Price of Yarn 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of 
Mills 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
17 
%of 
Total 
29.41 
23.53 
17.65 
17.65 
5.88 
5.88 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of 
Mills 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
15 
%of 
Total 
26.67 
20.00 
20.00 
13.33 
13.33 
6.67 
100.00 
laial 
No. of 
Mills 
9 
7 
6 
5 
3 
2 
32 
%of 
Total 
28.13 
21.88 
18.75 
15.62 
9.37 
6.25 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(i) in Appendix-1.. 
The executives of the smaple mills mentioned (Table 6.22) three factors 
which are responsible for facing the unfair competition by BTMC mills in the local 
market. Out of 10 respondents, 8 have ranked as 1 to the first factor i.e. 80 per 
cent respondents mentioned that smuggling is the most important factor and 2 
respondents (20 per cent) identified the liberal import as the most important factor 
for unfair competition in the local market. Inappropriate govt, policy is also 
responsible (ranked as 3 by 5 respondents) but illegal prodution is not identified 
as a problem by any respondent for facing the unfair competition in the local market. 
Table 6.22 : Factors for Unfair Competition in the Local Market 
Factors 
(a) Due to Smuggling 
(b) Due to Liberal Import 
(c) Due to Illegal Production 
(d) Due to Inappropriate Govt. Policy 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(vi) in Appendix-1. 
Rank-1 
8 
2 
0 
0 
Number of Mills 
Rank-2 
2 
8 
0 
0 
Rank-3 
0 
0 
0 
5 
Rank-4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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6.2.6 Stockpiling of Finished Products 
Sound marketing system is the foundation of a business. Marketing problem 
leads to sales decline resulting in increases stocklot. At present all the BTMC mills 
are facing the problem of stockpiling of finished products. Earlier this problem 
had faced by some BTMC mills occasionally but now it is a major problem. Major 
reasons for the problem of stockpiling are low quality of yarn, availability of similar 
smuggled yarn at cheaper price, high price of yarn in comparison to modern 
technology based private mills yarn, poor sales promotion efforts, ineffective 
distributive network, sale of imported cloths at cheaper price through an unautho-
rized way by the garments factories etc. which are ultimately reducing the market 
share of BTMC products. The executives of the sample mills mentioned (Table 
6.23) some important causative factors behind creation of stocklot. 
Table 6.23 : Reasons for Stockpiling of Finished Products 
Reasons 
Mills 
(a) Smuggling from Neighbouring 
Countries 
(b) High Selling Price 
(c) Low Quality of Products 
(d) Lengthy Procedure on 
Fixation of Selling Price 
(e) Competition with Imported 
High Quality Products 
(f) Eagerness to the Foreign 
Yarns & Cloths 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Total Mills 
4 33.34 
3 25.00 
2 16.67 
1 8.33 
1 8.33 
1 8.33 
12 100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Total Mills 
3 37.50 
2 25.00 
2 25.00 
1 12.50 
-
-
8 100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Total 
7 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
20 
%of 
35.00 
25.00 
20.00 
10.00 
5.00 
5.00 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(iii) in Appendix-1. 
Table 6.23 reflects the opinions of the executives of the sample mills for 
creating the problem of stockpiling of finished products. Smuggling of yarn & 
cloths, from neighbouring countries specially from India, is identified as number 
one reason which represents 35 per cent of the causative factors by 7 respondents 
for declining the sales volume which are ultimately creating stocklot. High selling 
price is also responsible (25 per cent) for this problem followed by low quality 
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of products (20 per cent), lengthy procedure on fixation of selling price (10 per 
cent). Competition with imported high quality products and eagerness to the foreign 
yarn & cloths are also identified by one respondent. The respondents of the mills 
have suggested some measures to minimize stockpiling which are shown in Table 
6.24. 
Table 6.24 : Suggestions to Minimize Stockpiling 
Suggestions 
(a) Check the Smuggling/Unauth-
orized Entry of Foreign Yarn 
(b) Push Sale & Sales through 
Advertisement 
(c) Reducing the Selling Price 
(d) Importing the Coarse Counts 
of Yarn should be Banned 
(e) Improve the Quality of Products 
(0 Quick Decision on Fixation 
of Selling Price 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of 
Mills 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
16 
%of 
Total 
25.00 
18.75 
18.75 
18.75 
12.50 
6.25 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of 
Mills 
4 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
12 
%of 
Total 
33.33 
16.67 
16.67 
8.33 
16.67 
8.33 
100.00 
Ifilai 
No. of 
Mills 
8 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
28 
%of 
Total 
28.57 
17.86 
17.85 
14.29 
14.29 
7.14 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(iv) in Appendix-1. 
Table 6.24 represents the opinions given by the respondents to minimize 
the stocklot. 8 respondents (80 per cent) opined that unauthorized entry of yarn 
and cloths through undesirable paths must be stopped. Sales should be increased 
through push sale, advertisement & reducing the selling price. Out of 10, 4 
respondents (40 per cent) have suggested to banned the import of coarse counts 
yarn and improve the quality of products. Quick decision on fixation of selling 
price has also been suggested by 2 respondents to minimize the huge stocklots of 
the mills. 
6.2.7 Product Development & Diversification 
Product development & diversification on a planned basis is essential to 
maximize profitability on a long term basis, because the old products may become 
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obsolete or inappropriate in the long run. So, product development & diversification 
is an important marketing strategy in specific cases to maximize profitability and 
to respond to the changing market demand. BTMC mills are facing too many 
problems on the way to the development & diversification of their products. 
Shortage of fund has been mentioned (Table 6.25) as the significant limiting factor 
by 9 respondents (90 per cent which represents 100 per cent from Group-A & 80 
per cent from Group-B mills). 80 per cent respondents (8 executives), which 
represents 34.78 per cent of total limiting factors, identified that old age of 
machineries is another important limiting factor for development of the products. 
In existing machinery i.e. without replacement of old-age by modern technology 
based machineries, diversification of product is not possible which has been 
mentioned by 5 respondents. One mill of Group-A has been facing the absence 
of dynamic leader. The frequency of the limiting factors is high in Group-A than 
that of Group-B. The mill executives have offered some remedial measures (Table 
6.26) to overcome the limiting factors for development & diversification of BTMC 
products. 9 respondents (5 from Group-A & 4 from Group-B) have desired the 
financial cooperation by the government and development financing institutions 
(DFIs). 8 respondents (5 from Group-A & 3 from Group-B), which represents 44.44 
per cent of total suggestions, have suggested to install the modern technology based 
machineries. One executive from Group-A has offered to appoint of dynamic 
manager. 
Table 6.25 : Limiting Factors for Product Development & Diversification 
Limiting Factors 
(a) Shortage of Fund 
(b) Old age of Machineries 
(c) Diversification in Existing 
Machinery is not Possible 
(d) Lack of Dynamic Leader 
Total : 
Group-A 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
5 35.71 
5 35.71 
3 21.43 
1 7.15 
14 100.00 
Group-B 
No. of %of 
Mills Total 
4 44.45 
3 33.33 
2 22.22 
-
9 100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Mills 
9 
8 
5 
1 
23 
%of 
Total 
39.13 
34.78 
21.74 
4.35 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(vii) in Appendix-1. 
136 
Table 6.26 : Suggestions for Product Development & Diversification 
Group-A Group-B Total 
Suggestions No. of %of No. of %of No. of %of 
Mills Total Mills Total Mills Total 
(a) Financial Cooperation by the 5 45.45 4 57.14 9 50.00 
Govt. & DFIs 
(b) Modern Machineries & Tech- 5 45.45 3 42.86 8 44.44 
nologies should be Installed 
(c) Appointing of Dynamic Manager 1 9.10 - - 1 5.56 
Total : 11 100.00 7 100.00 18 100~ob~ 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 8(viii) in Appendix-1. 
6.2.8 Common-size Profit & Loss Statements 
The common-size profit & loss statements show the percentage of profit 
earned or loss suffered to sales along with the percentage of individual cost or 
expense item to sales. This statements are also known as 'component percentage 
statements' or' 100 per cent statements'. There are two methods to adopt the common-
size analysis technique i.e.. vertical and horizontal analysis. If the financial state-
ments are reviewed of one period (year) only then it is called vertical or static 
analysis. In this section, financial statements are reviewed for five years so this 
may termed as horizontal or dynamic analysis. The reason for the greater use of 
common-size percentages of income statement items is the close relationship among 
sales, cost of goods sold and operating expenses. These statements show not only 
the position relating to sales but also indicate items of cost responsible for increase 
or decrease in the percentage of profit. 
The figure of sales has been taken equal to 100 per cent for the analysis 
of condensed profit & loss statement including common-size percentages of the 
sample mills (Table A-2.1 to A-2.10 in Appendix-2) to calculate the individual 
cost items for the period of study from 1992-93 to 1996-97. The overall analysis 
of cost items of selected mills represent that the percentage of cost of goods sold 
to sales veried from 81.85 per cent in B3 during the year 1992-93 to 382.00 per 
cent in A, in 1996-97 (Table A-2.8 & A-2.1 in Appendix-2). In all the mills the 
percentages of cost of goods sold to sales have showed an increasing trend during 
the study period which resulted in increasing percentage of net operating loss. On 
the whole, all the sample mills faced adverse situation and during the year 1996-
97 they suffered heavy losses. 
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Table 6.27 shows the common-size percentages of individual cost items of 
profit & loss statements of the mills of Group-A & B during the study period. The 
cost of goods sold absorbed fluctuating percentage of sales which varied from 87.8 
per cent in Group-B during 1992-93 to 319.5 per cent in Group-A during 1996-
97. Average cost of goods sold during the study period was 159.7 & 112.8 per 
cent of sales respectively in Group-A & Group-B. Operating expenses varied from 
23.8 per cent in Group-B during 1994-95 to 199.2 per cent in Group-A during 1996-
97. During the period of study the net loss before tax of Group-A consumed an 
increasing percentage of sales (from 54.1 in 1992-93 to 412.7 in 1996-97) except 
during the year 1994-95. In case of Group-B net loss also consumed an increasing 
percentage of sales (from 11.5 in 1992-93 to 118.9 in 1996-97) except during the 
years 1994-95 & 1995-96. 
The percentage of cost of goods sold of sample mills indicated an increasing 
trend during 1992-93 to 1996-97 except in 1994-95. This reflects an adverse 
situation because during the study period in both group of mills, the percentages 
of cost of goods sold were larger than sales i.e. more than 100 per cent except 
in Group-B during 1992-93. This adverse situation resulted in increasing percentage 
of net operating loss. The main problem faced by the BTMC mills was the declining 
trend of sales which resulted in under utlization of capacity causing operating losses 
during the study period. During all the years under study period, no provision for 
taxation was made by the sample mills because the net profits were negative except 
in 1992-93 by B, & B2 (Table A-2.6 & A-2.7 in Appendix-2). Due to operating 
losses, no dividend was declared by any mill. For the continuous losses, the mills 
are facing serious problem of working capital shortage resulting in late payment 
(Table 6.28) of salaries & wages to the employees. 
Table 6.28 : Length of Time in Payment of Salaries & Wages 
Group-A Group-B Total 
Length of Time No. of %of No. of %of No. of %of 
Mills Total Mills Total Mills Total 
Salaries of Wages Paid to the 
Employees -
(a) In Time 1 20.00 3 60.00 4 40.00 
(b) Little Late 1 20.00 - - 1 10.00 
(c) As & when Available 3 60.00 2 40.00 5 50.00 
Total : 5 100.00 5 100.00 10 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 10 in Appendix-1. 
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Table 6.28 shows that out of 10,6(60 per cent) mills are delaying in payment 
of salaries & wages to the employees. 5 mills (3 from Group-A & 2 from Group-
B) are paying salaries & wages as and when the cash is available. This is happening 
mainly due to liquidity crisis. 
6.2.9 Production Cost 
Cost, by and large, is the most important factor influencing sales in a 
competitive market. This is an age of mass production as a result of which 
competition in industry is very keen. It is of utmost importance for an industry 
to not only increase the sales of its products but also to ensure that its operations 
relating to production, administration and sales are economical. A proper analysis 
of costs provides information about detecting the sources of waste in production. 
Condensed profit & loss statements including common-size percentages of 
the sample mills (as shown in Table A-2.1 to A-2.10 in Appendix-2) reveal that 
during the period of study from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the cost of goods sold absorbed 
fluctuating percentage of sales and indicated increasing trend except in 1994-95 
in all the sample mills. The influencing cost item in cost of goods sold is materials 
consumed, the percentages of materials consumption to sales varied from 22.70 
in 1993-94 ( in case of A5) to 115.68 in 1996-97 in B,. Another significant 
influencing item in cost of goods sold is salaries & wages. The amount of salaries 
& wages in all the sample mills during study period was almost same i.e. fluctuation 
of total amount was reasonable but the percentage of this item to sales fluctuated 
abnormally which varied from 17.52 per cent in 1994-95 to 377.68 in 1996-97 (in 
case of B5 & A4 respectively) and indicating the adverse situation resulted in 
increasing the operating losses. 50 per cent of the sample mills failed to met the 
expenditure of only salaries & wages by their sales volume, 100 per cent mills 
failed to met the material cost and salaries & wages by the sales volume during 
the last financial year 1996-97. The percentages of interest to sales in all the sample 
mills have shown an increasing trend. Due to heavy burden of interest which varied 
from zero per cent of sales in 1992-93 (in B,) to 220.29 per cent in 1996-97 (in 
A4). Payment of interest by A4 & some other mills was more than 2 times of sales 
volume in 1996-97. 
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Practically, the increasing trend of net loss in all the sample mills created 
an adverse situation which is arising the question of their survival. The analysis 
of the condensed profit & loss statements including common-size percentages 
(Table A-2.1 to A-2.10 in Appendix-2) is reflecting an adverse scenario which is 
happening due to the declining trend of sales volume in all the mills during study 
period. The percentage of sales volume has decreased from 100 per cent in 1992-
93 (as base year) to 15.2 per cent during 1996-97 in A,. The same percentages 
in 1996-97 were 30.7, 23.0, 8.4, 27.5, 40.7, 24.6, 66.9, 31.6 & 50.4 in A2 , A3, 
A4 , A5 , B, , B2 , B3 , B4 & B5 respectively which represent the declining trend 
of sales and also very unsatisfactory sales performance during the study period. 
So, it is clear that increasing the idle capacity i.e. decline in production & sales 
is the most significant reason behind the sharp increasing trend of the percentages 
of cost items to sales. 
Table 6.29 : Reasons for High Production Cost 
Reasons 
(a) Under-utilization of capacity 
(b) High Interest Burden on Bank 
Loan 
(c) Lack of Modern Machinery and 
Technology 
(d) Frequent Breakdown of 
Electricity 
(e) High Rate of Electricity & 
Gas Charge 
(f) High Rate of Salaries & Wages 
(g) High Rate of Import Duty, 
Tax & VAT etc. 
(h) Overstaffing 
(i) Increasing Trend of Cost of 
Raw-materials, Stores & Spares 
(j) Corruption 
Total : 
Crpup-A 
No. of 
Mills 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
30 
%of 
Total 
16.67 
16.67 
13.33 
13.33 
10.00 
10.00 
6.67 
6.67 
3.33 
3.33 
100.00 
Group-B 
No. of 
Mills 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
26 
%of 
Total 
19.23 
15.39 
11.54 
11.54 
7.69 
7.69 
7.69 
7.69 
7.69 
3.85 
100.00 
Total 
No. of 
Mills 
10 
9 
7 
7 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
56 
%of 
Total 
17.86 
16.07 
12.50 
12.50 
8.93 
8.93 
7.14 
7.14 
5.36 
3.57 
100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 9(ii) in Appendix-1. 
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Without increasing the sales volume, it is very difficult to earn profit and survive 
of the BTMC mills because the fixed and semi-fixed costs are not controllable (upto 
a certain limit). An investigation into the reasons for high production cost (as 
highlighted in Table 6.29) reveals that 100 per cent respondents mentioned as 
number one reason is under-utilization of capacity; high rate of interest burden 
is the second significant reason which has mentioned by 9 respondents out of 10 
for the increasing trend of production cost. Lack of modern machinery and tech-
nology is the another reason for high production cost followed by frequent break-
down of electricity, high rate of electricity & gas charge, high rate of salaries & 
wages, high rate of import duty, overstaffing, increasing trend of cost of raw 
materials & spare parts and corruption. 
Table 6.30 : Suggestions to Control Produciton Cost 
Group-A Group-B Total 
Suggestions No. of %of No. of %of No. of %of 
Mills Total Mills Total Mills Total 
(a) Increasing the volume of 4 13.80 3 14.29 7 14.00 
Production 
(b) Replacement of Old by Modern 4 13.80 3 14.29 7 14.00 
Machineries 
(c) Reducing Int. on Bank Loan 4 13.80 2 9.52 6 12.00 
(d) Reducing the Rate & ensure 3 10.34 3 14.29 6 12.00 
the Proper Supply of Electricity 
(e) Withdrawal of Import Duty, 3 10.34 3 14.29 6 12.00 
VAT, Tax & Surcharges 
(0 Replacement of Old-aged Man- 3 10.34 2 9.52 5 10.00 
power by Young and Energetic One 
(g) Encourage & Expedite the 3 10.34 2 9.52 5 10.00 
Voluntary Retirement System 
(h) Increasing the Existing the 2 6.90 1 4.76 3 6.00 
Selling price of yarn 
(i) Exemption of Accrual Interest 2 6.90 1 4.76 3 6.00 
on Bank Loan 
(j) Purchasing of Raw-cotton at 1 3.44 1 4.76 2 4.00 
Lower Prices 
Total : 29 100.00 21 100.00 50 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 9(iii) in Appendix-1. 
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The executives of the sample mills have offered some suggestions to control 
the production cost. Table 6.30 reveals that 7 executives (70 per cent) have suggested 
to increase the volume of production and the equal number of executives have also 
suggested replacement of the old machineries by modern technology-based ma-
chineries. Some other suggestions are: reducing the interest rate, proper supply of 
electricity, appointing the young & energetic manpower, encourage & expedite the 
voluntary retirement system etc. 
On the basis of the overall observations and with the analysis of operational 
efficiencies & financial performances during the study period indicating that the 
overall situation of the sample mills under BTMC are going from bad to worse. 
6.3 Analysis of Financial Statements Through Ratio Technique 
Financial statements consist of financial details of an organization which 
carry a plethora of published information. Normally, all the interested parties 
whether it is investors or creditors or management use these statements for assessing 
the industry's financial soundness or viability. But, neither all of which information 
is relevant for every interested parties nor they have sufficient time to go through 
these multi-aspect information. Therefore, various parties need only selected and 
meaningful information in small size. This is served by financial ratios. One of 
the methods and commonly used technique of analyzing the financial statements 
is ratio analysis. This analysis helps to know the financial growth & development 
with the present condition and also provides guides & clues especially in spotting 
trends towards better or poor performance of a business enterprise. 
Although ratio analysis is used widely but it is difficult to understand the 
entire picture of the financial position of an enterprise with the help of any single 
ratio. Therefore, a set of important ratios have been chosen for the analysis of 
financial statements of the sample mills for the study period of five years from 
1992-93 to 1996-97. The means values of each financial ratio of the selected mills 
have been calculated for each year of the study period from 1992-93 to 1996-97 
(Appendix-4) to judge the exact financial conditions of each mill as well as group 
mill. The t-test has also been applied to measure the difference between the mean 
values of selected ratios of the mills under Group A & B. 
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6.3.1 Selection of Ratio Indicators 
A ratio is simply one number expressed in terms of another. Ratios indicate 
the relationship between one item or a group of items and another item or group 
of items in the balance sheet and income statement. There are endless ratio. Selection 
of the ratios depends upon the purpose of the analysis. A set of 27 different ratios 
have been selected for the purpose of evaluation of past trend of financial health 
of the sample mills as well as the prediction of future. The ratios have been chosen 
taking into consideration their popularity in literature and usefulness in some 
established MDA (multivariate discriminant analysis ) models for prediction of 
sickness. These 27 ratios have been chosed from 4 ratio groups viz. 5 ratios under 
liquidity group, 12 under profitability, 6 under turnover & 4 under solvency. 
Profitability ratios have been divided into two sub-heads i.e. cash flow ratios & 
income ratios. A list of all the ratios selected alongwith the definitions and their 
directions shows in Appendix-3. 27 ratios which have been used for the study 
are given below : 
A. Liquidity Ratios : 
Ratio Name of the Ratio 
Code 
R, Current assets to Current liabilities (CA/CL) 
R2 Quick assets to Current liabilities (QA/CL) 
R3 Net working capital to Total assets (NWC/TA) 
R4 Current assets to Total assets (CA/TA) 
R5 Defensive assets to Total operating expenditure (DA/TOE) 
B. Profitability Ratios : 
(i) Cash Flow Ratios 
R6 Cash flow to Total assets (CF/TA) 
R7 Cash flow to Total tangible assets (CF/TTA) 
Rg Cash flow to Total liabilities (CF/TL) 
Rg Operating cash flow to Net sales (OCF/NS) 
(ii) Income Ratios 
R|0 Gross profit to Net sales (GP/NS) 
R,, Net profit to Net sales (NP/NS) 
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R,2 Earnings before depreciation, interest & taxes to Net sales 
(EBDIT/NS) 
R13 Earnings before interest & taxes to Total assets (EBIT/TA) 
R14 Earnings before interest & taxes to Total tangible assets (EBIT/ 
TTA) 
R15 Retained earnings to Total assets (RE/TA) 
R16 Net profit after tax to Net worth (NPAT/NW) 
R17 Operating cost ratio (OCR) 
C. Activity/Turnover Ratios : 
R l g Stock to Cost of goods sold (Stock/COGS) 
R19 Net sales to Capital employed (NS/CE) 
R20 Net sales to Current assets (NS/CA) 
R21 Net sales to Fixed assets (NS/FA) 
R22 Net sales to Total assets (NS/TA) 
R23 Net sales to Total tangible assets (NS/TTA) 
D. Solvency/Leverage Ratios : 
R24 Long term debt to Equity (LTD/Equity) 
R25 Long term debt to Total assets (LTD/TA) 
R26 Earnings before interest & taxes to Interest (EBIT/Interest) 
R27 Market value of equity to Book value of total debt (MVE/BVTD) 
6.3.2 Liquidity Ratios 
These ratios reveal the debt repaying capacity of the business in short-run 
i.e. these indicate the firm's ability to meet its short-term financial obligations. 
Liquidity is a must for the continuous operations of the business. Table 6.31 shows 
that during the study period from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the average liquidity ratios 
(CA/CL, QA/CL, NWC/TA, CA/TA & DA/TOE) of Group-B were better than 
Group-A. Average current ratio (CA/CL) was 0.37 & 2.53, Quick ratio (QA/CL) 
was 0.15 & 1.89, Net working captial to Total assets was -0.71 & -0.55, Current 
assets to Total assets was 0.30 & 0.37 and Defensive assets to Total operating 
expenditure was 0.15 & 0.28 in case of Group-A & Group-B respectively. The above 
ratios indicate that Group-A mills are suffering more liquidity problem than that 
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of Group-B. Standard deviation of all the liquidity ratios (except CA/TA) was higher 
in Group-B than Group-A. It happened due to the abnormal higher ratios of B, 
under Group-B than others in the same group. 
R, : Current Ratio (CA/CL) : 
Current ratio is a significant test of liquidity position. A ratio of 2:1 is a 
standard norm for this ratio, meaning thereby that current assets should be at least 
double of the current liabilities. But this ratio of all the sample mills are getting 
down year by year (as shown in the Table A-4.1 in Appendix-4). During the period 
of study, the ratio (also known as 2:1 ratio or working capital ratio) varied from 
0.05 in 1993-94 to 24.95 in 1994-95 (in case of B3 & B, respectively). In the mills 
under Group-A, during study period, the ratios were less than 1.00 except in A5 
in 1994-95. On the other hand, the ratios of Group-B were better than Group-A. 
This ratio of B, was fluctuated abnormally which varied from 1.48 in 1996-97 to 
24.95 in 1994-95 and standard edeviation (SD) was too high (9.59). This higher 
ratio indicates that B, could not utilize its current assets efficiently. The decreasing 
trend of current ratios of the sample mills indicates that the short-term financial 
strength of these mills were unsatisfactory. 
Table 6.31 : Average Liquidity Ratios of Selected Milk During 1992-93 to 1996-97 
Code of Mills 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
X 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
X 
SD 
CA/CL 
0.4712 
0.3555 
0.1727 
0.1850 
0.6787 
0.3726 
0.1891 
10.0685 
1.7643 
0.1232 
0.4040 
0.2746 
2.5269 
3.8161 
QA/CL 
0.1758 
0.2411 
0.0502 
0.0741 
0.2216 
0.1525 
0.0772 
8.0248 
1.1322 
0.0416 
0.1177 
0.1565 
1.8946 
3.0910 
NWC/TA 
-0.9248 
-0.5823 
-0.6272 
-0.9816 
-0.4381 
-0.7108 
0.2083 
0.3374 
0.0002 
-1.5495 
-0.6823 
-0.8530 
-0.5494 
0.6631 
CA/TA 
0.6441 
0.3022 
0.1117 
0.2097 
0.2498 
0.3035 
0.1814 
0.5111 
0.4788 
0.2089 
0.3926 
0.2809 
0.3745 
0.1149 
(Mean Values) 
DA/TOE 
0.2313 
0.3227 
0.0453 
0.1122 
0.0555 
0.1534 
0.1074 
0.8654 
0.1906 
0.0782 
0.0809 
0.2063 
0.2843 
0.2954 
Source : Tabls A-4.1 to A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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R2 : Quick Ratio (QA/CL) 
Quick ratio (also known as acid test ratio or liquid ratio) is widely accepted 
as the best available test of the liqudity poistion. During the period of study the 
ratio varied from 0.01 in 1993-94 to 22.21 in 1994-95 in case of A5&B, respectively 
(Table A-4.2 in Appendix-4). Average ratios of Group-A, during study period, were 
less than 0.25 and the same fluctuated widely from 0.04 to 8.02 of Group-B. During 
the last financial year 1996-97, the quick ratios of the sample mills were less than 
0.25 except in B, . This ratio of the mills was always less than the standard norm 
1:1 except in B, (in each year during study period) & in B2 for 1994-95 only. It 
reflects very unsatisfactory liquid position i.e. sickness situation of the sample mills. 
R3 : Net Working Capital to Total Assets (NWC/TA) 
The NWC to TA ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of a firm relative 
to the total capitalization. During the study period, the average ratios of the sample 
mills showed negative figures (except B, & B2 ) which varied from -1.55 in B3 
to -0.44 in A5 (Table A-4.3 in Appendix-4). The only positive ratios showed in 
B, which was decreasing and negative ratios of other mills were increasing during 
the study period. This increasing trend of negative ratios accopanied by continuous 
losses indicate the adverse scenario and sign of sickness of the mills. 
R4 : Current Assets to Total Assets (CA/TA) : 
The CA to TA ratio measures the liquidity position of an enterprise relative 
to total capitalization. During the study period from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the average 
ratios varied from 0.11 in A3 to 0.64 in A, (Table A-4.4 in Appendix-4). The ratios 
of the sample mills showed a decreasing trend except B, which indicate the declining 
trend of liquidity position. 
R5 : Defensive Assets to Total Operating Expenditure : 
The DA to TOE ratio calculates the interval of time for whcih the enterprise 
can finance its continuing operations from its liquidity assets without resorting to 
cash flows from sales or from other short term sources of finance. During the study 
peirod, the average ratios of the mills varied from 0.05 in A3 to 0.87 in Bj (Table 
A-4.5 in Appendix-4). The ratios showed a fluctuating trend among the mills during 
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the study period. The average mean value was only 0.15 & 0.28 in Group-A & 
Group-B which indicates that Group-B mills have the better defensive liquid 
position than that of Group-A. 
6.3.3 Profitability Ratios : 
These ratios are calculated to measure and evaluate the operational perfor-
mance of the mills. Table 6.32 shows that the average ratios, during the study period, 
of all the mills were negative. Actually, profit is a volume and profitablity is a 
ratio. So, the negative profitability ratios indicate net losses i.e. poor sales and 
lack of control over expenses. 
Cash Flow Ratios : 
The flow of cash into and out of the business can be regarded as the barometer 
of the financial health of an enterprise. Cash is an important tool for generating 
profit so the cash flow information is very significant forjudging the profitability. 
All the cash flow ratios showed the negative figures. During the study period, 
average cash flow ratios (Table 6.32) viz. CF to TA varied from -.042 in A, to 
-0.02 in B, , CF to TTA varied from -1.09 in A, to -0.05 in B, , CF to TL varied 
from -0.17 in A, to -0.02 in B5 and OCF to NS varied from -1.70 in A4 to -0.18 
in B, . Average cash flow ratios of Group-B mills were better than that of Group-
A except CF to TL ratio. 
R6 : Cash Flow to Total Assets (CF/TA) 
This ratio indicates how effectively assets are being employed in generating 
cash. This is the real test of economic success or failure of the firm because the 
survival of the company depends directly on the earning power of its assets. During 
the study period, the ratios of the smaple mills were negative and those negative 
ratios are showing increasing trend which indicate that the mills are facing financial 
crisis. Group-A mills were in more financial crisis, during study period, than that 
of Group-A except in 1996-97 (Table A-4.6 in Appendix-4). 
R, : Cash Flow to Total Tangible Assets (CF/TTA) 
The CF to TTA ratio indicates the magnitude of cash resources available 
to the total opeating assets of the smaple mills. During the study period, average 
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ratios varied from -1.09 in A, to -0.05 in B, which indicates the inefficiency 
in management of operating assets. During the year 1996-97, the ratios were negative 
in all the sample mills (Table A-4.7 in Appendix-4). The mean values, during the 
study period, of Group-A & B are -0.33 & -0.21 respectively which indicates worse 
situation in Group-A than that of in Group-B. 
R8 : Cash Flow to Total Liabilities (CF/TL) 
This ratio indicates the company's capacity to withstand financial pressure 
and shows the long run liquidity position of the company. In 1996-97, the ratios 
of all the sample mills were negative which varied from -0.40 in B2 to -0.06 in 
B5 (Table A-4.8 in Appendix-4). The ratios indicate that the dependence on loan 
or government grant to meet its obligations is increasing and also relfect the sickness 
situation of the sample BTMC mills. 
R9 : Operating Cash Flow to Net Sales (OCF/NS) 
This ratio shows the operating efficiency of the mills in generating cash 
from business. During the study period, the ratios were negative in the sample mills 
except in B, & B2 during 1992-93 (Table A-4.9 in Appendix-4). The average ratios 
of the mills, during the study period, varied from -1.70 in A4 to -0.18 in B, . This 
ratios are showing increasing trend which indicate that the mills are not able to 
survive on its own fiancial capabilities. 
Income Ratios : 
These ratios are the measure to ascertain the efficiency of business enterprise 
in generating profits. Income ratios are the significant indicators of overall effi-
ciency of the business enterprise because they compare return of value over and 
above the values put into a business with sale or service carried on by the enterpirse 
with the help of assets employed in the firm. Table 6.32 shows that all the average 
income ratios viz. GP to NS, NP to S, EBDIT to NS, EBIT to TA, EBIT to TTA, 
RE to TA, NPAT to N W & Operating Cost Ratio of all the sample mills were negative 
during the year 1992-93 to 1996-97. These ratios indicate the adverse situation 
of the smaple mills. 
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R10 : Gross Profit to Net Sales (GP/NS) 
This ratio represents the margin between net sales & cost of goods sold. 
It indicates the gross earning capacity of the mills. During the study period, the 
average GP to NS ratios of the sample mills were negative (Table A-4.10 in 
Appendix-4) which varied from -1.37 in A4 to -0.14 in B 5 . The five year's average 
ratio of Group-A & Group-B was -.087 & -0.22 respectively. The ratios of all the 
mills deteriorated during study period. This deterioration is continuing due to the 
increasing trend in cost of production. Cost of production increased due to the 
decreasing trend of sales volume resulting in increasing the idle capacity. 
R„ : Net Profit to Net Sales (NP/NS) 
This ratio is a measure of the overall profitablity of the enterprise which 
establishes relationship between net profit & net sales. Table 6.32 shows that during 
study period the average NP to NS of the sample mills were negative which varied 
from -2.11 in A4 to -0.31 in B,. From 1992-93 to 1996-97, not a single ratio of 
any mill shows positive. The increasing trend of negative ratios (Table A-4.11 in 
Appendix-4) of all the mills accompanied by continuous losses indicates the adverse 
scenario and the sign of sickness also. 
R12 : EBDIT to Net Sales 
This ratio shows the level of profit earned before charging depreciation, 
interest & taxes in relation to sales. During the study period, the average ratio of 
all the sample mills were negative which varied from -1.04 in A4 to -0.10 in B,. 
The increasing trend of negative ratios (Table A-4.12 in Appendix-4) of the mills 
indicates the unsatisfactory performance and inability to pay their interest charge 
which reflects the sickness situation. 
R13 : EBIT to Total Assets 
It is a measure of true productivity of the mill's assets, abstracting from 
tax & interest. During the study period, the average ratios of all the sample mills 
were negative which varied from -0.46 in A, to -0.06 in B, (Table A-4.13 in 
Appendix-4). The increasing trend of the negative ratios indicates an adverse 
situation of the mills. 
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R|4 : EBIT to Total Tangible Assets 
This ratio measures how efficiently the operating assets are being employed 
in generating profits (before interest & taxes). During the study period, the average 
ratios of all the sample mills were negative which varied from -1.19 in A, to -
0.14 in B, (Table A-4.14 in Appendix-4). The average ratio for five years was -
0.43 & -0.29 in Group-A & Group-B respectively which indicates that Group-A 
mills are sufferieng more losses than that of Group-B. 
R]5 : Retained Earnings to Total Assets (RE/TA) 
The retained earnings are nothing but reserves and surpluses which is the 
total sum of profits that the company had retained over its life time. During the 
study period from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the ratios of the sample mills were negative 
except in B, & B2 during the year 1992-93 (Table A-4.15 in Appendix-4). The 
ratios of all the mills are deteriorated during the study period which reflect an adverse 
scenario in growth financing. 
R,6 : Net Profit after Tax to Net Worth (NPAT/NW) 
This ratio identifies the earning power of the owner's investment. During 
the study period, the average ratios of the sample mills were positive except in 
B, & B2. All the mills sustained loss during study period but the reason behind 
the positive ratios is negative net worth. The mills had negative net worth except 
B, during the study period. The ratios (as calculated with net loss divided by net 
worth) indicate that the net worth has been eroded in nine selected mills (Table 
A-4.16 in Appendix-4). 
RJ7 : Operating Cost Ratio 
This ratio is considered as one of the most suitable measure for assessing 
the operating efficiecny and helps the management in judging its operations. Table 
6.32 shows the average operating cost ratios which were more than 1 i.e. it indicates 
that the operating cost (cost of goods sold plus other operating expenses) of the 
sample mills were more than net sales which varied from 1.23 in B5 to 2.48 in 
A5. In the year 1996-97 the ratios were higher than that of previous years which 
varied from 1.47 in B5 to 6.64 in A4 (Table A-4.17 in Appendix-4). These ratios 
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are showing increasing trend of operating cost to sales and for that the operating 
losses of the mills are increasing year by year. In every year, during the study peirod, 
this ratio of Group-A was higher than that of Group-B. It indicates that Group-
A mills are incurring more operating losses than that of Group-B. The growing 
trend of operating cost ratios reflect a dangerous scenario and the sickness of the 
sample mills. 
6.3.4 Activity/Turnover Ratios 
These ratios measure the operational efficiency of various assets which are 
calculated on the basis of the relationship between the level of activity and level 
of various assets. Table 6.33 shows that the average ratios, during the study peirod, 
of Group-B were higher than that of Group-A i.e. Group-B mills were in better 
position in terms of turnover activities. 
R18 : Stock to Cost of Goods Sold (Stock/COGS) 
This ratio reflects the efficiency of inventory management. During the study 
peirod, the average inventory to COGS of the sample mills varied from 0.58 in 
A5 to 0.17 in A3 (Table A-4.18 in Appendix-4). The trend of this ratio, from 1992-
93 to 1996-97, of Group-A was better than that of Group-B. 
R19 : Net Sales to Capital Employed (NS/CE) 
This ratio indicates the extent to which capital employed in the firm con-
tributes towards sales. During the study period, the average NS to CE of the sample 
mills was lowest -1.87 in A2 and highest 2.72 in B2 (Table A-4.19 in Appendix-
4). In all the millls, during the period of study from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the ratios 
are showing decreasing whcih trend indicate that inefficient utilization of resources 
is increasing year by year. 
R20 : Net Sales to Current Assets (NS/CA) 
This ratio shows the efficiency of sales management. During the study peirod, 
the average ratios of the mills were fluctuated which varied from 0.72 in B, to 
3.62 in B.j (Table A-4.20 in Appendix-4). In all the mills, the ratios had a declining 
trend of net sales which were reflected their sickness. 
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R21 : Net Sales to Fixed Assets (NS/FA) 
This ratio measures the efficiency which the firm is utilizing its investment 
in fixed assets. During the year 1992-93, this ratio was 0.95 & 1.23 which were 
decreased to 0.23 & 0.61 in 1996-97 in case of Group-A & Group-B respectively 
(Table A-4.21 in Appendix-4). The trend of the ratios of the mills are showing 
the declining trend of sales. 
Table 6.33 : Average Activity/Turnover Ratios of Selected Mills During 1992-93 
to 1996-97 
(Mean Values) 
Code of 
Mills 
A, . 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
X 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
X 
SD 
Stock/ 
COGS 
0.4464 
0.1935 
0.1702 
0.2597 
0.5779 
0.3295 
0.1576 
0.4360 
0.2276 
0.1828 
0.3236 
0.2187 
0.2778 
0.0918 
NS/CE 
0.2098 
-1.8691 
1.2960 
0.7818 
0.7911 
0.2419 
1.1101 
0.4055 
2.7182 
-1.0095 
-0.5698 
-0.6122 
0.1864 
1.3489 
NS/CA 
0.8651 
1.2639 
3.0572 
1.8740 
1.2586 
1.6638 
0.7678 
0.7219 
2.2253 
3.6165 
2.2756 
1.9891 
2.1657 
0.9205 
NS/FA 
1.8030 
0.5602 
0.3822 
0.4916 
0.3713 
0.7217 
0.5452 
0.6942 
2.0349 
0.8369 
1.4016 
0.7523 
1.1440 
0.5119 
NS/TA 
0.5602 
0.3870 
0.3375 
0.3838 
0.2783 
0.3894 
0.0941 
0.3458 
1.0347 
0.6602 
0.8537 
0.5411 
0.6871 
0.2396 
NS/TTA 
1.8204 
0.5800 
0.3822 
0.4916 
0.3713 
0.7291 
0.5510 
0.8726 
2.0463 
0.8380 
1.4206 
0.7663 
1.1887 
0.4880 
Source : Tables A-4.18 to A-4.23 in Appendix-4. 
R^ : Net Sales to Toal Assets (NS/TA) 
This ratio shows the effective use of assets in improving sales. During the 
study period, the average ratios of the sample mills varied from 0.28 in A5 to 1.03 
in B2 (Table A-4.22 in Appendix-4). The declining trend of this ratios, during the 
study period, indicate that the sales generating ability of the sample mills is 
decreasing. 
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R23 : Net Sales to Total Tangible Assets (NS/TTA) 
This ratio shows the ability of the company to generate sales from all the 
financial resources committed to it. These ratios of the sample mills, during study 
peirod, are shown a declining trend. The average of the mean values was 0.73 & 
1.19 in case of Group-A & B respectively (Table A-4.23 in Appendix-4). The 
declining trend of these ratios indicate inefficiency in utilizing the operating assets. 
6.3.5 Solvency/Leverage Ratios 
These ratios are used to measure the ability of the company to meet the 
long-term obligations viz. to pay interest/standing charges regularly, to repay the 
principal amount as per schedule. Table 6.34 shows that all the leverage ratios viz. 
LTD to Equity, LTD to Total Assets, EBITto Interest & MVE to BVTD are reflecting 
the adverse situation of the sample mills. 
R24 : Long-Term Debt to Equity (LTD to Equity) 
This LTD to Equity ratio (also known as Debt-Equity ratio or Debt to Net 
Worth ratio) measures the relationship between borrowed funds and internal owner's 
funds. For analyzing the composition of capital structure, this ratio is empoyed 
as a principal tool. During the study period, the average debt-equity ratios of 9 
sample mills (except B, ) were negative which varied from -1.42 in B2 to -0.29 
in B3 (Table A-4.24 in Appendix-4). In every year, the ratios of Group-A & B 
have shown a negative scenario except B,. The reason for this adverse scenario 
is negative equity/net worth. The long-term financial strength of the selected mills 
was not satisfactory. For the financial weakness the mills were not able to repay 
their principal loan amount without any assistance of government loan or grant. 
These ratios of the sample mills (except Bj) adversely affected their profitability. 
R25 : Long-term Debt to Total Assets (LTD/TA) 
This ratio describes the financial position of any business enterprise which 
is capable to meet outside long-term obligations in full out of its own assets. During 
the study period, the average ratios of the sample mills varied from 0.06 in B, 
to 1.57 in A3 and the average ratio was 1.19 & 0.42 in Group-A & B respectively 
(Table A-4.25 in Appendix-4). These ratios of the sample mills were increased from 
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1992-93 to 1996-97. During the last fiancial year i.e. in 1996-97, long term debt 
of 6 mills, out of 10 sample mills, was more than total assets. In case of A , , long 
term debt was 2.6 times than total assets. The dependence on long-term debt is 
increasing year by year for the matter it is increasing the debt burden and adversely 
affecting the profitability of the mills. 
Table 6.34 : Average Leverage Ratios of Selected Mills During 1992-93 to 1996-97. 
(Mean Values) 
: of Mills 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
X 
SD 
B. 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
X 
SD 
LTD/Equity 
-0.3903 
-1.0121 
-1.0730 
-0.7013 
-1.0829 
-0.8519 
0.2697 
0.0942 
-1.4167 
-0.2906 
-0.6140 
-0.8417 
-0.6138 
0.5104 
LTD/TA 
0.6546 
1.0212 
1.5747 
1.1708 
1.5505 
1.1944 
0.3445 
0.0583 
0.3576 
0.4148 
0.7315 
0.5163 
0.4157 
0.2195 
EBIT/Interest 
-4.0034 
-1.5048 
-1.2154 
-1.7039 
-2.1325 
-2.1120 
0.0819 
-4.0358 
-2.9367 
-2.6381 
^f.1026 
-0.9823 
-2.6988 
0.1627 
MVE/BVTD 
-0.7215 
-0.5473 
-0.5884 
-0.6074 
-0.5551 
-0.6039 
0.0627 
5.9244 
-0.1247 
-0.5911 
-0.5413 
-0.4276 
0.8479 
2.5434 
Source : Tabls A-4.24 to A-4.27 in Appendix-4. 
R26 : Earnings before Interest & Taxes to Interest 
This ratio (also called as Time interest earned ratio) measures the extent 
to which the earnings are sufficient to cover interest payment. During the study 
period, the average ratios of the sample mills were negative which varied from 
-4.10 in B4 to -0.98 in B5 (Table A-4.26 in Appendix-4). During the period of 
study from 1992-93 to 1996-97, the sample mills under Group-A incurred losses 
before payment of interest. It indicates that not a single mill of Group-A were able 
to meet interest charges from their earnings. In case of Group-B, in 1992-93, net 
profit before tax of B2 & B3 was available for payment of interest (approximately 
6.3 & 0.04 times. In that year B, earned profit of Tk. 4.68 lac, but the mill did 
not pay any amount as interest i.e. interest payment was zero. The inability of the 
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mills to pay interest charges are increasing year by year because of increasing net 
losses which are affected adversely to the confidence of DFIs, Bankers, Creditors, 
Investors as well as Government also. 
R27 : MVE to BVTD 
During the study period, the average ratios of 9 sample mills (except B,) 
were negative which varied from -0.72 in A! to -0.12 in B2 (Table A-4.27 in 
Appendix-4). In case of B, , the average ratios was 5.92 but standard deviation 
was to high i.e. 4.3688. In 1996-97, this ratio of B, was only 0.95 whereas it was 
highest 11.64 in 1994-95. The equity of the sample mills, except only B, , was 
negative and this negative ratios have showing an increasing trend i.e. the equity 
position of the mills has shown a deterioration which indicates that the dependence 
of the mills on external funds is increasing. The negative equity has shown worse 
situation in Group-A than that of Group-B. 
6.3.6 Mean & t-values of Selected Ratios and Statistical Significance of Mean 
Differences 
The comparison of the mean values of ratios of two groups assisted to 
determine the general relationship between the financial ratios of the mills under 
Group-A & B. The t-values have been calculated to find-out whether mean values 
of the ratios differ significantly from one group to another. Practically, it is very 
difficult to gather any idea of statistical difference through simple observation of 
mean values of ratios of two groups. Therefore, the t-test has been applied to measure 
the difference between the mean values of selected twenty seven financial ratios 
of Group A & Group-B. The t-value of each ratio is computed by the following 
formula : 
x , x 2 , .» , »»2 / n ! "2 
V n,+n2 
where 
t = — - — * -yl t(n,+n2_2) 
S \ n,+n2 
under the null hypothesis |i, = \i2 
~x, = mean value of the mills under Group-A 
"x2 = mean value of the mills under Group-B 
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n, = number of observations in Group-A 
n2 = number of observations in Group-B 
S = combined standard deviation 
The value of S is calculated as follows : 
n, + n2 - 2 
Average mean values of the selected ratios, for the study period of 
five years, of Group-A & Group-B and t-values have been worked out & presented 
in the Table 6.35. 
If the calculated value oft* is greater than the tabulated value at 0.05 level 
of significance i.e. calculated Y > to.o5,(n,+n2-2), then we may reject the null hypothesis, 
i.e. the difference between the ratios of group mean may be considered significant. 
On the contray, if the calculated value of 't' is smaller than the tabulated value 
of't' then we may accept the null hypothesis, i.e. calculated 't' < to.o5,(n,+n2-2), than 
the difference between the ratios of group mean may be considered insignificant. 
Table 6.35 reflects that there is significant difference between the mean 
values of 11 ratios out of 27 ratios selected for the study. These 11 ratios are given 
below : 
Profitability Ratios : 
R9 
R I 0 
R.. 
R.2 
R.5 
R,7 
= OCF/NS 
= GP/NS 
= NP/NS 
= EBDIT/NS 
- RE/TA 
-OCR 
Activity/Turnover Ratios : 
R2I = NS/FA 
R22 = NS/TA 
R23 - NS/TTA 
Leverage/Solvency Ratios 
R25 - LTD/TA 
R„ = MVE/BVTD 
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Tabic 6.35 : Mean and t-values of the Selected Ratios for Group-A & B 
Name & Code of the 
Selected Ratios 
Mean values 
of Group-A 
Mean values t-values 
of Group-B 
A. Liquidity Ratios 
R, CA/CL 
R2 QA/CL 
R3 NWC/TA 
R4 CA/TA 
R5 DA/TOE 
B. Profitability Ratios 
(i) Cash Flow Ratios-
R6 CF/TA 
R7 CF/TTA 
Rg CF/TL 
R9 OCF/NS 
(ii) Income Ratios— 
R 
R, 
R 
R 
10 GP/NS 
NP/NS 
EBDIT/NS 
EBIT/TA 
RJ4 EBIT/TTA 
RE/TA 
NPAT/NW 
OCR 
C. Activity/Turnover Ratios 
Rlg Stock/COGS 
R19 NS/CE 
R20 NS/CA 
R21 NS/FA 
R22 NS/TA 
R23 NS/TTA 
D. Leverage/Solvency Ratios 
LTD/Equity 
LTD/TA 
EBIT/ Interest 
MVE/BVTD 
0.3726 
0.1525 
-0.7108 
0.3035 
0.1534 
2.5269 
1.8946 
-0.5494 
0.3745 
0.2843 
-1.854 
-1.739 
-0.974 
-1.507 
-1.829 
-0.1732 
0.3315 
-0.0726 
-1.1474 
-0.8735 
-1.4095 
-0.7132 
-0.2380 
-0.4265 
-0.3500 
0.2777 
1.9901 
0.3295 
0.2419 
1.6638 
0.7217 
0.3894 
0.7291 
-0.8519 
1.1944 
-2.1120 
-0.6039 
-0.1305 
-0.2120 
-0.0826 
-0.3623 
-0.2195 
-0.4509 
-0.2459 
-0.1761 
-0.2884 
-0.2403 
0.1082 
1.3452 
0.2778 
0.1864 
2.1657 
1.1440 
0.6871 
1.1887 
-0.6138 
0.4157 
-2.6162 
0.8479 
-0.868 
-1.165 
0.298 
-2.722* 
-2.607* 
-2.852* 
-2.238* 
-1.299 
-1.362 
-2.135* 
0.865 
2.484* 
0.785 
0.052 
-1.399 
-2.259* 
-3.871* 
-2.468* 
-0.997 
4.505* 
0.799 
-2.252* 
Source : Tables 6.31. 6.32, 6.33, & 6.34. 
Note : (i) R, ... R27 represents the variables. 
(ii) Group-A represents the losing textile mills under BTMC. 
(iii) Group-B represents the probable profitable & nearest to the breakeven 
mills under BTMC. 
(iv) Table value at 48 d.f = 2.020 
(v) * denotes significant at 95 per cent confidence level. 
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Table 6.35 clearly indicates that the t-values at 5% level of significance 
of the above mentioned 11 ratios (which comprises of 50% i.e. 6 from profitability 
ratios. 50% i.e. 3 from activity ratios and again 50% i.e. 2 from leverage ratios) 
are greater than the tabulated value o f t ' with 48 d.f is 2.020 i.e. these 11 ratios 
are found significant at 95% confidence level and possess the ability to differentiate 
the state of financial health between the mills under Group-A & B. The analysis 
of the table further reveals that the mean differences of 100 per cent of the liquidity 
ratios and 50 per cent each from profitability, activity & leverage ratios are found 
insignificant (at 95% confidence level) for the purpose of differentiation between 
the two groups of mills under univariate approach. The reason for the higher rate 
of insignificant ratios (16 out of 27 selected ratios i.e. 59%) is the continuous losses 
sustained by all the sample mills and almost the same adverse situation prevailing 
in the mills under the both group. Among the selected ratios for the study, LTD 
to TA from leverage ratio group, NS to TA from activity ratio group & NP to NS 
from profitability ratio group are found to be most important variables (having high 
differentiating power) to differentiate between the two groups of mills in individual 
capacity. 
6.4 Identification of Sickness Through Mult i -variate Models 
To predict industrial sickness, there are two significant analysis technique. 
The first one is univariate ratio analysis and the next is multiple discriminant 
analysis. Twenty seven important financial ratios for five years have been calculated 
& discussed as a part of univariate ratio analysis in earlier section to predict the 
sickness situation of the sample textile mills operating under BTMC. From the 
endless ratios, selection of some specific ratios is a difficult task which depends 
upon the purpose of the analysis and varies from industry to industry, purpose to 
purpose and overall man to man. Not only this, the pioneer of the first extensive 
work to predict corporate failure under the univariate approach, W.H. Beaver [ 1967] 
proved that all the financial ratios have different degree of accuracy in predicting 
failure of the business. 
To overcome the shortcomings of univariate financial ratio analysis and to 
develop a sophisticated approach, efforts have been made by some scholars in the 
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area of sickness/failure of industries and formulated some different multi-variate 
models in predicting failure/sickness. In this section, under multivariate approach, 
three important multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) models based on financial 
ratios viz. Altman's Z-scroe, Satyanarayana's Z* value and Yadav's Y-score have 
been applied to evaluate the financial health & identify the degree of sickness of 
the sample mills. 
6.4.1 MDA Model : Altman's Z-score 
Prof. Altman in 1968 made a significant break through in the area of business 
bankruptcy prediction by developing a model known as Z-score model (popularly 
known as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) model). The model, is relevant 
to manufacturing companies, is used here in making analytical study of selected 
mills to findout their financial health. The Z model is as under : 
Z = 0.012x, + 0.014x2 + 0.033x3 + 0.006x4 + 0.010x5 
where 
x, = Net working capital to Total assets (NWC/TA) 
x2 = Retained earnings to Total assets (RE/TA) 
x3 = Earnings before interest & taxes to Total assets 
(EBIT/TA) 
x4 = Market value of equity to Book value of total debt 
(MVE/BVTD) 
x5 = Net sales to Total assets (NS/TA) 
Z = Overall index 
According the results of Z-score on bankruptcy, it may put to predict the 
degree of sickness as follows : 
Less than 1.8 points = Sickness 
1.8 to 2.99 points = Approaching Sickness 
3.0 points & above = Financially Sound & Healthy 
2.675 = Cut-off Point which Discriminates 
between Sick & Non-sick Firms. 
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Table 6.36 : Z-score Values and Ranking on the Basis of Yearly 
Average Scores. 
(Cut-off Point = 2.675) 
KfiTT Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1994-05 1995-96 1996-97 Average Rank 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
-0.342 -2.191 -2.887 -4.256 -6.74 -3.230 10 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-0.556 -1.326 -1.290 -1.917 -2.592 -1.536 5 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-1.467 -2.147 -1.277 -1.512 -2.616 -1.804 7 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-1.782 -2.501 -1.155 -2.421 -2.798 -2.131 8 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-1.228 -2.362 -0.971 -1.512 -1.312 -1.477 4 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
Average Z-score -1.075 -2.105 -1 .516-2 .324 -3.158 -2.036 -
of Group-A Mills 
4.175 6.703 7.797 0.956 0.426 4.011 1 
Non-sick Non-sick Non-sick Sick Sick Non-sick 
2.338 0.260 0.816 0.260 -3.552 -0.080 2 
Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-1.037 -3.098 -2.613 -2.270 -4.141 -2.632 9 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-0.691 -1.708 -0.284 -1.609 -4.619 -1.782 6 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-0.438 -1.568 -0.691 -1.650 -2.768 -1.423 3 
Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
Average Z-score 0.869 0.118 1.005 -0.967 -2.931 -0.381 
of Group-B Mills 
Source : Tables A-5.1 to A-5.10 in Appendix-5. 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
Z-score 
Sick/Non-sick 
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Table 6.36 shows the Z-score values for the period of study from 1992-
93 to 1996-97, the average of five years Z-score values, the ranking on the basis 
of average scores for all the ten selected mills alongwith the degree of sickness. 
Table 6.36 shows that the value of'Z' was negative for all the sample mills from 
Group-A and 4 mills from Group-B i.e. out of 10 sample mills, the average Z-
score value for 9 mills was negative and only B, had postive value. It indicates 
that 9 mills were sick and the remaining one was non-sick. Though, B, was non-
sick on the basis of average score during the study period but in 1995-96 and 1996-
97, the Z-score value of that mill indicates the sickness because in last two years 
the score was below 1.8. Between 1992-93 & 1994-95 the value of'Z' for B, had 
gone up from 4.175 to 7.797 but suddenly this value had come down to 0.956 in 
the next year 1995-96. 
Ranking of Z-scores of the sample mills indicates that 3 mills from Group-
B occupied 1st to 3rd position. 4th & 5th position occupied by the mills from Group-
A and at the 6th rank, there was B4 i.e. again from Group-B. Another 3 mills from 
Group-A ranked from 7th to 10th position except one mill from Group-B which 
occupied 9th position. 
6.4.2 MDA Model : Satyanarayana's Z* value 
P.V. Satyanarayana calculated the value of 'Z' considering earnings after 
covering interest but before tax instead of earnings before interest & tax accounted 
in Altman's equation (i.e. Satyanarayana considered EBT instead of EBIT what 
was done by Altman). In Indian industries (the nature of which'are almost same 
as the industries of Bangladesh) interest forms an important element of cost, so 
that to avoid the misleading in conclusion he denoted the revised 'Z' with adjusting 
the interest in earnings as 'Z*'. According to him, the formula for calculation of 
Altman's Z-score value and cut-off point will be same for calculating Z* value, 
only difference is that X3 variable will be the ratio of Earnings before tax to Total 
assets. 
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Table 6.37 : Z* Values and Ranking on the Basis of Yearly Average 
Values. 
(Cut-off Point = 2.675) 
TviTTI Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 Average Rank 
Code 
A, Z* Value -0.580 -2.497 -3.343 -4.589 -6.833 -3.568 10 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
A2 Z* Value -0.863 -1.701 -1.636 -2.208 -2.987 -1.879 5 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
A3 Z* Value -1.873 -2.613 -1.768 -1.997 -3.139 -2.278 7 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
A4 Z* Value -2.080 -2.872 -1.508 -2.819 -3.227 -2.501 8 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
A5 Z* Value -1.457 -2.688 -1.283 -1.848 -1.626 -1.780 3 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
Average Z* Value -1.371 -2.474 -1.908 -2.692 -3.562 -2.401 -
of Group-A Mills 
B, Z* Value 4.175 6.666 7.797 0.884 0.264 3.957 1 
Sick/Non-sick Non-sick Non-sick Non-sick Sick Sick Non-sick 
B2 Z* Value 2.294 0.153 0.745 -0.530 -3.820 -0.232 2 
Sick/Non-sick Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
B, Z* Value -1.284 -3.392 -2.827 -2.487 -4.434 -2.885 9 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
B4 Z* Value -0.900 -1.962 -0.550 -1.761 -4.928 -2.020 6 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
B5 Z* Value -0.735 -1.943 -1.035 -2.043 -3.175 -1.786 4 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick Sick 
Average Z* Value 0.710 -0.096 0.826 -1.187 -3.219 -0.593 -
of Group-B Mills 
Source : Tables A-5.1 to A-5.10 in Appendix-5. 
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Table 6.37 shows the Z* values from 1992-93 to 1996-97, yearly average 
Z* Values, the degree of sickness and the ranking on the basis of average values 
for all the 10 selected mills. The average value of Z* was negative for 9 mills 
which indicates that these 9 mills were sick and B, mills was non-sick. Though 
the same result reflected in Altman's Z-score but remarkable difference between 
'Z-score' & Z* value was that, on the basis of Z-score vlaue, A5 & B5 ranked 4th 
& 3rd position respectively but according to Z* value A5 captured 3rd positon and 
B5 occupied 4th position. In the year 1996-97, the difference between the two values 
of 'Z' (i.e. Z-Z*) for the sample mills were fluctuated and varied from 0.162 in 
B, to 0.523 in A3 (Tables A-5.1 to A-5.10 in Appendix-5). During the study period, 
the difference value of Z (i.e. Z-Z*) showed an increasing trend in the sample mills, 
except in very few cases, which indicates that the payment of interest was increasing 
i.e. the dependence on external funds was also increasing of the sample mills. 
6.4.3 MDA Model : Yadav's Y-score 
R.A. yadav made an attempt and developed a multi-ratio discriminant model 
containing four independent ratios serving as the best predictive variables by using 
various statistical techniques. The best multiple discriminant funciton investigated 
by him is as under : 
Y = 19.8927 V9 + 0.0047 V25 + 0.7141 V31 + 0.4860 V35 
V9 = Earnings before interest & taxes to Total tangible assets (EBIT/ 
TTA) 
V25 = Current assets to Current liabilities (CA/CL) 
V31 = Net sales to Total tangible assets (NS/TTA) 
V35 = Defensive assets to Total operating expenditures (DA/TOE) 
Y = Overall discriminant score 
A score of 1.425 was established as a cut-off point. If the Y-score of any 
individual company is above 1.425, it indicates the company's strong financial 
position. On the other hand, the score of below 1.425 indicates the sickness. 
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Table 6.38 : Y-score Values an 
Average Scores. 
M7T1 Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 
Code 
A, Y-score -8.130 -23354 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
A2 Y-score -1.240 -3.557 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
A3 Y-score -2.409 -2.829 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
A4 Y-score -3.091 -3.690 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
A5 Y-score -3.179 -6.292 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
Average Y-score -3.610 -7.944 
of Group-A Mills 
B, Y-score 0.985 -2.240 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
B2 Y-score 5.009 -4.170 
Sick/Non-sick Non-sick Sick 
B3 Y-score 0.707 -5.244 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
B4 Y-score -3.894 -7.535 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
B5 Y-score -0.297 -3.442 
Sick/Non-sick Sick Sick 
Average Y-score 0.502 -4.526 
of Group-B Mills 
Source : Tables A-5.1 to A-5.10 in Appendi 
I Ranking on the Basis of Yearly 
(Cut-off Point = 1.425) 
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 Average Rank 
-18.819 -28.015 -33371 -22338 10 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-2.070 -5.138 -8.179 -4.037 4 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-2.808 -3.764 -6.478 -3.658 3 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-2.409 -5.935 -7.246 -4.474 5 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-^.166 -4.983 -6.015 -4.927 7 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-6.054 -9.567 -12.258 -7.887 -
-0.669 -2.883 -3.918 -1.745 1 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-4.781 -6.578 -21.564 -6.417 8 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-4.637 -4.004 -9.470 -^.530 6 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-4.771 -8.477 -17.938 -8.523 9 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-1.254 -2.428 -4.999 -2.484 2 
Sick Sick Sick Sick 
-3.222 -^.874 -11.578 -4.740 -
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Table 6.38 represents the Y-score values for the study period from 
1992-93 to 1996-97 for all the sample mills. The yearly average scores were 
negative for the sample mills which varied from -1.745 in B, to -22.338 
in A,. The average scores of the mills were negative and below cut-off point 
it indicates that if we consider Yadav's Y-score value than the sickness 
situation reflects in all the sample mills. During the study period, only in 
1992-93 the socre was positive for 3 mills from Group-B but only one mill 
i.e. B, had crossed the cut-off point i.e it had the score above 1.425 which 
had come-down to -4.170 in the next year and -21.564 in 1996-97. Ranking 
of the mills has been changed in relation to Z-score or Z* value except for 
A, & B,. These two mills occupied 1st & 10th position respectively as like 
as the position occupied in Z-score & Z* value. The negative Y-score values 
are showing a very unsatisfactory situation and arising the question of 
survival of the sample mills. 
6.5 Opinions of the Respondent's on Different Aspects of Sickness 
A questionnaire was used to collect the opinions of the executives 
on different aspects of sickness/continuous losses of the selected mills. 
Some problems faced by the mills, suggestions to overcome the constraints, 
effects of sickness/continuous losses alognwith some suggestions to the 
government to overcome the adverse situation of the mills, given by the 
executives, are discussed below. 
6.5.1 Causes of Sickness/Continuous Losses and Remedial Measures 
The textile mills operating under BTMC are facing some serious 
problems. To collect the opinion of the executives, it was requested to 
identify the factors/causes which are responsible for sickness/continuous 
losses of their mills through a questionnaire with the dergee of agreement/ 
disagreement. Their opinions are tabulated and presented in Table 6.39. 
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Table 6.39 : Degree of Agreement/Disagreement to the Causes of Industrial 
Sickness in BTMC Enterprises 
(Frequency Distribution of Respondent's in Percentage). 
9 Tn Z. 
Factors / Causes 
•o 
f s I I I, § I Wcghted 
o Sb «» •§ 7 £ • *verage 
^ « < i -^ ^ | Score 
D Q 
C/3 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21 . 
INTERNAL CAUSES 
Absence of efficient/professional 
management & dynamic leadership 
Frequent breakdown of machinery 
Shortage/irregular supply of raw-material 
and other input 
Poor quality of raw materials 
Under utilisation of capacity 
Surplus manpower/Absence of effective 
manpower planning 
Imbalanced capital structure/Adverse 
debt-equity ratio 
Lack of trained & skilled labour 
Lack of 'Balancing-Modernisation-
Replacement and Expansion1 (BMRE) 
Corruption and bribery at all levels 
Technological obsolescence 
Lack of coordination among public 
enterprises, govt, agencies, support institu-
tions & authorities for industrialisation 
Labour absenteeism / Low labour turnover 
Poor labour relations 
Lack of cost conciousness 
Delayed in decision making 
Continuous labour strike & lock-out 
Dependence on few buyers 
High production cost 
Lack of sales promotion 
Poor utilisation of assets 
11 45 11 22 11 3.23 
45 33 11 11 
78 22 - -
4.12 
11 6 7 - 2 2 - 3.67 
- 56 33 11 - 3.45 
44 56 - - - 4.44 
45 11 22 11 11 3.68 
4.78 
-
67 
44 
89 
— 
33 
33 
11 
-
44 
- 67 -
- -
- 45 -
- 11 -
11 45 -
- 2.66 
- 4.67 
- 3.45 
- 4.67 
- 2.99 
-
-
33 
22 
-
-
33 
-
— 
45 
56 
45 
33 
-
11 
56 
11 
11 
22 
11 
-
-
-
11 
11 
11 
33 
33 
33 
22 
45 
89 
78 
-
78 
56 
-
-
-
-
11 
-
-
-
_ 
3.12 
3.23 
3.89 
3.32 
1.89 
2.33 
4.22 
2.33 
2.55 
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Factors / Causes o „ « -8 ? £ ? Avera8e 
_ « < ? i ~ .2 Score 
^ 5 " -° 
100 
33 
-
45 
22 
78 
44 
-
67 
11 
33 
56 
22 
56 
-
-
11 
11 
-
— 
— 
-
-
78 
11 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
22 
_ 
_ 
5.00 
4.33 
2.33 
4.12 
3.56 
4.78 
4.44 
22. Favouritism, family ties, nepotism and 22 11 11 56 - 2.99 
undue role play in the appointments, 
promotions and selection of higher trainning 
23. Any other (Please specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Total Weighted Average Score 75.77 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
24. Shortage of working capital 
25. High price of raw materials 
26. Lack of adequate infrastructure 
27. High rate of electricity charge, fuel & 
machinery parts 
28. High rate of wages & salaries fixed by 
the govt. 
29. High rate of loan interest & debt burden 
30. Low sales price of finished goods in 
comparison to the production cost fixed 
by the government 
31. Political unrest & influence 22 34 22 22 - 3.56 
32. Conflicting changes in govt, policy & decision 11 44 45 - - 3.66 
33. Easy availability of similar product in the 78 22 - - - 4.78 
market through smuggling, liberal import 
34. Natural disasters - 11 33 56 - 2.55 
35. Heavy financial burden due to total debt & 89 11 - - - 4.89 
interest liability, taka devaluation etc. 
36. Frequent load shedding, irregular supply & 78 22 - - - 4.78 
failure of electricity 
37. Trade unionism 
38. Changes in demand 
39. Poor marketing facilities 
40. Govt, policy regarding price & distribution 
41. Unfair competition in the market 
Total Weighted Aerage Score 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 12.2. in Appendix-1. 
22 
11 
-
-
33 
45 
67 
44 
67 
56 
- 33 -
22 - -
11 45 -
22 11 -
11 - -
- 3.56 
- 3.89 
- 2.99 
- 3.56 
- 4.22 
71.00 
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To measure the degree of agreement with various causes commenting/ 
mentioning on BTMC mill's sickness, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale 
of 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree), the extent to which they believed 
each factors/causes are responsible for sickness of the mills under BTMC. Out of 
10 mills, only the executive of B, is declared the mill as non-sick (the reason for 
this opinion was— though they incurred net loss from 1993-94 to 1996-97 but at 
the end of the financial year of 1996-97, their accumulated profit was positive). 
So the table is prepared on the basis of the opinions of 9 executives. The Table 
6.39 indicates that repondents have strong attitudes towards some internal factors 
of the mill's sickness like imbalanced capital structure/adverse debt-equity ratio, 
lack of BMRE, technological obsolescence, under-utilization of capacity frequent 
break-down of machinery, high production cost etc. as they got weighted average 
score of more than 4.0. The table depicts that imbalanced capital structure/adverse 
debt-equity ratio is the prime cause of sickness in BTMC mills as it got the highest 
weighted average score of 4.78. Majority of the respondents (89%) strongly agree 
with the cause that, due to technological obsolescence mills are sick. 100 per cent 
repsondents are found to be indifferent, that is, they disagree (89% disagree & 11% 
strongly disagree) with the factor of continuous labour strike and lock-out as the 
cause of sickness. 44 per cent of the respondents strongly agree with the factors 
of corruption & bribery at all levels are the causes of sickness; although 45 per 
cent executives disagree with this view. 56 per cent of the executives agree (11% 
strongly agree & 45% agree) with the factors of absence of efficient/professional 
management & dynamic leadership are the causes of sickness, though 33 per cent 
executives reject this view. 
On the other hand, executives have also an attitudes towards some external 
causes/factors of sickness of the mills under BTMC. Some important factors and 
their weighted average scores are : shortage of working capital (5.00), heavy 
financial burden due to total debt & interest liability, taka devaluation etc. (4.89), 
easy availability of similar product in the market through smuggling, liberal import 
& illegal production (4.78), high rate of loan interest & debt burden (4.78), frequent 
load shedding, irregular supply & failure of electricity (4.78), low sales price of 
finished goods (in comparison to the production cost) fixed by the Govt. (4.44), 
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high price of raw-materials (4.33), unfair competition in the local market (4.22) 
and high rate of electricity charge, fuel & machinery parts (4.12) etc. All of these 
factors got weighted average score of more than 4.0. All the respondents (100%) 
strongly agree with the cause that shortage of working capital is very important 
factor for sickness of the BTMC mills. Only 11 per cent of the respondents agree 
with the view that natural disasters is liable for sickness though 56 per cent of 
the respondents have rejected this view. 45 per cent of the respondents did not 
pass any comment with the view that conflicting/changes in govt, policy & decision 
is liable for sickness. 
Table 6.39 also shows that internal causes/factors are more responsible than 
external factors as the total weighted average score of internal factors are 75.77 
as compared to external factors 71.00. The executives have identified that shortage 
of working capital is the prime cause for sickness of BTMC mills followed by heavy 
financial burden due to total debt & interest liability, adverse debt equity ratio, 
smuggling, load shedding & failure of electricity, high rate of interest, lack of 
BMRE, technological obsolescence, low sales price, under-utilization of capacity etc. 
The executives of the mills were asked to mention some remedial measures, 
in their personal opinion, to overcome the adverse situation of the textile mills 
operating under BTMC which are presented in Table 6.40. 
Table 6.40 shows that 100 per cent of the executives (14.93% of the total 
suggestions) suggested to provide adequate working capital. 90 per cent of the 
respondents offered to take appropriate measures for improving the quantity of 
production & sales through capacity rationalization. 80 per cent of the executives 
mentioned that militancy of trade union & their irrational activities should be 
restricted/controlled. 70 per cent of the respondents suggested to improve the quality 
of the products and regular supply of electricity. 6 respondents (3 from Group-
A & 3 from Group-B) offered to take initiatie to modernize their machinery through 
BMRE for producing high quality products at lower cost. Supply of raw-materials 
& spare-parts without any interruption, reducing the surplus manpower, reducing 
interest rate & electricity charges etc. are also suggested to overcome the sickness 
situation of the sample mills. 
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Table 6.40 : Suggestions to Overcome the Sickness Situation 
4 
3 
3 
10.81 
8.11 
8.11 
3 
3 
2 
10.00 
10.00 
6.67 
7 
6 
5 
10.45 
8.96 
7.46 
Group-A Group-B Total 
Suggestions No. of %of No. of %of No. of %of 
Mills Total Mills Total Mills Total 
(a) To Provide Adequate Working 5 13.51 5 16.67 10 14.93 
Capital 
(b) To Improve the Quantity & Volume 5 13.51 4 13.33 9 13.44 
of Production and Sales through 
Capacity Rationalization 
(c) To be Restricted/Controlled of 4 10.81 4 13.33 8 11.94 
Trade Union Activities 
(d) To Improve the Quality of 3 8.11 4 13.33 7 10.45 
Yarn through using Good 
Quality of Raw-cotton 
(e) Regular Supply of Electricity 
(0 Take Initiative for BMRE 
(g) Supply of Raw-materials & 
Spare-parts without Interruption 
(h) To Reduce Interest Rate & 3 8.11 1 3.33 4 5.97 
Electricity Charges 
(i) To Reduce the Surplus Manpower 3 8.11 2 6.67 5 7.46 
(j) To Increase the Delegation of 1 2.70 1 3.33 2 2.98 
Authority to Enterprise Level 
(k) To Undertake Cost Control & 1 2.70 I 3.34 2 2.98 
Reduction Programmes 
(1) Govt. Assistance through 1 2.70 - - 1 1.49 
Exempting Tax, Duty etc. 
(m) To Keep Free from Political 1 2.71 - - 1 1.49 
Influence 
Total : 37 100.00 30 100.00 67 100.00 
Source : Based on Questionnaire, Question No. 14 in Appendix-1. 
6.5.2 Effects of Sickness/Continuous Losses 
The impact of sickness/continuous losses of the mills under BTMC 
falls on the economy as a whole affecting country's limited financial resources, 
creating unemployment, decreasing the quantity of production, increasing idle 
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capacity, creating some social & political problems, reducing employment potential 
etc. The executives were asked through a questionnaire to mention their personal 
opinion on the effects of sickness/continuous losses of the mills. Their opinions 
are summarized as follows : 
Effects on Employment : 
(i) Sickness in BTMC mills is rendering its large number of workers unem-
ployed 
(ii) It is creating unemployment problems & reducing employment potential 
(iii) Increasing the possibility of denationalization 
(iv) Increasing the possibility of dismissal of existing employees 
(v) Loss of employment & income generation 
(vi) It is creating uncertainty among the employees which ultimately decreasing 
productivity 
Effects on Production : 
(i) Production is decreasing due to shortage of working captial 
(ii) Raw-material can not procured in time due to financial crisis 
(iii) Increasing the cost of production due to idle capacity 
(iv) Low recovering of fixed costs 
Effects on Market : 
(i) Difficult to maintain the quality of products and it is creating some 
marketing problems 
(ii) Decreasing the market share of BTMC products 
(iii) Increasing the fascination of both foreign & other domestic products 
Social Effects : 
(i) Increasing the social crime among the unemployed workers viz. hijacks, 
morale turpitudes etc. 
(ii) Due to irregular payment of salaries & wages, maintenance of family become 
difficult 
(iii) Reducing the living standard of general mass especially in around the mill area 
(iv) Increasing the possibility of creation financial crisis 
(v) Development of civilization hampers and similar other effects 
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(vi) Increasing the frustrations about life and ultimatelyadding some new crim-
inal offences 
Effects on Politics : 
(i) It may create political instability in different way. 
(ii) Opposition political parties are getting new issues to pressurize the gov-
ernment 
(iii) It is creating the environment of denationalization 
(iv) It leads widespread strikes & industrial unrest 
(v) Obtaining support of the opposition parties and placing various demands 
to the government 
Effects on Economy : 
(i) Decreasing the revenue earnings of the government (through import duty 
& tax etc.) 
(ii) Increasing the dependence on external loan & govt, grant. 
(iii) Unable to pay both principal amount & interest charges 
(iv) Govt, is not getting return on invested capital 
(v) Remaining idle of valuable assets 
(vi) Profitability of banks is eroding by writing-off interest & loan, revenue losses 
due to reducing interest rates and non-availability of funds 
(viii) Decreasing the contribution to the public exchequer 
(ix) It shows the stagnancy on economy 
6.5.3 Suggestions to the Government to Overcome the Adverse Situation of 
the Mills 
To know the weaknesses of the government policies and other constraints 
which are liable for the sickness/continuous losses, the executives of the sample 
mills were asked to mention such things. They identified some constraints as well 
as suggested the govt, to take some measures to overcome the adverse situation 
and also to revive the sick textile mills. The important suggestions, given by the 
executives of the sample mills, are the following: 
(i) Check the smuggling/free entry of yarn from neibouring countries 
(ii) Import of yarn upto 40 counts should be restricted 
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(iii) Frame a specific rule so that the users must use domestic yarn, at least a 
minimum limit 
(iv) Decrease all sorts of taxes viz. import duty, customs duty, VAT etc. 
(v) Reschedule of bank loan's instalment, simplification in charges of bank loan's 
interest etc. 
(vi) Reduce the rate of electricity charges 
(vii) Empower the mill authority to take pricing decision 
(viii) Take necessary steps to control the flow of cloths in the market from garments 
factories 
(ix) Govt, contribution to the equity for restructuring the debt-equity ratio 
(x) Provide working capital by the govt, as an special grant 
6.6 Testing of the Hypotheses 
In course of the study, four specific hypotheses laid down in the 4th chapter 
of this study have been tested and found that -
Hypothesis One : In Bangladesh, most of the public textile mills operating under 
BTMC are sick. 
This hypothesis has been tested on ten textile mills (53% of total running 
mills operating under BTMC). In process of the study, the operational & financial 
indicators are found negative and different financial ratios showed very unsatis-
factory performance i.e. adverse situation of the mills. The amount of total accu-
mulated loss of sample mills is increasing at an alarming rate. Out of 10 selected 
mills, 9 are found as sick in two MDA models and all the mills are found as sick 
in another (Yadav's Y-score) multi-variate model. Thus, the first hypothesis is found 
to be valid. 
Hypothesis Two : The sickness of the BTMC mills results from some important 
factors like shortage of working capital, under-utilization of capacity, adverse debt-
equity ratio, entry of yarn & cloth through smuggling & some unauthorized way 
etc. 
This hypothesis has been examined & found positive i.e. sickness became 
very much apparent from some important internal & external factors. In course 
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of the study, it is found that shortage of working capital is the single most important 
factor which leads to maximum sickness. During the study period, the capacity 
utilization has showed a declining trend. In the sample mills, it was average 20 
per cent only in 1996-97. The payment of interest & total debt burden of the sample 
mills has been increased due to adverse debt-equity ratio. A large quantity of yarns 
& cloths are coming through smuggling/unauthorized way resulting in decreasing 
the demand of BTMC products, decreasing the sales volume, increasing idle capacity 
& cost of production. Thus, the findings support the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Three : The mills under Group-B (which mills are probable profitable 
& nearest to the break-even) have better operational efficiency and financial 
performance than that of the mills under Group-A (losing mills). 
To test the above hypothesis, the data & information have been analyzed 
& presented in different tables of this chapter. Some important operational & 
financial indicators were as follows-
Indicators 
Percentage of mills/units started 
commercial production within 2 years 
Capacity utilization 
Production achievement 
Cost of goods sold to Sales 
Operating expenses to Sales 
Gross profit to Net sales 
Net profit to Net sales 
Group-A 
20% 
43% 
62% 
160% 
83% 
-0.87 
-1.41 
Group-B 
29% 
58% 
76% 
113% 
33% 
-0.22 
-0.45 
Source : Tables 6.3, 6.14, 6.27, 6.32. 
An analysis of the above mentioned ratios represents that though the per-
formance of the mills under both the groups was negative but the Group-B had 
better operational achievement & financial performance than that of Group-A. 
Hence, the hypothesis stands valid. 
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Hypothesis Four : The difference between the state of financial health of the mills 
under Group-A & B is significant which can be analysed with the help of the selected 
ratios for the study. 
For the purpose of testing the above hypothesis, the 't'-test has been applied 
to measure the difference between the mean values of 27 selected financial ratios 
of Group-A & B.The t-values of 11 ratios (41% of selected ratios) are found to 
be significant at 95 per cent confidence level i.e. the remaining 16 ratios (59% 
of selected ratios) have been found insignificant (at 0.05 level of significance). 
Majority of the selected ratios do not posses the ability to differentiate between 
Group-A & B i.e. the difference between the state of financial health of the mills 
under Group-A & B is found to be insignificant; so, the null hypothesis may be 
accepted. Thus, the above hypothesis is found to be invalid. 
6.7 Summary 
The above analyses & discussions highlight the overall situation of the 
sample mills. The losing mills and probable profitable & nearest to the break-even 
mills, grouped by BTMC authority, are treated as Group-A & B respectively in 
this study. Out of 10 selected mills, the machineries of 3 mills have already exceeded 
& 4 mills are almost in the last stage of normal life span (20-year). The time gaps 
between establishment & commencement of commercial production for 75 per cent 
of the sample mills/.units were too much wider (more than 2 years). Installed 
capacity utilization during 1996-97 was only 9 per cent in Group-A and 31 per 
cent in Group-B as compared to 69 per cent & 82 per cent respectively during the 
year 1992-93. Some important constraints, mentioned by the executives, for low 
capacity utilization are shortage of working capital, frequent breakdown of elec-
tricity, low demand of products, old-age of machinery etc. The percentage of actual 
unusable wastage of the mills was higher than targeted in each year during the 
study period. The overall operational efficiencies of all the sample mills reflected 
an adverse scenario. 
Ninety per cent of the sample mills procure 91-100 per cent raw-material 
from imported source. It indicates that the mills depend on almost entirely imported 
raw materials. The demand of BTMC products is showing a declining trend because 
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of smuggling/unauthorized entry of yarn & cloth, low quality of products, high 
price in comparison to imported high quality products etc. For the decreasing trend 
in demand & sales, the mills are facing the problem of stockpiling. 
Average cost of goods sold during the study period was 159.7 per cent & 
112.8 per cent of sales in Group-A & Group-B respectively. During the period 
of study the net loss before tax of Group-A consumed an increasing percentage 
of sales from 54.1 in 1992-93 to 412.7 in 1996-97 and the same percentage for 
Group-B was 11.5 in 1992-93 to 118.9 in 1996-97. No provision for taxation and 
dividend was made by the sample mills during the study period. The percentage 
of sales volume has decreased from 100 per cent in 1992-93 (as base year) to 15.2 
per cent in 1996-97 for A, and in case of others the percentages has also shown 
a declining trend from 1992-93 to 1996-97. The reasons behind the increasing trend 
of production cost & net loss were under-utilization of capacity, high rate of interest 
liability, obsolescence of machinery, frequent break-down of electricity, high rate 
of electricity & gas charges, overstaffing etc. 
In the area of financial health of the mills, all the ratios (viz. liquidity, 
profitability, activity & leverage) showed an adverse scenario i.e. sickness of the 
mills was reflected when three multivariate models were applied. The executives 
have identified some factors/causes for sickness of their mills. The significant 
factors are : shortage of working capital, heavy financial burden due to total debt 
& interest liability, adverse debt-equity ratio, smuggling, load shedding, lack of 
BMRE, under-utilization of capacity, low quality of products overstaffing etc. The 
impact of sickness/continuous losses of the mills falls on the economy as a whole 
affecting country's limited financial resources, creating unemployment, increasing 
social crime etc. The executives have suggested government to take some remedial 
measures to overcome the adverse situation of the mills viz. to check smuggling, 
to decrease all sorts of taxes, to provide working capital as an special grant, to 
contribute to the equity etc. The overall analysis of data & information of the sample 
mills, during the study period, reveals that the mills under Group-A were in worse 
situation than that of the mills under Group-B. 
In course of the study, four specific hypotheses have been tested with the 
help of collected data. First three hypotheses have found to be valid and the last 
one has found to be invalid i.e. it has been rejected. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This chapter deals with the major findings through the analysis of collected 
data and conclusions thereof. Recommendations and policy implications for the 
government for controlling sickness in thepublic sectortextile industry ofBangladesh 
have been discussed in the light of the findings of the study. Some potential areas 
for further research have also been suggested. Research shows that most of the 
firms/industries ofBangladesh are incurring at losses especially the state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises (SOMEs) under different public sector industrial cor-
porations. The number of public sector sick industries and volume of their losses 
are increasing in an alarming proportion. So the government must initiate some urgent 
steps to control the problem of sickness before it gets worsen. 
In the following paragraph, major findings of research have been discussed : 
7.1 Major Findings 
From the analysis and interpretation of primary & secondary data as well 
as some informal discussions with the executives and labour union leaders, the 
following major findings have emerged : 
• All the selected mills have been recorded an abnormal deterioration in capacity 
utilization. During the period of study, installed capacity utilization in 1996-
97 was only 9 per cent & 31 per cent in the selected mills of Group-A & 
B respectively as against 69 per cent & 82 per cent in 1992-93. The important 
reasons for the deterioration in capacity utilization were inadequacy of work-
ing capital, frequent power failure, absenteeism, shortage of back-process, 
shortage of raw-cotton & spare parts, ends down, strike & meetings, un-
satisfactory sales performance etc. 
• Most of the textile mills are tied up with outdated technologies & obsolete 
machineries. The heavy costs of operating the outdated technology has become 
an unbearable burden on the costs of the mills. 25 per cent of installed spindles 
& 100 percent of installed looms of the selected mills are 35 to 43 years 
old. 45 per cent of installed spindles are 15 to 20years old. The ratio indicates 
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that a substantial portion of machineries have already been exceeded the 
normal life span (20-year) and others are almost in the last stage of the span 
of normal life. The machineries of BTMC mills are found to be far away from 
modern technology. 
• Time taken for project implementation of the sample mills was more than 
reasonable. It is found that in large number of cases (75percent) the time 
gaps between establishment and commencement of commercial production 
were too much wider (more than 2 years), mostly due to the financial difficulty 
and delay in decision for bureaucratic administration which had increased debt 
burden & cost escalations also. It is also found that the extent of time over-
run was higher (80 per cent) in case of losing mills (Group-A) than that of 
probable profitable & nearest to the break-even (Group-B) mills (71.73 per cent). 
• Most of the mills under BTMC have been incurring huge losses and moreover 
the losses have been increasing year after year. Out of 30 textile mills of 
BTMC, as many as twenty nine (97 per cent) had incurred a huge loss in the 
last financial year (1996-97) aggregating Tk. 163.55 crores as against Tk. 
144.59 crores in 1992-93 by thirty eight (93 per cent) mills out of forty one. 
The accumulated loss of thirty mills of BTMC reached to Tk. 951.70 crores 
in June, 1997 from Tk. 585.73 crores of forty one mills in 1992-93. 
• BTMC mills have surplus manpower and the expenditure for the surplus 
personnel affecting the working capital position of the mills. Not only this, 
most of the selected mills are facing some other labour problems like militancy 
of labour unions, multiplicity of employees unions and unreasonable demand 
of financial and non-financial nature. It is observed that trade union leaders 
roam in the offices, very much reluctant to their duties and always are engaged 
to pressurise the management. 
• The selected mills and for that matter BTMC had to depend on heavy bank 
loan & govt, grant in different forms to meet the deficit of required working 
capital. In 1996-97, the long-term debt of six mills was more than their total assets. 
In case of A5, long-term debt was 2.6 times than total assets. 
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• During the study period, it has been observed that the net worth has been 
completely eroded in nine selected mills. Only Sunderban Textile Mills (B,) had 
positive net worth. The average debt-equity ratio (total long-term debt/ 
proprietors fund) of nine selected mills (except B,) were negative which varied 
from -0.29 in B3 to -1.42 in B2. 
• During the study period of five years from 1992-93 to 1996-97,the perfor-
mance of the mills has deteriorated to a hopeless position. The last year i.e. 
1996-97 was far worse off than before for the sample mills in the sense that, 
idle capacity, cost of goods sold to sales and net losses have been increased 
during 1996-97 compared to previous years. Average installed capacity 
utilization of the sample mills had come down to 20 per cent only in 1996-
97 from 76 per cent in 1992-93, on the other hand, average loss has increased 
by 100.69 per cent in the same period. Average sales had also come down from 
100 per cent in 1992-93 (as the base year) to 33 per cent. 
• The authority of the public textile enterprises is very much centralized with 
BTMC head office & Ministry of Textiles. Decision making process is mostly 
bureaucratic. Not only this, the hierarchy and structure is highly complicated. 
The powers and responsibilities of different tiers (Ministry, Corporation & 
Enterprise level) have notbeen clearly demarcated; the accountability can 
not, therefore, be properly established and implemented. Appointed of Chairman, 
the members of the Board of Directors of BTMC and the Enterprise Man-
agement Boards are mostly controlled by the government directly and indi-
rectly by the bureaucrats. 
• BTMC mills are mostly (approximately 90 per cent) depend on imported raw 
cotton. Individual mills have no authority to import or purchase raw cotton 
from domestic sources. The procurement process is highly complicated. The 
problems faced by the corporation in procurement of raw-materials are : 
failure on contracts, non-maintenance of shipment schedule, non-availability 
of required types of cotton at required time, variation in quality, high price, 
shortage of foreign currency etc. 
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• The demand of BTMC cloths has been deteriorated due to poor quality; lack 
of attractiveness of print, design, smooth finishing & fastness of colour; poor 
attention to consumers preferences etc. Besides, BTMC cloths are facing stiff 
competition from smuggled & imported second hand cloths because of their 
taw. prices. 
• The demand of yarns, produced by the BTMC mills, has come down con-
siderably due to some reasons viz. low quality, availability of smuggled yarn, 
high price (in comparison to imported / smuggled yarn), inappropriate dis-
tribution policy etc. 
• The percentage of actual unusable wastage of the selected mills was higher 
than that of targeted in each year during the study period. The actual average 
wastage was the highest 13 per cent in Magura Textile Mills (A4) and the lowest 
was 9.5 per cent in Kurigram Textile Mills (B4). 
• During the study period, in every year a lion share of cash generated from 
operation of the selected mills is eaten-up through payment of huge bank 
interest as well as for liquidating loan. The percentage of average payment 
of interest to sales by the sample mills varied from 4.12 by B2 to 40.71 by 
A3. 
• All the selected mills during the period of study, holding much higher finished 
products, suffering from shortage of cash, paying a large amount as interest. 
The inefficiency handling of the different components of working capital has 
resulted in huge losses and also affected the liquidity position of the mills. 
• It is viewed and also observed that the mill executives and top management 
of BTMC are always engaged in responding to the inquiries raised by ministers, 
bureaucrats, politicians, parliamentarians and the like. They are transferred/ 
fired without notice mainly due to personal or political reasons instead of 
evaluation of their performance. Frequent changes of the BTMC chairman 
and mill executives are the root of sickness and instability in policies. 
• Under univariate approach, out of twenty seven selected ratios for the study, 
the mean differences of 100 per cent of he liquidity ratios, 50 per cent each 
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of profitability, activity & leverage ratios have been found insignificant at 5 
per cent level of significance for the purpose of differentiate between the state 
of financial health of the losing and probable profitable & nearest to the break-
even mills. 
• Out often selected mills, nine have been identified as sick and only Sunderban 
Textile Mills (B,) was non-sick but this mill has showed approaching sickness 
when Altman's & Satyanarayana's MDA models are applied. As per Yadav's 
MDA model, all the selected mills have been identified as sick. 
• The main controllable i.e. internal problems faced by the BTMC mills are 
adverse debt-equity ratio, frequent breakdown of machineries due to obso-
lescence, under utilization of capacity, low quality of products, surplus man-
power, high cost of production, lack of BMRE, corruption & bribery at all 
levels etc. 
• In course of the study, it is found that shortage of working capital is the single 
most important factor which leads to sickness. Some significant external 
factors for incurring a huge operating losses are : smuggling/unauthorized entry 
of yarn & cloths, heavy financial burden due to total debt & interest liability, 
frequent power failure & load shedding, changes in demand, inappropriate 
activities of trade union leaders, high price of raw cotton, high rate ofbank 
loan interest & electricity charges etc. 
7.2 Conclusions 
Industrial sickness is one of the most serious problems which Bangladesh 
is facing today. The Government of Bangladesh has taken a few steps to identify 
and rehabilitate the sick industrial units but no substantial progress has yet been 
achieved and much remains to be done on this issue. 
In the present study, it has been found that most of the public textile mills 
under BTMC have been incurring huge losses and these losses are increasing 
year after year. Nine out often selected mills have been identified as sick and 
the remaining one mill has showed approaching sickness as per Altman's Z-score 
and Satyanarayana's Z* Value. As per Yadav's MDA model, all the selected 
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mills are identified sick. Under univariate approach, twenty seven selected ratios 
are classified into four ratio groups. Among these four groups, liquidity, prof-
itability & leverage ratio groups of the selected mills have been found negative 
and activity ratio group has also been indicated below satisfactory operating 
performance. For this negative liquidity and profitability, loan repayments by the 
sample mills have started falling and become loan defaulter — their financial 
liability is mounting. In fact, there was a complete breakdown in the activities 
of the selected mills under BTMC. In spite of incurring continuous losses and 
some other difficulties, all the sample mills are still in existence and are continuing 
their operations. These mills are in position to run their operations, in spite of 
huge accumulated losses, mainly because of financial assistance being received 
by them from the government controlled financial institutions like BSB & BSRS, 
commercial banks and government itself. 
Not a single reason or factor but a large number of internal factors are 
liable for the sickness of the textile mills of BTMC. Some of the important factors 
are : adverse debt-equity ratio, frequent breakdown of machineries due to 
obsolescence, under-utilization of capacity, low quality of products, surplus man-
power, high cost of production, lack of BMRE, corruption & bribery at all levels 
etc. It is found that all the sample mills faced the problem of deficiency in working 
capital. Some other important external problems are : smuggling/unauthorized 
entry of yarn & cloths, heavy financial burden due to total debt & interest liability, 
frequent power failure & load shedding, trade unionism, changes in demand, high 
price of raw cotton, high rate of bank loan interest & electricity charges etc. 
It is also found that though all the selected mills have shown as adverse scenario 
but Group B (prolable profitable & nearest to the breakeven mills) have shown 
better financial performance and operational efficiency than that of Group-A 
(losing mills). The dismal performance of the BTMC mills and the increasing trend 
of losses by the mills have been additional burden on the public exchequer as 
well as exerted heavy pressure on the fiscal situation of Bangladesh which is 
cumulating over time. 
As the public textile mills of Bangladesh is at cross roads, so there are 
two options before the sick and ailing public textile mills in the present context 
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of liberalization & privatisation. Either these can be denationalized or turned 
around. The Government of Bangladesh started denationalization of public textile 
sick mills since 1976 but vigorously since 1982. BIDS conducted a study (Research 
report number 129, June 1991) and pointed out that the performance of the 
denationalized textile mills was worse than that of before denationalization. Even 
some mills were failed to continue their operations and become closed. The 
government should keep in mind that changing the burden of sick industries from 
the shoulder of the government to the private investors or others is not only the 
duty & responsibility of the government. Existing denationalization activities of 
the government may be treated as an 'avoiding attitude1 which are passing the 
burden from one shoulder to the other — but it is not making the burden lighter. 
So, it may be said that denationalization of public sector sick mills is not the 
solution of the problem. Not only this, the government has no surety that after 
denationalization, the new private owners will not bring the mill to a worse fate 
than before. Actually, the government has a responsibility & significant role in 
preventing sickness and also in the rehabilitation of sick industries. The govern-
ment should also realise that people do not want a public sector or a private 
sector but an efficient sector. With the help of the findings, some measures have been 
recommended to solve the problem of public textile enterprises. Some policy measures 
have also been recommended to cure the problem of industrial sickness in Bangladesh 
and to face the bottlenecks in this regard in view of the general objective of the study. 
From the findings of this study, it is clear that not a single reason or party is 
causing the sickness of an industry. So it may concluded that no single party either 
mill management, BTMC, DFIs, Commercial banks, or the Government is suf-
ficiently capable of removing the bottlenecks. Therefore, joint efforts of relevant 
parties are essential to successfully deal with the grave problem of industrial 
sickness in Bangladesh. 
7.3 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
In view of the above findings and conclusions of the study, the following 
recommendations are made to cure the sick public sector textile mills and for achieving 
rapid growth of textile industry in Bangladesh : 
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* Capital structure should be improved to increase the share of enterprise's 
own contribution corresponding to debt capital. In this regard, to improve 
the existing adverse debt-equity ratio, capital restructuring should be done 
in 60:40 ratio and the government should make contribution to capital ac-
cordingly. 
* Steps should be taken on emergency basis to increase sales turnover and bring 
down the over-stocking of finished products to normal level through increasing 
sales performance. For increasing the sales of existing finished products, 
advertisement, push sales, price reduction etc. may be some wayout. 
* Surplus manpower should be rationalized through expanding voluntary retire-
ment scheme, 'golden handshake' and also retrenchment, if necessary. Old-
aged employees should be replaced by young and energetic one. 
* The rate of interest on loan should be lowered and it should be calculated 
on simple basis instead of compound charge as well as the system of penal 
interest should be abolished. 
* The charge of interest should start from the date of commencement of com-
mercial production and the first repayment of loan should start after 6 months 
from the date of commencement of commercial production. Existing bank loan 
to the enterprises should also be rescheduled. 
Steps should be taken to stop frequent load shedding and disturbance in the 
supply of electricity by pin-pointing & removing inefficiencies of Power 
Development Board. On an emergency basis, the enterprises should install 
the power-generator to face the problem of frequent electricity failure. 
Steps should be made to modernize the plant & machinery according to the 
changes in the technology and also to stop frequent breakdown of machineries 
through immediate & appropriate BMRE of running mills. 
For optimizing the capital structure of the mills and removing the existing debt-
burden, attention should be given to raising internal funds from the own 
sources. For the purpose, the mills may sell off some surplus unproductive 
assets like real estates, buildings & machineries etc. 
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* Efforts should be made to protect the smuggling of yarn & cloths in Bangladesh 
to eliminate unfair competition in the local market. 
* Operational efficiency should be enhanced through cost and wastage reduction 
measures by pin-pointing the areas of deficiencies. 
* More autonomy on procurement of raw materials may be given to the individual 
mill authority to procure high quality of raw-materials at reasonable price and 
at required time on a test basis. After a certain period, the import activities 
may be evaluated. The import policy required to be modified to ensure timely 
availability of raw-materials and spare-parts. 
* Besides cotton, one important raw material needed by the BTMC mills is 
viscose staple fibre (VSF) which is the nearest substitute for cotton. The 
machineries may be modified to much use of viscose. At the time of cotton 
shortage, its adequate availability in the local market will act as a deterrent 
on any undue rise in cotton prices or non-availability of raw cotton. 
* Import policy of cloth should be reviewed as well as the cloth imported by 
the garments factories should not be allowed to come in the local market. 
* Import of yarn upto 40 counts should be restricted as well as import policy 
of yarn should be reviewed and modified. 
* Individual mills of BTMC should be allowed to adopt free market pricing. 
* The management and employees at every level should be honest and sincere 
in their duties. 
* The Ministry of Textiles should be merged with the Ministry of Jute and the 
BTMC should be totally abolished which will minimize govt, costs. The running 
mills should continue their operations under the supervision and control of 
the Ministry of Jute and Textiles. A separate section in the ministry may be 
created for the control & supervision of running public textile mills. An expert 
in the area of textile sector may be appointed as the chief executive of the 
newly created section. 
Before denationalization, necessary steps should be taken to bring the loss 
making public textile enterprises into the group of profit making enterprises 
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or at least to bring them into the break-even point. For the purpose, a high 
powered committee may be appointed to make possible recommendations 
for rehabilitation and modernization of public textile enterprises. 
7.4 Policy Implications 
The following policy implications are important for the government of 
Bangladesh. We must not forget that "prevention is better than cure". Sickness 
in industry never enters like a bang but creeps slowly and if responses 
to initial causative factors are not timely, both the intensity of the sickness 
and its complexity increases, making its cure more difficult and remedial 
treatment is prolonged. So, every cure & precautionary measures should 
be taken to save the industry from future sickness. From the view point 
of the general objective of the study, some discussions have been made 
in different chapters in this study. On the basis of the findings and in-
formation gathered by the researcher through some informal discussions 
with different individuals, the researcher would like to suggest some policy 
measures to solve the grave problem of industrial sickness in Bangladesh. 
* A 'screening committee' may set-up by the government under the chair-
manship of one experienced parliament member in the area of industries 
with representatives of the Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Finance, 
Bangladesh Bank, DFISJ Commercial Banks, Chamber of Commerce 
& Industries, Experts, Lawyers, Economists to identify the causes of 
industrial sickness, make appropriate recommendations in each case 
and formulate a new policy regarding sick industries. Within the screen-
ing committee, a sub-committee may be formed to conduct a survey 
to know the latest position of sick industrial units in Bangladesh. The 
survey team may given an extra duty to identify the sick units which 
have chances of becoming viable. Non-viable sick units should be 
allowed to die a natural death instead of injection of more funds. 
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* Ensure proper coordination among Sick Industries Rehabilitation Cell, 
Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Finance, Board of Investment, Privatisation 
Board, DFIs, NCBs, etc. to take quick decision and adopt a common 
strategy regarding industrialization, rehabilitation of viable sick indus-
tries and liquidation of non-viable industries. 
* The object of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of Bangladesh is 
not clear to all. It should be reviewed & prepared by giving emphasis 
on commercial principle instead of social object. 
* To ensure the interests of the employees and avoid the movement 
against liquidation of the public enterprises by the labour unions, the 
government should take the steps to held a formal & constructive 
dialogue among different parties like government, opposition political 
party, management, trade unions, local authorities, experts and the like. 
This dialogue must be maintained before, during and after liquidation. 
The management should produce on that formal meeting the rationale 
of liquidation-proposal supported with logic & financial information 
and seek the trade unions & opposition political party's support to 
reach a peaceful liquidation. 
* Fiscal, tariff, import and other policies may be reviewed and changed 
to protect the smuggling and unauthorized entry of input and other 
products. 
* Steps should be taken to reduce the system loss in power generation 
& distribution and ensure its regular supply at a reasonable price. 
* Unnecessary paper works should be avoided and Bureaucratic red-
tapism should be removed in order to speed up the rehabilitation 
programme of sick industries, denationalization of loss-making public 
sector enterprises etc. 
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7.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
In the context of limitations of the study and to enhance the scope of the 
analysis, some potential areas where further research may be undertaken are : 
• The study may be conducted covering the sick industrial units under private 
sector. 
• The coverage of the study is limited to one out of six public sector industrial 
corporations. Coverage of the public sector corporation can be further extended. 
• Inter-sectoral variation in economic performance may be explored to fix up 
development strategies. 
• The evaluation of the economic performance of denationalized industries may 
be studied. 
• A comparative study on causative factors of industrial sickness in Bangladesh 
and India may be conducted which will help in understanding the differences 
of the two countries. 
• A predictive multi-variate model for identifying the sickness in industries of 
Bangladesh may be developed. 
The Researcher charmingly feels that the potential for further research exists 
in the above areas which are still largely unexplored and where a good 
contribution to the existing knowledge on the subject can be made. 
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APPENDIX - 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Forwarding Letter) 
Subject : Ph.D. project on "Causes and Remedies of Industrial Sickness in 
Bangladesh" 
Sir / Madam, 
I have been working on a Ph.D. project entitled "Causes and Remedies 
of Industrial Sickness in Bangladesh" since June 1996 in the department of 
Commerce, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India. I need some information 
regarding the above topic of your organization. It will be highly appreciated if 
you kindly fill in the questionnaire enclosed herewith and return the same to 
me. 
One blank page has been attached to the questionnaire for your use. I would 
like to mention here that, for space limitation in the questionnaire, it has not 
been possible to accomodate space for more than 3-4 answers. You are therefore, 
requested kindly to use more extra sheet(s) for appropriate answer, where nec-
essary. You can use Bengali language (if you need). 
This questionnaire is purely for academic purpose and the information 
given by you will be kept strictly confidential. 
Thanking you 
Yours sincerely 
Dated : (Md. Sawkat Jahangir) 
Research Scholar 
Department of Commerce 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh-202002, India 
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PART - I : GENERAL 
1. Name of the mill with address : 
2. Year of establishment : 
3. Types of ownership : 
4. Number of employees in your mill : 
(a) Officer ( ) (i) Permanent ( ) 
(b) Staff ( ) (ii) Temporary ( ) 
(c) Workers ( ) 
5. Name of the products : 
(a) Main products : 
(b) By-products (if any) : 
6. Raw materials : 
(i) Types of main raw-materials : 
(ii) Sources of main raw-materials : 
(a) Domestic (%) 
(b) Import (%) 
(iii) What are the problems faced by your mill in procurement of raw-
materials ? 
(iv) Do you have any quality problem of raw-materials ? 
Yes No 
(v) If yes, Plaese state the reasons, what are your suggestions ? 
(vi) Does your unit follow EOQ (Economic Order Quantity), Safety 
stock, Maximum and Minimum level in raw-material procurement? 
7. Production capacity and planning : 
(i) Please state the reasons for -
(a) Low capacity utilization 
(b) High capacity utilization 
(ii) Do you have any quality control system ? 
Yes No 
(iii) If yes, at what stage is it undertaken ? 
(iv) What are the limiting factors in quality control of your product(s) 
and what are your suggestions in this regard ? 
8. Marketing : 
(i) Reasons for low market share 
(ii) Do you face any stockpiling of your products ? 
Yes No 
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(iii) If Yes, what are the reasons ? 
(iv) What are your suggestions to minimize stockpiling ? 
(v) Do you face any unfair competition in the local market ? 
Yes No 
(vi) If yes, please rank the following factors -
(a) Due to smuggling 
(b) Due to liberal import 
(c) Due to illegal production 
(d) Due to inappropriate govt, policy 
(e) Due to other reasons (please specify) 
(vii) In your opinion, what are the limiting factors for product devel-
opment and diversification ? 
(viii) What are your suggestions in this regard ? 
Costing : 
(i) Do you face any problem of high cost of production ? 
Yes No 
(ii) If yes, in your opinion, what are the reasons for high production 
cost ? 
(iii) What are the suggestions to control it ? 
Are salaries and wages paid to the employees ? 
(a) In time (b) Little late (c) As and when available 
Is there any problem of decrease in demand for your product ? 
Yes No 
1 If yes, what reasons do you consider responsible for the same ? 
2 What are your suggestions to face it ? 
PART - II : INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS 
In your opinion, do you think that your industry may considered as sick? 
Yes No 
1 If not, is there any serious problem facing your industry which in your 
view may lead to sickness in future ? 
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12.2 If yes. in your opinion which factors / causes are responsible for sickness/ 
continuous losses ? (Please tick the relevant answer in the columes 
provided). 
Factors / Causes © £> "> 
i: w < 
[ 5 4 3 2 1 
INTERNAL CAUSES 
1. Absence of efficient/professional management & 
dynamic leadership 
2. Frequent breakdown of machinery 
3 Shortage/irregular supply of raw-material and 
other input 
4. Poor quality of raw materials 
5. Under utilisation of capacity 
6. Surplus manpower/Absence of effective 
manpower planning 
7. Imbalanced capital structure/Adverse debt-equity 
ratio 
8. Lack of trained & skilled labour 
9. Lack of 'Balancing-Modernisation-Replacement 
and Expansion' (BMRE) 
10. Corruption and bribery at all levels 
1 1. Technological obsolescence 
12. Lack of coordination among public enterprises, 
govt, agencies, support institutions & authorities 
for industrialisation 
13. Labour absenteeism / Low labour turnover 
14. Poor labour relations 
15. Lack of cost conciousness 
16. Delayed in decision making 
17. Continuous labour strike & lock-out 
18. Dependence on few buyers 
19. High price of product 
20. Lack of sales promotion 
•o <L> 
•a 
o 
u TJ 
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D 
<u 
tJ) 
CS 
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>*v 00 »-
o <? 
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Factors / Causes o w> "> 
5 4 3 2 1 
21. Poor utilisation of assets 
22. Favouritism, family ties, nepotism and undue role 
play in the appointments, promotions and 
selection of higher trainning 
23. Any other (Please specify) 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
24. Shortage of working capital 
25. High price of raw materials 
26. Lack of adequate infrastructure 
27. High rate of electricity charge, fuel & machinery 
parts 
28. High rate of wages & salaries fixed by the govt. 
29. High rate of loan interest & debt burden 
30. Low sales price of finished goods in comparison to 
the production cost fixed by the government 
31. Political unrest & influence 
32. Conflicting changes in govt, policy & decision 
33. Easy availability of similar product in the market 
through smuggling, liberal import 
34. Natural disasters 
35. Heavy financial burden due to total debt & 
interest liability, taka devaluation etc. 
36. Frequent load shedding, irregular supply & 
failure of electricity 
37. Trade unionism 
38. Changes in demand 
39. Poor marketing facilities 
40. Govt, policy regarding price & distribution 
41. Unfair competition in the market 
42. Any other (Please specify) 
•a 
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13. What measures are being taken for the revival and rehabilitation of sick 
units by -
(a) The Mi l l : 
(b) The Corporation : 
(c) The Government : 
(d) Development Financing Institutions (DFIs : BSB & BSRS) and 
Commercial Banks : 
(e) Other Agencies (Please specify) : 
14. In your opinion, what are the remedial measures to overcome the situation 
of sick textile units operating under BTMC ? 
15. Do you follow any model/system for predicting the sickness of the mill? 
16. In your opinion, what are the criterias which may consider in identifying 
an unit as sick ? 
17. Are there any specific govt, policies or actions which have contributed 
/ may contribute to the sickness of the unit (e.g. Tariff anomalies, Denial 
of power, Import policy etc. ) ? 
Yes No 
1.7.1 If yes, which that policy and what govt, action can help revival ? 
18. What suggestions do you have for successful implementation of the 
rehabilitation programme ? 
19. Are you satisfied with the govt, policy regarding : 
(a) Price fixation (b) Raw-materials 
(c) Management of BTMC (d) Sick industries 
(Please explain a little on favour of your answer) 
20. In your opinion, what are the effects of sickness/continuous losses on : 
(a) Employment : (b) Production : (c) Market : 
(d) Social : (e) Political : (f) Economy : 
21. What policies have been adopted by the Govt, of Bangladesh to tackle 
the problem of sick public textile units ? 
22. What is the contribution of your mill/corporation in the development of 
economy of Bangladesh ? 
23. Does your unit need external funds ? 
(a) Some times (b) Frequently (c) Not at all 
Name and address of the 
respondent with Telephone No. 
Thank you very much for your help and co-operation. 
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APPENDIX - 4 
Table A-4.1 : Current Assets to Current Liabilities of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
\ 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0 9015 
0 5248 
0 J 745 
0.2342 
0.4137 
0.4497 
0.2582 
4.2246 
1.2571 
0.1779 
0.4955 
0.4329 
1.3176 
1.4974 
1993-94 
0.5343 
0.3558 
0.0772 
0.1236 
0.2510 
0.2684 
0.1650 
17.9148 
0.7868 
0.0542 
0.3543 
0.2470 
3.8714 
7.0258 
1994-95 
0.3650 
0.2898 
0.2279 
0.2394 
1.9767 
0.6198 
0.6802 
24.9544 
5.3838 
0.1281 
0.5756 
0.3461 
6.2776 
9.5408 
1995-96 
0.3174 
0.3032 
0.2497 
0.1904 
0.4554 
0.3032 
0.0883 
1.7726 
0.9211 
0.1497 
0.3856 
0.1850 
0.6828 
0.6107 
1996-97 
0.2379 
0.3038 
0.1343 
0.1376 
0.2968 
0.2221 
0.0740 
1.4762 
0.4725 
0.1060 
0.2090 
0.1620 
0.4851 
0.5112 
Mean 
0.4712 
0.3555 
0.1727 
0.1850 
0.6787 
0.3726 
0.1891 
10.0685 
1.7643 
0.1232 
0.4040 
0.2746 
2.5269 
3.8161 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2360 
0.0876 
0.0626 
0.0478 
0.6532 
0.1452 
0.3675 
9.5912 
1.8272 
0.0419 
0.1254 
0.1016 
2.2319 
5.7995 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.2 : Quick Assets to Current Liabilities of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A, 
A, 
\ 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
_
co
 
B2 
B3 
B< 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.2587 
0.2789 
0.0211 
0.0503 
0.0150 
0.1248 
0.1184 
1.7044 
0.5100 
0.0327 
0.0708 
0.1595 
0.4955 
0.6276 
1993-94 
0.2091 
0.2498 
0.0141 
0.0369 
0.0112 
0.1042 
0.1034 
13.9876 
0.1200 
0.0269 
0.0680 
0.1047 
2.8614 
5.5632 
1994-95 
0.1812 
0.2324 
0.0792 
0.1533 
0.9776 
0.3247 
0.3302 
22.2128 
4.6099 
0.0705 
0.3069 
0.3083 
5.4477 
8.5601 
1995-96 
0.1378 
0.2004 
0.0661 
0.0724 
0.0560 
0.1065 
0.0550 
1.1903 
0.2261 
0.0470 
0.0823 
0.1130 
0.3317 
0.4335 
1996-97 
0.0920 
0.2441 
0.0705 
0.0576 
0.0483 
0.1025 
0.0723 
1.0291 
0.1950 
0.0311 
0.0605 
0.0971 
0.2826 
0.3773 
Mean 
0.1758 
0.2411 
0.0502 
0.0741 
0.2216 
0.1525 
0.0772 
8.0248 
1.1322 
0.0416 
0.1177 
0.1565 
1.8946 
3.0910 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0574 
0.0255 
0.0270 
0.0412 
0.3784 
0.0865 
0.1894 
8.6308 
1.7439 
0.0159 
0.0949 
0.0789 
2.0277 
5.0064 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.3 : Net Working Capital to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.0855 
-0.2947 
-0.7737 
-1.0270 
-0.5541 
-0.5470 
0.3342 
0.2896 
0.0942 
-1.1237 
-0.4725 
-0.4796 
-0.3384 
0.4972 
1993-94 
-0.6463 
-0.5666 
-1.1259 
-1.5023 
-0.9505 
-0.9583 
0.3391 
0.4476 
-0.1130 
-1.7643 
-0.8033 
-0.8105 
-0.2845 
0.9191 
1994-95 
-1.1076 
-0.7432 
-0.3423 
-0.5539 
-0.0995 
-0.5693 
0.3442 
0.5025 
0.5276 
-1.4611 
-0.2326 
-0.4806 
-0.2288 
0.7333 
1995-96 
-1.2461 
-0.7517 
-0.3426 
-0.7533 
-0.2186 
-0.6625 
0.3623 
0.2576 
-0.0384 
-1.4352 
-0.6602 
-1.0658 
-0.5884 
0.6274 
1996-97 
-1.5384 
-0.5551 
-0.5516 
-1.0715 
-0.3677 
-0.8169 
0.4304 
0.1895 
-0.4696 
-1.9630 
-1.2427 
-1.4284 
-0.9828 
0.7569 
Mean 
-0.9248 
-0.5823 
-0.6272 
-0.9816 
-0.4381 
-0.7108 
0.2083 
0.3374 
0.0002 
-1.5495 
-0.6823 
-0.8530 
-0.5494 
0.6631 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.5089 
0.1663 
0.2960 
0.3213 
0.2979 
0.1560 
0.3958 
0.1183 
0.3231 
0.2896 
0.3392 
0.3623 
0.2608 
0.7276 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.4 : Current Assets to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A, 
A. 
A4 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B. 
B< 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.7824 
0.3254 
0.1635 
0.3140 
0.3910 
0.3953 
0.2074 
0.3794 
0.4607 
0.2432 
0.4641 
0.3661 
0.3827 
0.0806 
1993-94 
0.7416 
0.3129 
0.0942 
0.2119 
0.3185 
0.3358 
0.2187 
0.4740 
0.4170 
0.1011 
0.4409 
0.2659 
0.3398 
0.1390 
1994-95 
0.6366 
0.3033 
0.1011 
0.1744 
0.2014 
0.2834 
0.1881 
0.5235 
0.6479 
0.2146 
0.3154 
0.2544 
0.3912 
0.1668 
1995-96 
0.5794 
0.3272 
0.1140 
0.1772 
0.1828 
0.2761 
0.1670 
0.5910 
0.4477 
0.2527 
0.4143 
0.2419 
0.3895 
0.1305 
1996-97 
0.4803 
0.2423 
0.0856 
0.1710 
0.1552 
0.2269 
0.1361 
0.5878 
0.4207 
0.2328 
0.3284 
0.2761 
0.3692 
0.1260 
Mean 
0.6441 
0.3022 
0.1117 
0.2097 
0.2498 
0.3035 
0.1814 
0.5111 
0.4788 
0.2089 
0.3926 
0.2809 
0.3745 
0.1149 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.1093 
0.0312 
0.0275 
0.0542 
0.0899 
0.0574 
0.1945 
0.0789 
0.0861 
0.0554 
0.0600 
0.0441 
0.0190 
0.1329 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.S : Defensive Assets to Total Operating Expenditure of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A ; 
A, 
A4 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B« 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.2860 
0.3124 
0.0305 
0.1097 
0.0383 
0.1554 
0.1209 
0.3676 
0.1417 
0.0623 
0.0752 
0.2126 
0.1719 
0.1116 
1993-94 
0.2938 
0.2869 
0.0260 
0.0727 
0.0247 
0.1408 
0.1233 
0.6046 
0.0466 
0.0463 
0.0811 
0.1557 
0.1869 
0.2126 
1994-95 
0.2334 
0.3279 
0.0527 
0.1337 
0.1242 
0.1744 
0.0959 
1.0795 
0.5456 
0.1408 
0.0937 
0.2741 
0.4267 
0.3623 
1995-96 
0.2031 
0.3761 
0.0437 
0.1031 
0.0343 
0.1521 
0.1271 
1.0704 
0.0677 
0.0779 
0.0665 
0.1644 
0.2894 
0.3922 
1996-97 
0.1402 
0.3104 
0.0736 
0.1420 
0.0561 
0.1445 
0.0899 
1.2050 
0.1515 
0.0638 
0.0882 
0.2247 
0.3466 
0.4328 
Mean 
0.2313 
0.3227 
0.0453 
0.1122 
0.0555 
0.1534 
0.1074 
0.8654 
0.1906 
0.0782 
0.0809 
0.2063 
0.2843 
0.2954 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0566 
0.0297 
0.0170 
0.0245 
0.0358 
0.0117 
0.1131 
0.3222 
0.1821 
0.0329 
0.0096 
0.0431 
0.0962 
0.3395 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.6 : Cash Flow to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A, 
A, 
A4 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B4 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.0904 
0.0098 
-0.0480 
-0.0589 
-0.0482 
-0.0471 
0.0324 
0.0410 
0.1221 
0.0609 
-0.0944 
0.0288 
0.0317 
0.0707 
1993-94 
-0.2981 
-0.0719 
-0.0751 
-0.0960 
-0.1621 
-0.1406 
0.0852 
-0.0332 
-0.1238 
-0.1958 
-0.2012 
-0.0756 
-0.1259 
0.0659 
1994-95 
-0.3380 
-0.0230 
-0.0624 
-0.0488 
-0.1162 
-0.1177 
0.1143 
-0.0012 
-0.0948 
-0.1497 
-0 1743 
-0.0086 
-0.0857 
0.0709 
1995-96 
-0.563) 
-0.1120 
-0.1043 
-0.1825 
-0.1432 
-0.2210 
0.1732 
-0.0420 
-0.1902 
-0.1219 
-0.2521 
-0.0502 
-0.1313 
0.0809 
1996-97 
-0.8191 
-0.2385 
-0.2256 
-0.2321 
-0.1829 
-0.3396 
0.2405 
-0.0611 
-0.6056 
-0.3310 
-0.5771 
-0.1305 
-0.3411 
0.2229 
Mean 
-0.4217 
-0.0871 
-0.1031 
-0.1237 
-0.1305 
-0.1732 
0.1252 
-0.0193 
-0.1785 
-0.1475 
-0.2598 
-0.0472 
-0.1305 
0.0879 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2490 
0.0863 
0.0640 
0.0718 
0.0467 
0.1000 
0.1785 
0.0358 
0.2379 
0.1266 
0.1666 
0.0548 
0.1206 
0.1693 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.7 : Cash Flow to Total Tangible Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A 2 
A, 
A, 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.4192 
0.0151 
-0.0574 
-0.0859 
-0.0792 
-0.1253 
0.1512 
1993-94 
-1.1639 
-0.1052 
-0.0829 
-0.1218 
-0.2379 
-0.3423 
0.4143 
1994-95 
-0.9392 
-0.0348 
-0.0694 
-0.0592 
-0.1455 
-0.2496 
0.3468 
1995-96 
-1.3531 
-0.1782 
-0.1177 
-0.2218 
-0.1752 
-0.4092 
0.4731 
1996-97 
-1.5948 
-0.3182 
-0.2467 
-0.2800 
-0.2165 
-0.5312 
0.5329 
Mean 
-1.0940 
-0.1243 
-0.1148 
-0.1537 
-0.1709 
-0.3315 
0.3818 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.4005 
0.1169 
0.0690 
0.0838 
0.0559 
0.1380 
0.4284 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B< 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
0.1043 
0.2263 
0.0804 
-0.1793 
0.0461 
0.0556 
0.1322 
-0.0795 
-0.2124 
-0.2178 
-0.3653 
-0.1047 
-0.1959 
0.1013 
-O.0032 
-0.2695 
-0.1906 
-0.2580 
-0.0118 
-0.1466 
0.1168 
-0.1043 
-0.3443 
-0.1638 
-0.4352 
-0.0675 
-0.2230 
0.1425 
-0.1481 
-1.1177 
-0.4318 
-0.8675 
-0.1847 
-0.5500 
0.3826 
-0.0462 
-0.3435 
-0.1847 
-0.4211 
-0.0645 
-0.2120 
0.1490 
0.0887 
0.4351 
0.1630 
0.2399 
0.0788 
0.1952 
0.2823 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.8 : Cash Flow to Total Liabilities of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A, 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.0837 
0.0076 
-0.0308 
-0.0371 
-0.0378 
-0.0364 
0.0290 
1993-94 
-0.1812 
-0.0432 
-0.0386 
-0.0474 
-0.0968 
-0.0814 
0.0541 
1994-95 
-0.1321 
-0.0122 
-0.0274 
-0.0209 
-0.0558 
-0.0497 
0.0437 
1995-96 
-0.2109 
-0.0569 
-0.0397 
-0.0684 
-0.0506 
-0.0853 
0.0635 
1996-97 
-0.2589 
-0.0882 
-0.0715 
-0.0728 
-0.0584 
-0.1100 
0.0751 
Mean 
-0.1734 
-0.0386 
-0.0416 
-0.0493 
-0.0599 
0.0726 
0.0510 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0609 
0.0336 
0.0157 
0.0194 
0.0198 
0.0264 
0.0613 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B« 
B 5 
Mean 
SD 
0.2950 
0.3188 
0.0410 
-0.0911 
0.0258 
0.1179 
0.1611 
-0.3994 
-0.2334 
-0.0965 
-0.1488 
-0.0533 
-0.1863 
0.1223 
-0.0161 
-0.1154 
-0.0692 
-0.1046 
-0.0052 
-0.0621 
0.0448 
-0.1053 
-0.2045 
-0.0530 
-0.1190 
-0.0278 
-0.1019 
0.0612 
-0.1308 
-0.3994 
-0.1145 
-O.2019 
-0.0576 
-0.1808 
0.1186 
-0.0713 
-0.1268 
-O.0584 
-0.1331 
-0.0236 
-0.0826 
0.0417 
0.2234 
0.2410 
0.0541 
0.0394 
0.0311 
0.1108 
0.1563 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.9 : Operating Cash Flow to Net Sales of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
As 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.2713 
-0.2073 
-0.4172 
-0.3722 
-0.6040 
-0.3744 
0.1365 
1993-94 
-0.6896 
-0.3686 
-0.5474 
-0.3553 
-1.0436 
-0.6009 
0.2534 
1994-95 
-0.5711 
-0.2374 
-0.5626 
-0.2584 
-0.4070 
-0.4073 
0.1428 
1995-96 
-1.2909 
-0.6513 
-0.6946 
-1.1118 
-0.7295 
-0.8956 
0.2572 
1996-97 
-3.3347 
-1.9345 
-2.6344 
-6.4216 
-2.9692 
-3.4589 
1.5515 
Mean 
-1.2315 
-0.6798 
-0.9712 
-1.7039 
-1.1507 
-1.1474 
0.3366 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.1026 
0.6467 
0.8362 
2.3786 
0.9325 
1.1705 
1.3731 
B i 
B2 
B3 
B< 
B.s 
Mean 
SD 
0.1012 
0.0787 
-0.0218 
-0.2291 
-0.1194 
-0.0381 
0.1236 
-0.0864 
-0.1341 
-0.3912 
-0.3821 
-0.4069 
-0.2801 
0.1398 
-0.0030 
-0.1336 
-0.3796 
-0.1709 
-0.1740 
-0.1722 
0.1209 
-0.2514 
-0.2082 
-0.2428 
-0.2994 
-0.2557 
-0.2515 
0.0292 
-0.6686 
-1.5227 
-0.7081 
-1.8403 
-0.6085 
-1.0696 
0.5106 
-0.1816 
-0.3840 
-0.3487 
-0.5844 
-0.3129 
-0.3623 
0.1304 
0.2694 
0.5774 
0.2236 
0.6319 
0.1768 
0.3635 
0.4408 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.10 : Gross Profit to Net Sales of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
As 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.1096 
-0.0670 
-0.2051 
-0.2097 
-0.4104 
-0.2004 
0.1185 
1993-94 
-0.4757 
-0.2122 
-0.2762 
-0.1992 
-0.7675 
-0.3862 
0.2148 
1994-95 
-0.3667 
-0.1015 
-0.2601 
-0.1745 
-0.2844 
-0.2374 
0.0915 
1995-96 
-1.0046 
-0.4409 
-0.3844 
-0.8740 
-0.5216 
-0.6451 
0.2476 
1996-97 
-3.0414 
-1.4213 
-1.7773 
-5.4147 
-2.8378 
-2.8985 
1.3996 
Mean 
-0.9996 
-0.4486 
-0.5806 
-1.3744 
-0.9643 
-0.8735 
0.3291 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.0617 
0.5036 
0.6012 
2.0372 
0.9501 
1.0245 
1.2113 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B< 
B 5 
Mean 
SD 
0.0383 
0.1325 
0.0893 
-0.0523 
0.0014 
0.0418 
0.0648 
-0.1053 
-0.0330 
-0.2539 
-0.1803 
-0.2068 
-0.1559 
0.0780 
-0.0238 
-0.0551 
-0.2394 
-0.0592 
-0.0467 
-0.0848 
0.0782 
-0.2485 
-0.0719 
-0.1430 
-0.1566 
-0.0994 
-0.1439 
0.0604 
-0.6350 
-1.0065 
-0.4995 
-1.3024 
-0.3313 
-0.7549 
0.3527 
-0.1949 
-0.2068 
-0.2093 
-0.3502 
-0.1366 
-0.2195 
0.0705 
0.2401 
0.4065 
0.1901 
0.4788 
0.1195 
0.2767 
0.3248 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.il : Net Profit to Net Sales of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A, 
A, 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.3061 
-0.3818 
-0.5846 
-0.5319 
-0.8950 
-0.5399 
0.2039 
1993-94 
-0.7334 
-0.5140 
-0.7208 
-0.4793 
-1.2950 
-0.7485 
0.2923 
1994-95 
-0.6124 
-0.3683 
-0.7734 
-0.3837 
-0.5471 
-0.5370 
0.1508 
1995-96 
-1.3756 
-0.8699 
-0.9084 
-1.3863 
-0.9510 
-1.0982 
0.2323 
1996-97 
-3.5247 
-2.3779 
-3.1766 
-7.7482 
-3.7932 
-4.1241 
1.8735 
Mean 
-1.3104 
-0.9024 
-1.2328 
-2.1059 
-1.4963 
-1.4095 
0.3977 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.1607 
0.7596 
0.9774 
2.8440 
1.1727 
1.3726 
1.6207 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
-0.0025 
-0.0513 
-0.1124 
-0.2791 
-0.2359 
-0.1362 
0.1058 
-0.1645 
-0.1693 
-0.4838 
-0.4298 
-0.5549 
-0.3605 
0.1630 
-0.0976 
-0.1636 
-0.4794 
-0.1997 
-0.2755 
-0.2432 
0.1313 
-0.3940 
-0.2391 
-0.3166 
-0.3310 
-0.3575 
-0.3276 
0.0515 
-0.9010 
-1.5227 
-0.8031 
-1.9430 
-0.7664 
-1.1872 
0.4670 
-0.3119 
-0.4292 
-0.4391 
-0.6365 
-0.4380 
-0.4509 
0.1166 
0.3216 
0.5501 
0.2271 
0.6575 
0.1976 
0.3762 
0.4435 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.12 : Earnings before Depreciation, Interest & Taxes to Net Sales of 
Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A 5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.1509 
0.0245 
-0.1172 
-0.1470 
-0.2475 
-0.1276 
0.0878 
1993-94 
-0.5263 
-0.1430 
-0.1902 
-0.1636 
-0.6487 
-0.3344 
0.2108 
1994-95 
-0.4053 
-0.0428 
-0.1663 
-0.0811 
-0.2245 
-0.1840 
0.1276 
1995-96 
-1.0949 
-0.3644 
-0.2884 
-0.6693 
-0.4263 
-0.5687 
0.2924 
1996-97 
-2.8500 
-1.2876 
-1.5478 
-4.1175 
-1.9544 
-2.3515 
1.0298 
Mean 
-1.0055 
-0.3627 
-0.4620 
-1.0357 
-0.7003 
-0.7132 
0.2741 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.9727 
0.4808 
0.5458 
1.5552 
0.6453 
0.8332 
0.9681 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
Bs 
Mean 
SD 
Source 
0.1012 
0.0884 
0.0947 
-0.1372 
0.0560 
0.0406 
0.0903 
-0.0644 
-0.1064 
-0.2688 
-0.2765 
-0.1626 
-0.1757 
0.0851 
-0.0030 
-0.1089 
-0.2650 
-0.1169 
-0.0133 
-0.1014 
0.0943 
-0.1654 
-0.1455 
-0.1578 
-0.2531 
-0.0758 
-0.1595 
0.0566 
-0.3703 
-1.3428 
-0.5583 
-1.5835 
-0.3129 
-0.8336 
0.5260 
-0.1004 
-0.3230 
-0.2310 
-0.4734 
-0.1017 
-0.2459 
0.1413 
0.1603 
0.5164 
0.2103 
0.5585 
0.1278 
0.3036 
0.3911 
: Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises fro; 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.13 : Earnings before Interest & Taxes to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A5 
A< 
\ 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B4 
Bs 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.1112 
-0.0601 
-0.1167 
-0.1229 
-0.1049 
-0.1032 
0.0223 
0.0010 
0.0842 
0.0026 
-0.1288 
-0.0311 
-0.0144 
0.0687 
1993-94 
-0.3228 
-0.1451 
-0.1435 
-0.1687 
-0.2249 
-0.2010 
0.0676 
-0.0735 
-0.1648 
-0.2632 
-0.2359 
-0.1445 
-0.1764 
0.0676 
1994-95 
-0.3724 
-0.0936 
-0.1415 
-0.1243 
-0.1887 
-0.1841 
0.0991 
-0.0380 
-0.1209 
-0.2061 
-0.2173 
-0.0744 
-0.1313 
0.0708 
1995-96 
-0.6066 
-0.1792 
-0.1816 
-0.2574 
-0.2176 
-0.2885 
0.1616 
-0.0782 
-0.2306 
-0.1789 
-0.2836 
-0.1176 
-0.1778 
0.0742 
1996-97 
-0.8738 
-0.3206 
—0.3046 
-0.3069 
-0.2600 
-0.4132 
0.2312 
-0.0994 
-0.6056 
-0.3873 
-0.6145 
-0.1963 
-O.3806 
0.2090 
Mean 
-0.4574 
-0.1597 
-0.1776 
-0.1960 
-0.1992 
-0.2380 
0.1106 
-0.0576 
-0.2075 
-0.2066 
-0.2960 
-0.1128 
-0.1761 
0.0829 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2611 
0.0903 
0.0668 
0.0739 
0.0523 
0.1055 
0.1733 
0.0353 
0.2251 
0.1268 
0.1669 
0.0568 
0.1183 
0.1634 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.14 : Earnings before Interest & Taxes to Total Tangible Assets of 
Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A, 
A4 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.5156 
-0.0921 
-0.1395 
-0.1791 
-0.1723 
-0.2197 
0.1511 
0.0025 
0.1561 
0.0035 
-0.2446 
-0.0497 
-0.0264 
0.1290 
1993-94 
-1.2607 
-0.2123 
-0.1585 
-0.2140 
-0.3301 
-0.4351 
0.4166 
-0.1759 
-0.2826 
-0.2928 
-0.4283 
-0.2000 
-0.2759 
0.0887 
1994-95 
-1.0350 
-0.1414 
-0.1575 
-0.1506 
-0.2362 
-0.3441 
0.3471 
-0.1042 
-0.3438 
-0.2624 
-0.3215 
-0.1016 
-0.2267 
0.1045 
1995-96 
-1.4577 
-0.2851 
-0.2050 
-0.3128 
-0.2662 
-0.5054 
0.4775 
-0.1941 
-0.4175 
-0.2405 
-0.4896 
-0.1581 
-0.3000 
0.1301 
1996-97 
-1.7011 
-0.4277 
-0.3332 
-0.3702 
-0.3078 
-0.6280 
0.5381 
-0.2411 
-1.1177 
-0.5054 
-0.9238 
-0.2780 
-0.6132 
0.3503 
Mean 
-1.1940 
-0.2317 
-0.1987 
-0.2453 
-0.2625 
-0.4265 
0.3844 
-0.1426 
-0 4011 
-0.2595 
-0.4816 
-0.1575 
-0.2884 
0.1336 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.4041 
0.1177 
0.0706 
0.0830 
0.0556 
0.1389 
0.4315 
0.0848 
0.4103 
0.1619 
0.2367 
0.0788 
0.1888 
0.2658 
Source Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.15 : Retained Earnings to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.1834 
-0.1530 
-0.2397 
-0.2131 
-0.1743 
-0.1927 
0.0304 
0.0010 
0.0708 
-0.0722 
-0.1920 
-0.1211 
-0.0627 
0.0918 
1993-94 
-0.4154 
-0.2586 
-0.2846 
-0.2812 
-0.3236 
-0.3127 
0.0555 
-0.0848 
-0.1971 
-0.3523 
-0.3128 
-0.2581 
-0.2410 
0.0940 
1994-95 
-0.5106 
-0.1985 
-0.2903 
-0.2312 
-0.2831 
-0.3027 
0.1093 
-0.0380 
-0.1424 
-0.2708 
-0.2979 
-0.1785 
-0.1855 
0.0934 
1995-96 
-0.7074 
-0.2674 
-0.3285 
-0.3781 
-0.3194 
-0.4002 
0.1576 
-0.1001 
-0.3125 
-0.2445 
-0.3297 
-0.2367 
-0.2447 
0.0810 
1996-97 
-1.0130 
-0.4404 
-0.4630 
-0.4368 
-0.3550 
-0.5416 
0.2385 
-0.1486 
-0.6868 
-0.4762 
-0.7081 
-0.3195 
-0.4678 
0.2143 
Mean 
-0.5660 
-0.2636 
-0.3212 
-0.3081 
-0.2911 
-0.3500 
0.1097 
-0.0741 
-0.2536 
-0.2832 
-0.3681 
-0.2228 
-0.2403 
0.0962 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2800 
0.0977 
0.0763 
0.0862 
0.0627 
0.1163 
0.1818 
0.0515 
0.2498 
0.1328 
0.1767 
0.0680 
0.1314 
0.1815 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.16 : Net Profit after Tax to Net Worth of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.4745 
0.3706 
0.4030 
0.3266 
0.4884 
0.4126 
0.0614 
0.0013 
0.2379 
0.1219 
0.9393 
06263 
0.3853 
0.3474 
1993-94 
0.4521 
0.3020 
0.2756 
0.2493 
0.4201 
0.3398 
0.0810 
-0.1017 
-4.3954 
0.3001 
0.5434 
0.4921 
-0.6323 
1.8952 
1994-95 
0.2670 
0.1797 
0.2075 
0.1566 
0.2331 
0.2088 
0.0389 
-0.0453 
1.1669 
0.2055 
0.2962 
0.2426 
0.3732 
0.4138 
1995-96 
0.2877 
0.2288 
0.1861 
0.2067 
0.1614 
0.2141 
0.0430 
-0.1902 
0.6253 
0.1648 
0.2249 
0.2514 
0.2152 
0.2594 
1996-97 
0.3131 
0.2241 
0.1971 
0.1820 
0.1506 
0.2134 
0.0552 
-0.3349 
0.5663 
0.2279 
0.3143 
0.2252 
0.1998 
0.2949 
Mean 
0.3589 
0.2610 
0.2539 
0.2242 
0.2907 
0.2777 
0.0458 
-0.1342 
-0.3598 
0.2040 
0.4636 
0.3675 
0.1082 
0.3100 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0868 
0.0674 
0.0808 
0.0596 
0.1382 
0.0836 
0.1017 
0.1189 
2.0397 
0.0601 
0.2607 
0.1624 
0.3782 
0.9750 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.17 : Operating Cost (Tatal ope. Cost - IntJNS) of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A., 
A4 
As 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B< 
B.s 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
1.1898 
1.1505 
1.2874 
1.3091 
1.5431 
1.2960 
0.1369 
1.0279 
0.9453 
0.9991 
1.1898 
1.0606 
1.0445 
0.0819 
1993-94 
1.5803 
1.2970 
1.3171 
1.2906 
1.9048 
1.4780 
0.2393 
1.1659 
1.1451 
1.3638 
1.3278 
1.3115 
1.2628 
0.0895 
1994-95 
1.4582 
1.1818 
1.3799 
1.2088 
1.3671 
1.3192 
0.1062 
1.1081 
1.1434 
1.3702 
1.1493 
1.1150 
1.1772 
0.0978 
1995-96 
2.2119 
1.5830 
1.5032 
1.9533 
1.6506 
1.7804 
0.2641 
1.3737 
1.1797 
1.2353 
1.2874 
1.1778 
1.2508 
0.0736 
1996-97 
4.1245 
2.7389 
3.0975 
6.6359 
3.7881 
4.0770 
1.3699 
1.7640 
2.3613 
1.6561 
2.7005 
1.4712 
1.9906 
0.4635 
Mean 
2.1129 
1.5902 
1.7170 
2.4795 
2.0507 
1.9901 
0.3139 
1.2879 
1.3550 
1.3249 
1.5310 
1.2272 
1.3452 
0.1022 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.0603 
0.5942 
0.6942 
2.0953 
0.8860 
1.0577 
1.2351 
0.2641 
0.5099 
0.2133 
0.5883 
0.1479 
0.3319 
0.3989 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.18 : Stock to Cost of Goods Sold of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A, 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B, 
Bs 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.8390 
0.3566 
0.2909 
0.5087 
1.3718 
0.6734 
03972 
0 5810 
0.2285 
0.3391 
0.5493 
0.4509 
0.4298 
0.1314 
1993-94 
0.5401 
0.1529 
0.1529 
0.2113 
0.6888 
0.3492 
0.2226 
0.1824 
0.2939 
0.0558 
0.4147 
0.2730 
0.2440 
0.1197 
1994-95 
0.2813 
0.1011 
0.1394 
0.0886 
0.1531 
0.1527 
0.0685 
0.1442 
0.1014 
0.1378 
0.0931 
0.0410 
0.1035 
0.0370 
1995-96 
0.3180 
0.2505 
0.1675 
0.2149 
0.3137 
0.2529 
0.0578 
0.6I2I 
0.2411 
0.1964 
0.2829 
0.1294 
0.2924 
0.1678 
1996-97 
0.2536 
0.1062 
0.1004 
0.2749 
0.3619 
0.2194 
0.1015 
0.6605 
0.2730 
0.1850 
0.2781 
0.1992 
0.3192 
0.1748 
Mean 
0.4464 
0.1935 
0.1702 
0.2597 
0.5779 
0.3295 
0.1576 
0.4360 
0.2276 
0.1828 
0.3236 
0.2187 
0.2778 
0.0918 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2208 
0.0976 
0.0643 
0.1385 
0.4335 
0.1833 
0.2806 
0.2245 
0.0672 
0.0925 
0.1524 
0.1391 
0.1064 
0.1722 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.19 : Net Sales to Capital Employed of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A, 
A3 
A4 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B< 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
4.5349 
1.0546 
6.5322 
-1.1751 
3.5509 
2.8995 
2.6945 
0.4450 
2.1798 
-1.7520 
10.8441 
3.3274 
3.0089 
4.2760 
1993-94 
-1.4602 
4.1746 
-1.7937 
-0.8216 
-0.9290 
-0.1660 
2.1990 
0.5294 
2.4770 
-0.8415 
-2.9802 
-6.0905 
-1.3812 
2.9517 
1994-95 
-1.1204 
-11.5884 
0.6743 
2.2178 
0.5763 
-1.8481 
4.9835 
0.3979 
0.9896 
-0.8360 
3.3003 
2.4452 
1.2594 
1.4681 
1995-96 
-0.6230 
-3.9003 
0.6656 
3.9202 
0.5609 
0.1247 
2.5159 
0.3810 
2.5429 
-1.1224 
-13.3753 
-2.1513 
-2.7450 
5.5448 
1996-97 
-0.2821 
0.9138 
0.4017 
-0.2325 
0.1962 
0.1994 
0.4404 
0.2740 
5.4017 
-0.4958 
-0.6381 
-0.5917 
0.7900 
2.3296 
Mean 
0.2098 
-1.8691 
1.2960 
0.7818 
0.7911 
0.2419 
1.1101 
0.4055 
2.7182 
-1.0095 
-0.5698 
-0.6122 
0.1864 
1.3489 
Standard 
Deviation 
2.2000 
5.5029 
2.7766 
1.9668 
1.4851 
1.5240 
3.3186 
0.0835 
1.4538 
0.4210 
7.9379 
3.3838 
2.0265 
4.1438 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.20 : Net Sales to Current Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill Standard 
Code 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 Mean Deviation 
A, 0.7659 0.7637 1.3097 0.8876 0.5984 0.8651 0.2406 
A2 1.2311 1.6075 1.7771 0.9396 0.7644 1.2639 0.3840 
A3 2.5072 4.1898 3.7142 3.1714 1.7036 3.0572 0.8789 
A, 1.2760 2.7692 3.4557 1.5393 0.3297 1.8740 1.1097 
A5 0.4981 0.7847 2.5700 1.8374 0.6030 1.2586 0.8109 
Mean 1.2557 2.0230 2.5653 1.6751 0.7998 1.6638 0.6091 
SD 0.6901 1.3072 0.9285 0.8300 0.4729 0.7678 1.0784 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1.0677 
3.0000 
2.6432 
1.4826 
1.4024 
1.9192 
0.7583 
1.0872 
2.7912 
7.2043 ' 
1.6508 
1.7494 
2.8966 
2.2230 
0.7441 
1.3435 
2.6326 
4.7308 
2.5472 
2.3996 
1.3687 
04298 
2.9195 
3.0557 
2.4044 
2.7364 
2.3092 
0.9647 
0.2805 
1.0722 
2.5467 
1.1096 
1.5100 
1.3038 
0.7384 
0.7219 
2.2253 
3.6165 
2.2756 
1.9891 
2.1657 
0.9205 
0.3267 
0.8378 
1.8026 
1.2980 
0.5479 
0.5316 
1.4338 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.21 : Net Sales to Fixed Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A, 
A, 
A, 
As 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B 2 
B3 
B4 
B 5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
2.7534 
0.5939 
0.4902 
0.5841 
0.3199 
0.9483 
0.9079 
0.6527 
2.5606 
0.8492 
1.2838 
0.8098 
1.2312 
0.6969 
1993-94 
2.1917 
0.7322 
0.4359 
0.7445 
0.3667 
0.8942 
0.6664 
0.9798 
1.9968 
0.8101 
1.3017 
0.6336 
1.1444 
0.4798 
1994-95 
2.2944 
0.7736 
0.4175 
0.7298 
0.6481 
0.9727 
0.6722 
0.8176 
2.4724 
0.7193 
2.1793 
0.8691 
1.4115 
0.7538 
1995-96 
1.2226 
0.4569 
0.4082 
0.3315 
0.4109 
0.5660 
0.3307 
0.6210 
2.3662 
1.0333 
1.7007 
0.8732 
1.3189 
0.6340 
1996-97 
0.5530 
0.2444 
0.1594 
0.0680 
0.1108 
0.2271 
0.1732 
0.4000 
0.7785 
0.7728 
0.5427 
0.5759 
0.6140 
0.1446 
Mean 
1.8030 
0.5602 
0.3822 
0.4916 
0.3713 
0.7217 
0.5452 
0.6942 
2.0349 
0.8369 
1.4016 
0.7523 
1.1440 
0.5119 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.7994 
0.1932 
0.1150 
0.2586 
0.1725 
0.2874 
0.6742 
0.1952 
0.6569 
0.1071 
0.5396 
0.1239 
0.2795 
0.6477 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.22 : Net Sales to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A, 
A4 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B4 
Bs 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.5992 
0.4006 
0.4100 
0.4007 
0.1948 
0.4011 
0.1280 
0.4051 
1.3810 
0.6427 
0.6880 
0.5134 
0.7260 
0.3422 
1993-94 
0.5664 
0.5030 
0.3948 
0.5867 
0.2499 
0.4602 
0.1246 
0.5153 
1.1641 
0.7282 
0.7278 
0.4651 
0.7201 
0.2467 
1994-95 
0.8338 
0.5390 
0.3753 
0.6026 
0.5176 
0.5737 
0.1498 
0.3896 
0.8705 
0.5649 
1.4920 
0.6480 
0.7930 
0.3822 
1995-96 
0.5143 
0.3074 
0.3616 
0.2727 
0.3358 
0.3584 
0.0834 
0.2540 
1.3070 
0.7722 
0.9961 
0.6620 
0.7983 
0.3503 
1996-97 
0.2874 
0.1852 
0.1458 
0.0564 
0.0936 
0.1537 
0.0800 
0.1649 
0.4510 
0.5929 
0.3644 
0.4169 
0.3980 
0.1390 
Mean 
0.5602 
0.3870 
0.3375 
0.3838 
0.2783 
0.3894 
0.0941 
0.3458 
1.0347 
0.6602 
0.8537 
0.5411 
0.6871 
0.2396 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.1749 
0.1295 
0.0973 
0.2044 
0.1432 
0.1383 
0.1807 
0.1227 
0.3401 
0.0788 
0.3769 
0.0980 
0.1482 
0.3394 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.23 : Net Sales to Total Tangible Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A, 
A4 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
2.7780 
0.6137 
0.4902 
0.5841 
0.3199 
0.9572 
0.9162 
1.0310 
2.5607 
0.8492 
1.3064 
0.8218 
1.3138 
0.6469 
1993-94 
2.2117 
0.7359 
0.4359 
0.7445 
0.3667 
0.8989 
0.6740 
1.2340 
1.9968 
0.8101 
1.3214 
0.6438 
1.2012 
0.4716 
1994-95 
2.3170 
0.8144 
0.4175 
0.7298 
0.6481 
0.9854 
0.6788 
1.0677 
2.4753 
0.7193 
2.2076 
0.8852 
1.4710 
0.7242 
1995-96 
1.2358 
0.4891 
0.4082 
0.3315 
0.4109 
0.5751 
0.3341 
0.6303 
2.3662 
1.0379 
1.7197 
0.8903 
1.3289 
0.6315 
1996-97 
0.5596 
0.2471 
0.1594 
0.0680 
0.1108 
0.2290 
0.1757 
0.4000 
0.8324 
0.7735 
0.5479 
0.5904 
0.6288 
0.1567 
Mean 
1.8204 
0.5800 
0.3822 
0.4916 
0.3713 
0.7291 
0.5510 
0.8726 
2.0463 
0.8380 
1.4206 
0.7663 
1.1887 
0.4880 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.8060 
0.1997 
0.1150 
0.2586 
0.1725 
0.2900 
0.6808 
0.3085 
0.6367 
0.1087 
0.5465 
0.1253 
0.2928 
0.6352 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.24 : Long-term Debt to Equity of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A, 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B< 
B, 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.5488 
-1.6459 
-1.0493 
-0.3799 
-0.9250 
-0.9098 
0.4411 
0.0621 
0.0551 
-0.2013 
-0.4862 
-1.3930 
-0.3927 
0.5391 
1993-94 
-0.2794 
-0.9187 
-0.7018 
-0.2734 
-0.5261 
-0.5399 
0.2485 
0.0680 
0.0103 
-0.1390 
-0.1880 
-0.6527 
-0.1803 
0.2541 
1994-95 
-0.4259 
-0.7643 
-1.3130 
-1.0912 
-1.6291 
-1.0447 
0.4189 
0.0609 
-5.7446 
-0.3688 
-1.1121 
-1.2404 
-1.6810 
2.0874 
1995-96 
-0.3433 
-0.7615 
-1.2280 
-0.9506 
-1.2269 
-0.9021 
0.3305 
0.1249 
-0.8880 
-0.4115 
-0.7125 
-0.5280 
-0.4830 
0.3445 
1996-97 
-0.3541 
-0.9699 
-1.0728 
-0.8114 
-1.1076 
-0.8632 
0.2746 
0.1550 
-0.5162 
-0.3326 
-0.5712 
-0.3943 
-0.3319 
0.2578 
Mean 
-0.3903 
-1.0121 
-1.0730 
-0.7013 
-1.0829 
-0.8519 
0.2697 
0.0942 
-1.4167 
-0.2906 
-0.6140 
-0.8417 
-0.6138 
0.5104 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0919 
0.3275 
0.2098 
0.3202 
0.3618 
0.1676 
0.3891 
0.0386 
2.1920 
0.1034 
0.3025 
0.3993 
0.5426 
1.1287 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.25 : Long-term Debt to Total Assets of Sample Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A
, 
A2 
A3 
A, 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B, 
B4 
B5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
0.2121 
0.6794 
0.6241 
0.2479 
0.3302 
0.4187 
0.1949 
0.0491 
0.0164 
0.1193 
0.0994 
0.2694 
0.1107 
0.0873 
1993-94 
0.2567 
0.7866 
0.7246 
0.3083 
0.4053 
0.4963 
0.2179 
0.0567 
0.0005 
0.1632 
0.1082 
0.3424 
0.1342 
0.1173 
1994-95 
0.8144 
0.8445 
1.8371 
1.6111 
1.9789 
1.4172 
0.4941 
0.0511 
0.7012 
0.4861 
1.1187 
0.9129 
0.6540 
0.3679 
1995-96 
0.8439 
0.8899 
2.1673 
1.7388 
2.4279 
1.6136 
0.6483 
0.0657 
0.4439 
0.6107 
1.0448 
0.4970 
0.5324 
0.3148 
1996-97 
1.1458 
1.9058 
2.5203 
1.9479 
2.6103 
2.0260 
0.5256 
0.0687 
0.6260 
0.6949 
1.2866 
0.5596 
0.6472 
0.3883 
Mean 
0.6546 
1.0212 
1.5747 
1.1708 
1.5505 
1.1944 
0.3445 
0.0583 
0.3576 
0.4148 
0.7315 
0.5163 
0.4157 
0.2195 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.3624 
0.4478 
0.7669 
0.7370 
0.9876 
0.6334 
0.7787 
0.0078 
0.2971 
0.2335 
0.5185 
0.2239 
0.2434 
0.3749 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
Table A-4.26 : Earnings before Interest & Taxes to Interest of Sample Mills 
Code of 
Group A & 
B Mills 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A, 
A, 
Mean 
SD 
B, 
B2 
B3 
B< 
Bs 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-1.5412 
-0.6471 
-0.9481 
-1.3616 
-1.5111 
-1.2018 
0.3488 
0.0000 
6.3008 
0.0350 
-2.0386 
-0.3450 
0.7904 
2.8584 
1993-94 
-3.4890 
-1.2783 
-1.0178 
-1.4991 
-2.2795 
-1.9127 
0.8937 
-6.5017 
-5.0978 
-2.9530 
-3.0681 
-1.2720 
-3.7785 
1.8235 
1994-95 
-2.6950 
-0.8919 
-0.9516 
-1.1635 
-1.9972 
-1.5398 
0.7002 
0.0000 
-5.6107 
-3.1850 
-2.6962 
-0.7147 
-2.4413 
1.9801 
1995-96 
-6.0187 
-2.0309 
-1.2363 
-2.1327 
-2.1369 
-2.7111 
1.6877 
-3.5847 
-2.8132 
-2.7266 
-6.1427 
-0.9871 
-3.2509 
3.2509 
1996-97 
-6.2730 
-2.6759 
-1.9234 
-2.3627 
-2.7380 
-3.1946 
1.5660 
-2.0209 
-7.4626 
^.3609 
-6.5676 
-1.5927 
-4.4009 
2.3503 
Mean 
^t.0034 
-1.5048 
-1.2154 
-1.7039 
-2.1325 
-2.1120 
0.9917 
-2.4215 
-2.9367 
-2.6381 
-4.0126 
-0.9823 
-2.6162 
1.0020 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.8575 
0.7498 
0.3693 
0.4624 
0.3982 
0.7384 
1.3739 
2.4449 
4.8508 
1.4505 
1.8733 
0.4323 
1.8207 
2.8400 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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Table A-4.27 : Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Total Debt of Sample 
Mills 
Mill 
Code 
A, 
A2 
A3 
A< 
A5 
Mean 
SD 
1992-93 
-0.3579 
-0.3176 
-0.3809 
-0.4107 
-0.2799 
-0.3494 
0.0462 
1993-94 
-0.5587 
-0.5139 
-0.5309 
-0.5577 
-0.4601 
-0.5243 
0.0363 
1994-95 
-0.7474 
-0.5843 
-0.6135 
-0.6311 
-0.5838 
-0.6320 
0.0604 
1995-96 
-0.9210 
-0.5936 
-0.6726 
-0.6853 
-0.6995 
-0.7144 
0.1096 
1996-97 
-1.0226 
-0.7269 
-0.7440 
-0.7524 
-0.7522 
-0.7996 
0.1119 
Mean 
-0.7215 
-0.5473 
-0.5884 
-0.6074 
-0.5551 
-0.6039 
0.0627 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2408 
0.1339 
0.1251 
0.1173 
0.1705 
0.1565 
0.1755 
5.6953 
0.7779 
0.3987 
0.1974 
0.1734 
1.1407 
2.3136 
10.0202 
0.0845 
-0.5788 
-0.4256 
-0.3697 
1.7461 
4.1429 
11.6381 
-0.1486 
-0.6097 
-0.6035 
-0.4466 
1.9659 
4.8390 
1.3185 
-0.5375 
-0.6456 
-0.6919 
-0.5216 
-0.2156 
0.7697 
0.9501 
-0.7997 
-0.7227 
-0.7882 
-0.6268 
-0.3975 
0.6766 
5.9244 
-0.1247 
-0.5911 
-0.5413 
-0.4276 
0.8479 
2.5434 
4.3688 
0.5450 
0.1075 
0.2094 
0.1529 
0.9823 
3.2189 
Source : Annual Report of BTMC 1992-93 & Provisional Accounts of BTMC Enterprises from 
1993-94 to 1996-97. 
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APPENDIX - 5 
Table A-5.1 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of A, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
1 
x i : 
A = 
X 2 : 
B = 
X 3 : 
c --
X 4 = 
D = 
X 5 : 
E = 
X 3 * 
F = 
V 9 
G = 
V 2 5 
H = 
v3, 
I = 
• v 3 5 
J = 
3articulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
 0.012x, 
= RE/TAxl00 
 0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTDxl00 
 0.006x4 
= NS/TAxlOO 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
-• 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
= 19.8927 V9 
- CA/CL 
= 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31' 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
-8.55 
-0.1026 
-18.34 
-0.2568 
-11.12 
-0.3670 
-35.79 
-0.2147 
59.92 
0.5992 ' 
-18.34 
-0,6052 
-0.5156 
-10.2567 
0.9015 
0.0042 
2.7780 
1.9838 
0.2860 
0.1390 
1993-94 
-64.63 
-0.7756 
-41.54 
-0.5816 
-32.28 
-1.0652 
-55.87 
-0.3352 
56.64 
0.5664 
-41.54 
-1.3708 
-1.2607 
-25.0787 
0.5343 
0.0025 
2.2117 
1.5794 
0.2938 
0.1428 
1994-95 
-110.76 
-1.3291 
-51.06 
-0.7148 
-37.24 
-1.2289 
-74.74 
-0.4484 
83.38 
0.8338 
-51.06 
-1.6850 
-1.0350 
-20.5889 
0.3650 
0.0017 
2.3170 
1.6546 
0.2334 
0.1134 
1995-96 
-124.61 
-1.4953 
-70.74 
-0.9904 
-60.66 
-2.0018 
-92.10 
-0.5526 
51.41 
0.5141 
-70.74 
-2.3344 
-1.4577 
-28.9976 
0.3174 
0.0015 
1.2358 
0.8825 
0.2031 
0.0987 
1996-97 
-153.84 
-1.8461 
-101.30 
-1.4182 
-87.38 
-2.8835 
-102.26 
-0.6136 
28.74 
0.2874 
-101.30 
-3.2429 
-1.7011 
-33.8395 
0.2379 
0.0011 
0.5596 
0.3996 
0.1402 
0.0681 
Altman's Z-score -0.342 -2.191 -2.887 -4.256 -6.474 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Saryanarayama's Z* Value -0.580 -2.497 -3.343 -4.589 -6.833 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 0.238 0.306 0.456 0.333 0.359 
Yadav's Y-score -8.130 -23.354 -18.819 -28.015 -33.371 
(G+H+l+J) 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.2 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of A2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
] 
x i : 
A = 
x2 = 
B = 
X 3 : 
c = 
X 4 = 
D = 
X 5 : 
E = 
x * 
A 3 
F = 
v9 
G = 
V 2 5 
H = 
V3> 
I = 
• v 3 5 
J = 
3articulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
 0.012x, 
RE/TA*100 
 0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTDxl00 
 0.006x4 
= NS/TAxl00 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
= 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
= 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V3I 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V3S 
1992-93 
-29.47 
-0.3535 
-15.30 
-02142 
-6.01 
-0.1983 
-31.76 
-0.1906 
40.06 
0.4006 
-15.30 
-0.5049 
-0.0921 
-1.8321 
0.5248 
0.0025 
0.6137 
0.4382 
0.3124 
0.1518 
1993-94 
-56.66 
-0.6799 
-25.86 
-0.3620 
-14.51 
-0.4788 
-51.39 
-0.3083 
50.30 
0.5030 
-25.86 
-0.8534 
-0.2123 
^1.2232 
0.3558 
0.0017 
0.7359 
0.5255 
0.2869 
0.1394 
1994-95 
-74.32 
-0.8918 
-19.85 
-0.2779 
-9.36 
-0.3089 
-58.43 
-0.3506 
53.90 
0.5390 
-19.85 
-0.6551 
-0.1414 
-2.8128 
0.2898 
0.0014 
0.8144 
0.5816 
0.3279 
0.1594 
1995-96 
-75.17 
-0.9020 
-26.74 
-0.3744 
-17.92 
-0.5914 
-59.36 
-0.3562 
30.74 
0.3074 
-26.74 
-0.8824 
-0.2851 
-5.6714 
0.3032 
0.0014 
0.4891 
0.3493 
0.3761 
0.1828 
1996-97 
-55.51 
-0.6661 
^14.04 
-0.6166 
-32.06 
-1.0580 
-72.69 
-0.4361 
18.52 
0.1852 
-44.04 
-1.4533 
-0.4277 
-8.5081 
0.3038 
0.0014 
0.2471 
0.1765 
0.3104 
0.1509 
Altaian's Z-score -0.556 -1.326 -1.290 -1.917 -2.592 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -0.863 -1.701 -1.636 -2.208 -2.987 
(A+B+F+D-E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y-score 
(G+H+I+J) 
0.307 0.375 0.346 0.291 0.395 
-1.240 -3.557 -2.070 -5.138 -8.179 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.3 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of A3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
1 
x i : 
A = 
x2 = 
B = 
X 3 : 
C = 
X4 = 
D = 
X 5 : 
E = 
x3* 
F = 
v 9 
G = 
v25 
H = 
v3, 
I = 
•V35 
J = 
Particulars 
- NWC/TAxlOO 
= 0.012x, 
 RE/TAxlOO 
= 0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
= 0.03 3x3 
=MVE/BVTDxlOO 
= 0.006x4 
- NS/TAxlOO 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
-- 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
= 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V3S 
1992-93 
-77.37 
-0.9281 
-23.97 
-0.3356 
-11.67 
-0.3851 
-38.09 
-0.2285 
41.00 
0.4100 
-23.97 
-0.7910 
-0.1395 
-2.7750 
0.1745 
0.0008 
0.4902 
0.3501 
0.0305 
0.0148 
1993-94 
-112.59 
-1.3511 
-28.46 
-0.3984 
-14.35 
-0.4736 
-53.09 
-0.3185 
39.48 
0.3948 
-28.46 
-0.9392 
-0.1585 
-3.1530 
0.0772 
0.0004 
0.4359 
0.3113 
0.0260 
0.0126 
1994-95 
-34.23 
-0.4108 
-29.03 
-0.4064 
-14.15 
-0.4670 
-61.35 
-0.3681 
37.53 
0.3753 
-29.03 
-0.9580 
-0.1575 
-3.1331 
0.2279 
0.0011 
0.4175 
0.2981 
0.0527 
0.0256 
1995-96 
-34.26 
-0.4111 
-32.85 
-0.4599 
-18.16 
-0.5993 
-67.26 
-0.4036 
36.16 
0.3616 
-32.85 
-1.0841 
-0.2050 
^ . 0 7 8 0 
0.2497 
0.0012 
0.4082 
0.2915 
0.0437 
0.0212 
1996-97 
-55.16 
-0.6619 
-^6.30 
-0.6482 
-30.46 
-1.0052 
-74.40 
-0.4464 
14.58 
0.1458 
-46.30 
-1.5279 
-0.3332 
-6.6282 
0.1343 
0.0006 
0.1594 
0.1138 
0.0736 
0.0358 
Altaian's Z-score 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
-1,467 -2.147 -1.277 -1.512 -2.616 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -1.873 -2.613 -1.768 -1.997 -3.139 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y-score 
(G+H+I+J) 
0.406 0.466 0.491 0.485 0.523 
-2.409 -2.829 -2.808 -3.764 -6.478 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.4 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of A4 
Particulars 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 
1. x, = NWC/TAxlOO -102.70 -150.23 -55.39 -75.33 -107.15 
A = 0.012x, -1.2324 -1.8028 -0.6447 -0.9040 -1.2858 
2. x2 - RE/TAxl00 -21.31 -28.12 -23.12 -37.81 -43.68 
B = 0.014x2 -0.2983 -0.3937 -0.3237 -0.5293 -0.6115 
3. x3 - EBIT/TAxlOO -12.29 -16.87 -12.43 -25.74 -30.69 
C = 0.033x3 -0.4056 -0.5567 -0.4102 -0.8494 -1.0128 
4. xA =MVE/BVTDxlOO -41.07 -55.77 -63.11 -68.53 -75.24 
D = 0.006x4 -0.2464 -0.3346 -0.3787 -0.4112 -0.4514 
5. x5 = NS/TAxlOO 40.07 58.67 60.26 27.27 5.64 
E = 0.010x5 0.4007 0.5867 0.6026 0.2727 0.564 
6. x3* = EBT/TAxlOO -21.31 -28.12 -23.12 -37.81 -43.68 
F = 0.033x3* -0.7032 -0.9280 -0.7630 -1.2477 -1.4414 
7. V9 = EBIT/TTA -0.1791 -0.2140 -0.1506 -0.3128 -0.3702 
G = 19.8927 V9 -3.5628 -4.2570 -2.9958 -6.2224 -7.3643 
8. V,s = CA/CL 0.2342 0.1236 0.2394 0.1904 0.1376 
H = 0.0047 V2S 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0006 
9. V,. = NS/TTA 0.5841 0.7445 0.7298 0.3315 0.0680 
I = 0.7141 V31 0.4171 0.5316 0.5212 0.2367 0.0486 
10. V35 = DA/TOE 0.1097 0.0727 0.1337 0.1031 0.1420 
J = 0.4860 V35 0.0533 0.0353 0.0650 0.0501 0.0690 
Altman's Z-score 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value 
(A-B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y-score 
(G+H+I+J) 
-1.782 
-2.080 
0.298 
-3.091 
-2.501 
-2.872 
0.371 
-3.690 
-1.155 
-1.508 
0.353 
-2.409 
-2.421 
-2.819 
0.398 
-5.935 
-2.798 
-3.227 
0.429 
-7.246 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
241 
Table A-5.5 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of A5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
Particulars 
X ! : 
A = 
x2 = 
B = 
X 3 = 
c = 
X 4 = 
D = 
X 5 = 
E = 
x * 
A 3 
F = 
v 9 
G = 
v25 
H = 
v3, 
I = 
•V35 
J -
- NWC/TAxlOO 
= 0.012x, 
 RE/TAxlOO 
= 0.014x2 
- EBIT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTD*100 
= 0.006x4 
= NS/TA*100 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
-- 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
= 0.0047 V2S 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V3<i 
1992-93 
-55.41 
-0.6649 
-17.43 
-0.2440 
-10.49 
-0.3462 
-27.99 
-0.1679 
19.48 
0.1948 
-17.43 
-0.5752 
-0.1723 
-3.4275 
0.4137 
0.0019 
0.3199 
0.2284 
0.0383 
0.0186 
1993-94 
-95.05 
-1.1406 
-32.36 
-0.4530 
-22.49 
-0.7422 
-46.01 
-0.2761 
24.99 
0.2499 
-32.36 
-1.0679 
-0.3301 
-6.5666 
0.2510 
0.0012 
0.3667 
0.2619 
0.0247 
0.0120 
1994-95 
-9.95 
-0.1194 
-28.31 
-0.3963 
-18.87 
-0.6227 
-58.38 
-0.3503 
51.76 
0.5176 
-28.31 
-0.9342 
-0.2362 
^ .6987 
1.9767 
0.0093 
0.6418 
0.4628 
0.1242 
0.0604 
1995-96 
-21.86 
-0.2623 
-31.94 
-0.4472 
-21.76 
-0.7181 
-69.95 
-0.4197 
33.58 
0.3358 
-31.94 
-1.0540 
-0.2662 
-5.2957 
0.4554 
0.0021 
0.4109 
0.2934 
0.0343 
0.0167 
1996-97 
-36.77 
-0.4412 
-35.50 
-0.497 
-26.00 
-0.858 
-75.22 
-0.4513 
9.36 
0.936 
-35.50 
-1.1715 
-0.3078 
-6.1230 
0.2968 
0.0014 
0.1108 
0.0791 
0.0561 
0.0273 
Altman's Z-score -1.228 -2.362 -0.971 -1.512 -1.312 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -1.457 -2.688 -1.283 -1.848 -1.626 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 0.229 0.326 0.312 0.336 0.314 
Yadav's Y-score -3.179 -6.292 -4.166 -4.983 -6.015 
(G+H+I+J) 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.6 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of B, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5-
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
] 
x i : 
A = 
X 2 : 
B = 
X 3 : 
c = 
V 
D = 
X 5 : 
E = 
X * 
X 3 
F = 
v 9 
G = 
v 2 5 
H = 
V 3 , 
I -
• v 3 5 
J = 
Particulars 
-NWC/TAxlOO 
 0.012x, 
= RE/TAxlOO 
 0.014x2 
= EBIT/TA^lOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTE»<100 
 0.006x4 
= NS/TA*100 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
0.0047 V25 
- NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
28.96 
0.3475 
0.10 
0.0014 
0.10 
0.0033 
569.53 
3.4172 
40.51 
0.4051 
0.10 
0.0033 
0.0025 
0.0497 
4.2246 
0.0199 
1.0310 
0.7362 
0.3676 
0.1787 
1993-94 
44.76 
0.5371 
-8.48 
-0.1187 
-7.35 
-0.2426 
1002.02 
6.0121 
51.53 
0.5153 
-8.48 
-0.2798 
-0.1759 
-3.4991 
17.9148 
0.0842 
1.2340 
0.8812 
0.6046 
0.2938 
1994-95 
50.25 
0.603 
-3.80 
-0.0532 
-3.80 
-0.1254 
1163.81 
6.9829 
38.96 
0.3896 
-3.80 
-0.1254 
-0.1042 
-2.0728 
24.9544 
0.1173 
1.0677 
0.7624 
1.0795 
0.5246 
1995-96 
25.76 
0.3091 
-10.01 
-0.1401 
-7.82 
-0.2581 
131.85 
0.7911 
25.40 
0.2540 
-10.01 
-0.3303 
-0.1941 
-3.8612 
1.7726 
0.0083 
0.6303 
0.4501 
1.0704 
0.5202 
1996-97 
18.95 
0.2274 
-14.86 
-0.2080 
-9.94 
-0.3280 
95.01 
0.5701 
16.49 
0.1649 
-14.86 
-0.4904 
-0.2411 
-4.7961 
1.4762 
0.0069 
0.4000 
0.2856 
1.2050 
0.5856 
Altman's Z-score 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
4.175 6.703 7.797 0.956 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y-score 
(G+H+I+J) 
0.426 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value 4.175 6.666 7.797 0.884 0.264 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
0.000 0.037 0.000 0.72 0.162 
0.985 -2.240 -0.669 -2.883 -3.918 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.7 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of B, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
1 
x i : 
A = 
X 2 = 
B -
X 3 : 
c = 
X 4 : 
D = 
X 5 : 
E = 
x3* 
F = 
V 9 
G = 
v 2 5 
H = 
V 3 , 
I -
•
V 3 5 
J = 
Particulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
 0.012x, 
= RE/TAxl00 
= 0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTDxlOO 
 0.006x4 
= NS/TAxl00 
= 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
- EBIT/TTA 
= 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
-- 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
9.42 
0.1130 
7.08 
0.0991 
8.42 
0.2779 
77.79 
0.4667 
138.10 
1.3810 
7.08 
0.2336 
0.1561 
3.1053 
1.2571 
0.0059 
2.5607 
1.8286 
0.1417 
0.0689 
1993-94 
-11.30 
-0.1356 
-19.71 
-0.2759 
-16.48 
-0.5438 
8.45 
0.0507 
116.41 
1.1641 
-19.71 
-0.6504 
-0.2826 
-5.6217 
0.7868 
0.0037 
1.9968 
1.4259 
0.0466 
0.0226 
1994-95 
52.76 
0.6331 
-14.24 
-0.1994 
-12.09 
-0.3990 
-14.86 
-0.0892 
87.05 
0.8705 
-14.24 
-0.4699 
-0.3438 
-6.8391 
5.3838 
0.0253 
2.4753 
1.7676 
0.5456 
0.2652 
1995-96 
-3.84 
-0.0461 
-31.25 
-0.4375 
-23.06 
-0.7610 
-53.75 
-0.3225 
130.70 
1.3070 
-31.25 
-1.0313 
-0.4175 
-8.3052 
0.9211 
0.0043 
2.3662 
1.6897 
0.0677 
0.0329 
1996-97 
-46.96 
-0.5635 
-68.68 
-0.9615 
-60.56 
-1.9985 
-79.97 
-0.4798 
45.10 
0.4510 
-68.68 
-2.2664 
-0.1177 
-22.2341 
0.4725 
0.0022 
0.8324 
0.5944 
0.1515 
0.0736 
Altman's Z-score 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
2.338 0.260 0.816 -0.260 -3.552 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value 2.294 0.153 0.745 -0.530 -3.820 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y score 
(G+H+l+J) 
0.044 0.107 0.071 0.270 0.268 
5.009 -4.170 -4.781 -6.578 -21.564 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.8 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of B3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
1 
x
. 
A = 
x2 
B = 
X3 
c = 
V 
D = 
X5 
E = 
x3* 
F = 
v9 
G = 
V 2 5 
H = 
V 3 . 
I = 
•
V 3 5 
J = 
Particulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
0.012x, 
= RE/TAxlOO 
0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTDxlOO 
 0.006x4 
= NS/TA><100 
= 0.010x5 
- EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
 19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
-- 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V3] 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
-112.37 
-1.3484 
-7.22 
-0.1011 
0.26 
0.0086 
-39.87 
-0.2392 
64.27 
0.6427 
-7.22 
-0.2383 
0.0035 
0.0696 
0.1779 
0.0008 
0.8492 
0.6064 
0.0623 
0.0303 
1993-94 
-176.43 
-2.1172 
-35.23 
-0.4932 
-26.32 
-0.8686 
-57.88 
-0.3473 
72.82 
0.7282 
-35.23 
-1.1626 
-0.2928 
-5.8450 
0.0542 
0.0003 
0.8101 
0.5785 
0.0463 
0.0225 
1994-95 
-146.11 
-1.7533 
-27.08 
-0.3791 
-20.61 
-0.6801 
-60.97 
-0.3658 
56.49 
0.5649 
-27.08 
-0.8936 
-0.2624 
-5.2198 
0.1281 
0.0006 
0.7193 
0.5137 
0.1408 
0.0684 
1995-96 
-143.52 
-1.7222 
-24.45 
-0.3423 
-17.89 
-0.5904 
-64.56 
-0.3874 
77.22 
0.7722 
-24.45 
-0.8069 
-0.2405 
^1.7842 
0.1497 
0.0007 
1.0379 
0.7412 
0.0779 
0.0379 
1996-97 
-196.30 
-2.3556 
-47.62 
-0.6667 
-38.73 
-1.2781 
-72.27 
-0.4336 
59.29 
0.5929 
-47.62 
-1.5715 
-0.5054 
-10.0538 
0.1060 
0.0005 
0.7735 
0.5524 
0.0638 
0.0310 
Altman's Z-score -1.037 -3.098 -2.613 -2.270 -4.141 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -1.284 -3.392 -2.827 -2.487 -4.434 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 0.247 0.294 0.214 0.217 0.293 
Yadav's Y-score 0.707 -5.244 -4.637 -4.004 -9.470 
(G+H+I+J) 
Source : Tables A-4.3. A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.9 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of B4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
x i 
A • 
x2 
B = 
X 3 
c = 
X 4 : 
D = 
X 5 
E = 
x3* 
F = 
v9 
G = 
V 2 5 
H = 
v3, 
I = 
•
V 3 5 
J = 
Particulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
= 0.012x, 
= RE/TAxl00 
0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTT>xlOO 
0.006x4 
= NS/TAxlOO 
0.01 Ox, 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
 0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
-47.25 
-0.567 
-19.20 
-0.2688 
-12.88 
-0.4250 
-19.74 
-0.1184 
68.80 
0.6880 
-19.20 
-0.6336 
-0.2446 
^1.8658 
0.4955 
0.0023 
1.3064 
0.9329 
0.0752 
0.0365 
1993-94 
-80.33 
-0.9640 
-31.28 
-0.4379 
-23.59 
-0.7785 
^12.56 
-0.2554 
72.78 
0.7278 
-31.28 
-1.0322 
-0.4283 
-8.5200 
0.3543 
0.0017 
1.3214 
0.9436 
0.0811 
0.0394 
1994-95 
-23.26 
-0.2791 
-29.79 
-0.4179 
-21.73 
-0.7171 
-60.35 
-0.3621 
149.20 
1.4920 
-29.79 
-0.9831 
-0.3215 
-6.3955 
0.5756 
0.0027 
2.2076 
1.5764 
0.0937 
0.0455 
1995-96 
-66.02 
-0.7922 
-32.97 
-0.4616 
-28.36 
-0.9359 
-69.19 
-0.4151 
99.61 
0.9961 
-32.97 
-1.0880 
-0.4896 
-9.7395 
0.3856 
0.0018 
1.7197 
1.2280 
0.0665 
0.0323 
1996-97 
-124.27 
-1.4912 
-70.81 
-0.9913 
-61.45 
-2.0279 
-78.82 
-0.4729 
36.44 
0.3644 
-70.81 
-2.3367 
-0.9236 
-18.3729 
0.2090 
0.0010 
0.5479 
0.3913 
0.0882 
0.0429 
Altaian's Z-score 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
-0.691 -1.708 -0.284 -1.609 -4.619 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -0.900 -1.962 -0.550 -1.761 -4.928 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 
Yadav's Y-score 
(G+H+l+J) 
0.209 0.254 0.266 0.152 0.309 
-3.894 -7.535 -4.771 -8.477 -17.938 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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Table A-5.10 : Calculation of Financial Health Scores of B5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
x i 
A = 
X 2 
B = 
X 3 
c = 
X 4 : 
D = 
X 5 
E = 
x * 
3 
F = 
v9 
G = 
V 2 5 
H = 
V 3 . 
I = 
•
V 3 5 
J = 
Particulars 
= NWC/TAxlOO 
- 0.012x, 
= RE/TAxl00 
0.014x2 
= EBIT/TAxlOO 
 0.033x3 
=MVE/BVTD><100 
0.006x4 
- NS/TAxlOO 
 0.010x5 
= EBT/TAxlOO 
= 0.033x3* 
= EBIT/TTA 
19.8927 V9 
= CA/CL 
0.0047 V25 
= NS/TTA 
0.7141 V31 
= DA/TOE 
0.4860 V35 
1992-93 
-47.96 
-0.5755 
-12.11 
-0.1695 
-3.11 
-0.1026 
-17.34 
-0.1040 
51.34 
0.5134 
-12.11 
-03996 
-0.0497 
-0.9887 
0.4329 
0.0020 
0.8218 
0.5868 
0.2126 
0.1033 
1993-94 
-81.05 
-0.9726 
-25.81 
-0.3613 
-14.45 
-0.4769 
-36.97 
-0.2218 
46.51 
0.4651 
-25.81 
-0.8517 
-0.2000 
-3.9785 
0.2470 
0.0012 
0.6438 
0.4597 
0.1557 
0.0757 
1994-95 
-48.06 
-0.5767 
-17.85 
-0.2499 
-7.44 
-0.2455 
-44.46 
-0.2668 
64.80 
0.6480 
-17.85 
-0.5891 
-0.1016 
-2.0211 
0.3461 
0.0016 
0.8852 
0.6321 
0.2741 
0.1332 
1995-96 
-106.58 
-1.2790 
-23.67 
-0.3314 
-11.76 
-0.3881 
-52.16 
-0.3130 
66.20 
0.6620 
-23.67 
-0.7811 
-0.1581 
-3.1450 
0.1850 
0.0009 
0.8903 
0.6358 
0.1644 
0.0799 
1996-97 
-142.84 
-1.7141 
-31.95 
-0.4473 
-19.63 
-0.6478 
-62.68 
-0.3761 
41.69 
0.4169 
-31.95 
-1.0543 
-0.2780 
-5.5302 
0.1620 
0.0008 
0.5904 
0.4216 
0.2247 
0.1092 
Altman's Z-score -0.438 -1.568 -0.691 -1.650 -2.768 
(A+B+C+D+E) 
Satyanarayana's Z* Value -0.735 -1.943 -1.035 -2.043 -3.175 
(A+B+F+D+E) 
Z-score - Z* Value 0.297 0.375 0.344 0.393 0.407 
Yadav's Yscore -0.297 -3.442 -1.254 -2.428 -4.999 
(G+H+l+J) 
Source : Tables A-4.3, A-4.15, A-4.13, A-4.27, A-4.22, A-4.15, A-4.14, A-4.1, A-4.23 
and A-4.5 in Appendix-4. 
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